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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION POLICY
DEVELOPMENT: STRUCTURES, PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES
by
Liguang Liu
Florida International University, 2011
Miami, Florida
Professor Allan Rosenbaum, Major Professor
Climate change is one of the most important and urgent issues of our time.
Since 2006, China has overtaken the United States as the world’s largest greenhouse gas
(GHG) emitter. China’s role in an international climate change solution has gained
increased attention. Although much literature has addressed the functioning, performance,
and implications of existing climate change mitigation policies and actions in China,
there is insufficient literature that illuminates how the national climate change mitigation
policies have been formulated and shaped. This research utilizes the policy network
approach to explore China’s climate change mitigation policy making by examining how
a variety of government, business, and civil society actors have formed networks to
address environmental contexts and influence the policy outcomes and changes.
The study is qualitative in nature. Three cases are selected to illustrate structural
and interactive features of the specific policy network settings in shaping different policy
arrangements and influencing the outcomes in the Chinese context. The three cases
include the regulatory evolution of China’s climate change policy making; the country’s
involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) activity, and China’s
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exploration of voluntary agreement through adopting the Top-1000 Industrial Energy
Conservation Program. The historical analysis of the policy process uses both primary
data from interviews and fieldwork, and secondary data from relevant literature.
The study finds that the Chinese central government dominates domestic
climate change policy making; however, expanded action networks that involve actors at
all levels have emerged in correspondence to diverse climate mitigation policy
arrangements. The improved openness and accessibility of climate change policy network
have contributed to its proactive engagement in promoting mitigation outcomes.
In conclusion, the research suggests that the policy network approach provides a
useful tool for studying China’s climate change policy making process. The involvement
of various types of state and non-state actors has shaped new relations and affected the
policy outcomes and changes. In addition, through the cross-case analysis, the study
challenges the “fragmented authoritarianism” model and argues that this once-influential
model is not appropriate in explaining new development and changes of policy making
processes in contemporary China.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Climate change has risen to dominate environmental and development agendas.
As a result of its rapid economic development and high dependency on carbon-intensive
energy sources, China has surpassed the United States as the largest greenhouse gas
(GHG) emitter in the world. Since China is still in the process of industrialization and
urbanization, given the country’s current technological capacity and energy supply mode,
there is no indication that its GHG emissions will decrease in the near future.
Consequently, China’s role in a climate change solution has gained increased
international attention.
The international community has established the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and created the Kyoto Protocol during the
1990s to coordinate international actions and meet the long-term GHG emission
reduction targets. As a developing country, China has no legally-binding commitments to
reduce GHG emissions for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol from 2008
to 2012. However, the country is facing more domestic and international pressures than
ever before to address climate change issues. Domestically, China is vulnerable to
climate change which will pose great negative impacts on China’s development pattern
(NDRC 2004; 2007), and the rapid domestic economic growth has been confronting
serious environment and resource constraints. Internationally, China’s commitment in
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mitigation has become more important because of its increased share in the world’s GHG
emissions and its growing economic influence around the world.
What lies behind the international climate change regime negotiation is the less
eye-catching fact that China has made remarkable and continuous progress in combating
climate change. The efforts include establishing and restructuring an inter-ministerial
coordination committee, developing relevant climate change policies, and initiating
mitigation and adaptation activities. Dozens of policies at the national level have been
adopted to implement international climate change mitigation agreements, improve
energy efficiency, diversify its energy sources and reduce polluting emissions. In the
following, these policies are categorized as climate change mitigation policies. Examples
of climate change mitigation policies at national level include China’s National Climate
Change Program developed in mid-2007 and a number of policy instruments, measures,
and programs having been developed since 2004 (IEA 2010; Leggett et al. 2008). With
the institutional development and policy implementation, a variety of state, business, and
civil society actors have formed networks to develop stable relationships between actors
and contribute to the mitigation of carbon emissions.
Whereas it remains a question what commitment China will accept in the future
climate regime, the understanding of the working mechanism of how China has
formulated and processed these current climate change mitigation policies can definitely
provide some useful indications of what the future will bring. Employing the policy
network approach, this study investigates the forces that drive China’s climate change
policy development and the impacts of the actor networks on the policy outcomes.
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This chapter introduces the background, research objectives, research
significance, and the methods that have been adopted in the study. Section 1.2 provides
background information about China’s climate change policy development and action.
This leads to a presentation of the objectives and significance of the research in sections
of 1.3 and 1.4. Following a brief description of research methodology in Section 1.5, the
structure of this dissertation is introduced in Section 1.6.
1.2 Research Background
Global climate change threatens the sustainability of human civilization, and
remains one of the most important and urgent issues of our time. Internationally, the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was established
in 1992 to form policy architecture to address the issue. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol,
initiated at the Third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 3), was signed to
mandate developed countries to achieve quantified emission reduction targets during the
first commitment period of 2008-2012. The Protocol also allows for three market-based
mechanisms, in which industrialized countries can cooperate with other counterparts,
including developing countries, to trade surplus emission reduction credits and achieve
their commitment targets with lower costs. These three flexibility mechanisms include
the International Emission Trading (IET), the Joint Implementation (JI), and the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM). Although currently there has been no quantified
emission reduction commitment for developing countries, many developing countries
have initiated policies and taken actions to mitigate their carbon emissions and adapt to
future climate impacts. The international community is working intensely to negotiate a
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new climate change regime, which would be more comprehensive than the Kyoto
Protocol and with stronger commitments for more countries.
Over the past three decades, China’s market-oriented reform has brought
remarkable economic growth. The rapid economic growth not only gives China a heavy
burden to restructure its energy supply and protect the environment, but also exerts an
increasing share of responsibility in mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. China’s
share in the global energy-related CO2 emissions increased from 10.6% in 1990 to 20.6%
in 2006 (EIA 2009). Since 2006, China has overtaken the United States as the world’s
largest GHG emitter (EIA 2008; Heggelund 2007; Gallagher 2007) and it is estimated the
growing trend will continue in the coming decades (Levine and Aden 2008). In addition,
China has played a major and influential role in forming the developing countries’
position in the international climate change negotiations (Bjørkum 2005).
China’s political regime has also experienced significant changes with the
economic reform. On the one hand, the policy making is still highly state-led, in which
most issues are considered and discussed among elites within party and government
organizations (Peng 2003; Brown 2010); on the other hand, there has been a progressive
decline of the state control over economy, with powers devolved towards “groups, new or
reformed institutions, households and perhaps even individuals” (Saich 2004, 223), and
meanwhile lower levels of the state in general enjoy greater financial freedom from
higher levels for decision-making within their jurisdictions. Over time, greater social
mobility and interaction among these actors affect outcomes and changes of public policy
development. With the transition from planned economy to market economy, the role of
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government in China has been experiencing continued transformations. How has the
policy been shaped and evolved in China to address the climate change challenges?
In climate change policy discussions, “mitigation” and “adaptation” are two
important terms. Mitigation is defined as “an anthropogenic intervention to reduce the
sources or enhance the sinks of greenhouse gases” (IPCC TAR 2001). Examples include
promoting the use of renewable energies, enhancing industrial energy efficiencies, and
expanding forest to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Adaptation refers to the
“adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic
stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities” (Op
cit.). Adaptation aims at reducing vulnerability to climate change. Examples include
defending against sea level rise, changing patterns of land use, and developing drought
tolerant crop varieties. Mitigation tackles the causes of climate change, while adaptation
deals with the effects of the phenomenon. Both have extensive economic, social and
environmental implications. For many years, mitigation options have dominated the
international climate policy discussions, but in recent years, adaptation has become an
equally important topic. Although experts believe mitigation and adaptation strategies
can and should be pursued simultaneously and in coordination, most of the current
international cooperation and negotiations are oriented towards mitigation policy
development and implementation. This study concentrates on the mitigation approach of
China’s climate change policy.
As a matter of fact, the importance of climate change mitigation action has been
echoed by a series of climate-specific and climate-related policies endorsed and
implemented by the Chinese central government (Gallagher 2008; NDRC 2007;
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Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008). Since 1996, under the umbrella of climate change
mitigation policy, China has adopted 27 policies and measures to address climate change
impacts, as shown by the International Energy Agency data (IEA 2010). These policies
and measures are taken in various forms. Some are regulatory instruments promulgated
by the State Council or its affiliated ministries; some are formulated and approved by the
National People’s Congress as laws. Furthermore, the voluntary agreement, which
involves some agreements between government and industry to achieve environmental
objectives beyond compliance to regulated obligations, has emerged as a pragmatic and
flexible approach to encourage energy-saving and emission reduction actions in industrial
sectors. A large amount of literature has dealt with the evaluation of these mitigation
policies and tried to predict the policy trends; however, the conclusions and suggestions
of these studies often differ significantly, mainly because there is no consensus regarding
the country’s mitigative capacity, and a realistic, agreed-upon baseline of carbon
emissions China does not seem to exist. Simultaneously, China’s arguments of its status
as a developing country and its refusal to implement a quantified GHG emission
reduction commitment in climate negotiations have intensified the concerns.
Given that the existing literature on China’s climate change mitigation policy
primarily focuses on the assessment of domestic mitigation policy performance and the
analysis of policy potentials and prospects, there is a paucity of publications on how the
existing mitigation policies have been formulated and developed, and why they are
processed in such manners. This study will attempt to fill in this gap by analyzing
China’s climate change mitigation policy making process through case studies. Three
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representative cases are selected from the population of mitigation policies or programs
that have been adopted by the Chinese central government and implemented nationwide.
Policy development can be convoluted process and frequently exists in a
constantly changing and specific political environment. Within this process, a range of
actors from government, business and civil society shape relations and organize their
interactions toward achieving collective goals. The policy network approach captures
such main features by conceptualizing policy making as a process through which a
variety of independent and interdependent actors form networks to address the
environmental context and determine the policy outcomes and change.
Given that an expanded network of actors has emerged in China’s climate
change policy process, this study employs the Adam and Kriesi’s policy network
framework (Adam and Kriesi, 2007) as an analytic toolbox to examine the country’s
climate change policy development and investigate the influences of actor networks to
policy outcomes and change. Such an arrangement is consistent in logic with some most
important literature that focuses on the roles of the structures and interactions of public
and private actors in explaining Chinese economic and energy policy processes
(Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Saich 2004).
1.3 Research Objectives
The central research objectives of this study are to gain a better understanding
of the nature of the process of China’s climate change mitigation policy making and
implementation, and of the role and influence of the state and non-state actor networks
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involved in the process. To achieve these objectives, the answers to the following
research questions are sought.
Q1. How do the policy networks influence the proactiveness of developing
climate change mitigation policies in China?
Q2. How does the political reform influence the choices of innovative
mitigation policy tools, such as market-based measures and voluntary agreements?
Q3. How are the non-state actors involved in China’s climate change policy
making process?
Q4. Under the rapidly changing international and domestic contexts, how does
China arrange its institutions to organize and coordinate climate change mitigation
actions?
On the basis of insights from the initial field study and the understanding of
policy network theory, four hypotheses were suggested to predict the possible outcomes
of the research questions.
Hypothesis 1: Increasing interaction between government, business, and civil
society actors will increase the likelihood of China’s taking a more proactive approach to
develop climate change mitigation policy.
Hypothesis 2: More fragmentation in the distribution of regulative power will
increase the likelihood of China’s utilizing more innovative policy instruments and
measures.
Hypothesis 3: Decreasing political control in policy development and
implementation will encourage other actors, in particular non-state actors, to exert greater
effort in shaping mitigation policy.
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Hypothesis 4: Increasing demand for shared responsibilities among ministries
and provincial governments will increase the likelihood of stronger coordination by the
central government.
Exploring dynamics of China’s climate change mitigation policy development
opens a window to a better understanding of the policy making process in contemporary
China. Among many models that have been used to analyze the Chinese policy process,
the fragmented authoritarianism model is the most influential and frequently referred one.
The model, developed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) and through cases studies of
China’s energy policy development, argues that the Chinese political system, though no
longer totalitarian, is still authoritarian; and the authority has been fragmented both
horizontally and vertically to the lower-level administrative units, making the policy
process “disjointed, protracted and incremental” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988;
Lieberthal 1992). The fragmented authoritarian model is taken as the most influential
model through which to understand Chinese politics and policy process; however, recent
studies show that the fragmented authoritarianism model cannot well explain the
fundamental changes in Chinese policy development that has happened over the past
decade (Lema and Ruby 2007; Wang 2006; Yu 2008; Mertha 2008). Does the generic
fragmented authoritarianism model still capture the main features of China’s climate
change mitigation policy development? By generalizing empirical findings from the three
cases of different climate change mitigation policy arrangements and through a historical
and institutional tracing of some large scale shifts in China’s climate change mitigation
policy development, this study also tests the validity of the fragmented authoritarianism
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model in contemporary China and, through the use of the policy network approach,
provides an improved understanding of the policy making process in contemporary China.
1.4 Significance of the Research
The study has much academic and practical significance. First, this study will
improve our understanding of China’s climate change policy making process under its
unique political and institutional circumstances. Due to lack of study on the domestic
climate policy process issues, debates and disputes have not been mitigated with regard to
the evaluation of Chinese climate change policy performance. The study on China’s
policy making process will provide useful insights for domestic policy innovation and
international climate regime negotiations.
Second, although the policy network approach has become one of promising
theoretical frameworks to simplify the complexity of the policy process, much remains to
be done to enhance its explanatory power and move from a general, relatively simple
framework to a denser, more logically interconnected framework or theory (Borzel 1998;
Sabatier 2007b). This study will contribute to the development of the approach by
generating a set of logically interrelated propositions and empirically testing the validity
of these propositions.
Third, the study will provide an empirical application of the policy network
approach in the Chinese context. The applications of the policy network theory and
approach have largely been limited to the liberal democracies for which it was originally
developed. However, the exploration of applying this approach to study Chinese policy
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process has begun, as shown in the journal papers by Li et al. (2003) and Zheng et al.
(2010). This study will continue the discussion on the usefulness of such application.
Last but not least, with the transition towards market-based economy and the
rise to the position of a major economy on the global stage, the political system and
governance in China are under continuous changes. The study will promote theoretical
discussions and gain a better understanding of dynamics of policy making process in
contemporary China, thus providing useful indications of future policy trends.
1.5 Overview of Methodology
The study is qualitative and inductive in nature. The historical development of
China’s climate change mitigation policy and action will be analyzed, as well as its
relevance with policy outcomes. The case study approach is used to illuminate structural
and interactive features of the specific policy network settings in shaping different policy
arrangements and influencing the outcomes in the Chinese context. Three cases, from the
pool of adopted climate mitigation policies, are selected to interpret the features of the
policy processes. The three cases include the development of China’s national climate
change strategy; China’s involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)
regime; and the initiation of a voluntary industrial efficiency program, i.e., the Top-1000
Industrial Energy Conservation Program.
The policy network analytical framework is adopted to guide the empirical data
collection and analysis, and the subsequent interpretation. Informative data are gained
from literature, interviews and field study. The detailed description of research design
and methods will be provided in Chapter 3.
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1.6 Outline of the Dissertation
This research consists of nine chapters. Following this introductory chapter,
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on global climate change politics, China’s political
regime and policy process, policy process theories, in particular the policy network
approach to be employed in the study. Chapter 3 describes the design of the research and
methodologies used for data collection, measurement and analysis. Three cases, including
one generic case and two nested cases about specific mitigation policy arrangements have
been selected to address the research questions and to test the relevant hypotheses. The
data come from governmental documents, scholarly journals and books, site visits,
observations, and interviews. The fieldwork and some related interviews were taken in
two Chinese cities of Beijing and Shenyang from November 2009 to February 2010.
Chapter 4 provides a historical overview of China’s climate change mitigation
policy development. It provides a timeline for the first generic case and sets a boarder
context for the other two nested cases. Chapters 5 to 7 contain the findings from the three
cases. The first case in Chapter 5 focuses on the regulatory evolution and network
development in China’s climate change mitigation policy making. The time period ranges
from 1988 to the present and will be divided into four phases. The second case in Chapter
6 focuses on China’s involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) regime,
a market scheme under the Kyoto Protocol that allows China to initiate carbon reduction
projects and trade certified credits in the global carbon market. The formal rule for
initiating the scheme in China was issued in June 2004 and revised in October 2005.
Chapter 7 presents the third case, which highlights China’s initiation of a voluntary
public-private agreement: the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program. The
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program, modeled on international sectoral target-setting programs, is a voluntary,
mitigation-related program implemented since March 2006. The industries included in
the program are large-scaled enterprises from nine energy-intensive sectors. The program
requires provincial governments to sign contracts with local enterprises and oversee the
enterprises to reach the energy efficiency goals. Chapters 5 to 7 describe the formation
and implementation of mitigation policies in the areas of concern, and examine the
interrelations between policy environmental context, actor networks and policy outcomes
and changes. The three cases are framed by the policy network approach introduced in
Chapter 2.
Chapters 8 and 9 analyze the results and present the conclusions. Chapter 8
draws together findings of the review studies and the three case studies to verify the
raised hypotheses and examine the appropriateness of the fragmented authoritarianism
model in depicting China’s policy process. The final chapter, Chapter 9, lists the overall
conclusions, the limitations of the research, and the recommendations for future research.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This literature review covers the topics of public policy process, global climate
change governance, China’s political regime change, and relevant theories of the policy
network approach. It is divided into two main parts. Sections 2.1 to 2.3 constitute the first
part. Section 2.1 presents selected research on the policy process and the relevant theories.
It also explains when the policy network approach is taken in this study to guide the
investigation. Section 2.2 focuses on the literature of China’s policy process and political
regime change because of reforms it has experienced, as well as reviews of the
fragmented authoritarianism model. Section 2.3 addresses the topic of climate change
regime and governance, highlighting the impacts of international climate change
governance and China’s efforts in taking climate change mitigation actions.
The second part reviews literature related to policy network concept and theory.
Section 2.4 reviews literature of policy network theory, as well as the progress on
enhancing its explanatory functions. Subsequently, an explanatory framework built on
discussions of policy network is developed in Section 2.5. Building connections between
contextual factors, policy networks and policy outcomes, this framework will be applied
to guide the empirical study and interpret the related results. Next, in Section 2.6, several
hypotheses are suggested and will be tested through case studies. Finally, Section 2.7
summarizes the chapter.
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2.1 Theories of Public Policy Process
2.1.1 Public Policy and Policy Process
There are various definitions of “public policy”. The term always refers to “the
actions of government and the intentions that determine those actions” (Cochran et al.
1999, 1). Thomas Dye (2005, 1) defines public policy as “whatever the government
chooses to do or not to do” and policy analysis is to describe and explain causes and
consequences of government activity (Op. cit., 4). Cochran et al. (1999, 1-2) characterize
public policy as “an intentional course of action followed by a government institution or
official for resolving an issue of public concern.” It consists of “political decisions for
implementing programs to achieve societal goals” (Cochran and Malone 1995, 1). Peters
(1999, 4) adds that public policy is the “sum of government activities, whether acting
directly or through agents, as it has an influence on the life of citizens.” Seeking to
emphasize the dynamic, interdependent relationship between government and citizens,
Gerston (2004, 7) defines public policy as “the combination of basic decisions,
commitments, and actions made by those who hold or affect government positions of
authority.” Although there is no consensus on the precise definition of public policy, all
the variants of definition imply that public policy is the output of the government and
firmly grounded in politics. Birkland (2001) suggests in studying policy issues, the
researchers should “look at the broader sweep of politics, not simply the written laws and
rules themselves.”
Policy process is “the process through which the policy is formed” (Gupta
2001). It has a “perpetual, dynamic, and evolutionary quality” (Gerston 2004, 6). In this
process of policy making, “problems are conceptualized and brought to government for
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solution” and “governmental institutions formulate alternatives and select policy
solutions; and those solutions get implemented, evaluated and revised” (Sabatier 2007a,
3). The policy cycle model provides a similar understanding. Under this approach, the
policy making process is segmented into series of continuous stages, such as agenda
setting, policy formulation, policy adaptation, policy implementation, policy evaluation,
and policy change (Gupta 2001). However, most of the time, the process is not as neatly
segmented as the policy cycle model suggests.
Other scholars also explain the complexity of understanding the policy process.
According to Sabatier (2007a, 3-4), an extremely complex set of elements interacts over
time in the process of public policy making. These complicating factors include:
hundreds of state and non-state actors involved, time span of a decade or more,
interrelationship of different policy arrangements, and possible technical and legal
involvement. Birkland (2001) points out that structural and historical factors influence the
policy making and constitute the environment in which public policy is made. These
environmental factors are not fixed in time, but the change in environment is rather slow.
Mol et al. (2001) use the term “policy culture” to describe politico-institutional factors
that influence policy making and implementation. Further, accepting the irrational nature
of policy process, Gerston (2004, 7-15) argues the interaction of key ingredients of policy
process, such as institutions, actor, issues, resources and political regime, has made
policy making a challenging process.
2.1.2 Models of Public Policy Process
In explaining the policy making process, “the emphasis is much more on the
unfolding than on the authoritative decision, with attention devoted to the structure,
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context, constraints and dynamics of the process, as well as to the actual decisions and
events that occur” (Schlarger 2007). To simplify the situation and develop general
concepts that apply to more than one case or problem, policy analysts have developed a
number of theories and models to study the policy process. Easton (1965) provides a
model that views policy process as the product of a system, influenced by and influencing
the environment in which it operates. The policy environment contains the features of
structural, social, political and economic systems. As the input of the policy making
system, societal demands involve public opinion, interest groups, mass media, political
parties, and community elites. It is the political system within government that translates
the societal demands into specific policy outcomes, consisting of laws, regulations and
other policy arrangements. However, the major criticism of the Easton’s model is that it
treats the internal workings of political system as a black box and does not provide
further explanation (Birkland 2001, 221).
Related to Easton’s system model is the most commonly-used policy cycle
model, also termed as stages heuristic (Jones 1970). The model represents the policy
process as a cycle, or series, of linearly connected stages, i.e., agenda setting, policy
formulation, decision-making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. According
to Sabatier (2007a, 6-7), the policy cycle approach served a useful purpose in the 1970s
and early 1980s and stimulated some excellent research within specific stages,
particularly, agenda setting and policy implementation. However, the model is subject to
some criticisms, such as lack of causal drivers, oversimplification of practical interacting
process, and possible inaccurate description of the stages.
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Over the past three decades, more sophisticated and useful models and
frameworks have been developed or extensively modified by political scientists to study
the policy process. Some representative models include Kingdon’s multiple streams
metaphor (Kingdon 1995), Ostrom and her colleagues’ institutional analysis and
development (IAD) model (Ostrom 1990), Sabatier’s advocacy coalition framework
(Sabatier 1988), Baumgartner and Jones’ punctuated equilibrium model (Baumgartner
and Jones 1993), and the policy network approach (e.g., Knoke 1990; Adam and Kriesi
2007). According to Sabatier (2007b, 321), although all these frameworks are relatively
promising general frameworks, they “need to be developed into more logically coherent
and ‘denser’ theoretical frameworks and, eventually, into fully developed theories”.
These models, derived from the practice of Western democracies and developed
by Western academics, provide diversified ways to order and simplify reality. Dye (2002,
45) claims that models have strengths and limitations; however, a good model should
keep congruence with the reality, direct inquiry and research, and suggest causes and
consequences of public policy. Sabatier (2007b) further clarifies the criteria of a more
robust theory or framework, such as logical coherence, clear causal process, empirical
falsifiability, and broad coverage in scope.
2.1.3 Application of the Policy Network Approach in the Research
Among a set of models and approaches to analyze policy processes, in this
study, the policy network approach is chosen as the analytic tool to historically and
institutionally examine China’s climate change mitigation policy making process. This
choice was made primarily due to the following four considerations.
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First, policy network theory takes into account various types of actors that affect
the development of public policy. Although government, as the key state agency, is often
the leading institution in steering non-state action in the political process; businesses and
social institutions also affect preferences and actions of state actors. By treating public
policy as the product of interdependent interactions between state and society, the
researcher can characterize the roles of actors in policy processes from a broad spectrum,
ranging from a closed, access-restricted structure to an open, loosely-organized, and
unstable issue networks (Rhode and March 1992; Mol et al. 2000). In the case of China,
although the decision making may still be characterized as centralized and top-down, it is
by no means monolithic (Saich 2004; Li 2005). With the rapid socio-economic change
under the reform, there has been more bargaining, negotiation and collaboration among
state actors, private actors and civil society actors in the policy process (Saich 2004).
Second, policies are generated under specific political-institutional contexts.
These contexts influence the actors and ideas in most policy making processes. Among a
number of approaches to using the network concept (to be described in detail in Section
2.3), this study takes Adam and Kriesi’s approach (2007) of proposing a casual model to
conceptualize the policy process. Under this approach, a variety of interdependent actors
form networks to address environmental contexts and determine policy outcomes and
changes. Such a causal model of policy network is helpful in generating logicallycoherent propositions which will be tested empirically (Sabatier 2007b).
Third, the complexity of the policy process calls for an examination of historical
development of the networks and relationship between networks and policy outcomes.
By identifying the dimensions of policy networks (introduced in Section 3.3),
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development of structures, functions, and changes of networks over time can be studied.
Further, more general features of policy style and policy outcomes can be connected with
the specific structures and interactions of actor networks. The present research treats
policy process as a dynamic cycle that involves various actors and is consistent with the
development of actor networks.
Fourth, although the institutional development and analysis (IAD) framework
and the advocacy coalition framework are the most impressive models having been
empirically tested in many different settings, no study has applied these frameworks to
study Chinese policy processes. However, there have been growing academic endeavors
in recent years that employ the policy network approach to study Chinese policy issues.
Li et al. (2003) applies Rhodes’ typology to analyze Chinese housing and real estate
policy. Tang (2004) uses conflict of interest among actors to analyze tax reforms in the
countryside. A recent study by Zheng and her Dutch colleagues (Zheng et al. 2010)
argues that the policy network theory is generally “useful to describe and explain policymaking in the Chinese context,” and “most, if not all, the theoretical notions developed
around policy networks proved fruitful when applied to the fragmentation,
interdependencies, stalemates and breakthroughs in decision-making processes in China”
(Op cit., 17).
Eichhorst and Bongardt (2009) suggest some adaptations be made in order to
analyze a specific policy arrangement in China. It is worth noting that policy networks
develop in the course of time through frequent interactions between mutually dependent
actors in the whole process of policy cycle, not only in decision-making phase, but also in
other phases such as agenda setting, policy implementation. The emphasis of the action
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network development is important because the decision-making normally takes a topdown approach in China and this process is rarely documented in detail, but this topdown approach incorporates bargaining and negotiation among diverse state and nonstate actors at all levels in the policy making process. As Saich (2004) argues, “China’s
size and diversity makes it especially important that policy remains flexible to account
and that policy makers receive accurate information for policy design and on feedback
once policy begins to be implemented”. Therefore, the examination of the features and
evolutions of the implementation networks should be included in analyzing the policy
process and understanding policy outcomes and changes.
Before reviewing the literature of policy network theory in Section 2.4, Sections
2.2 and 2.3 will review the literature related to China’s policy process and China’s
response to the global climate change governance.
2.2 Research on China’s Policy Process
2.2.1 Formal Policy Process in China
With China’s reform and opening up, its policy making process has been
evolving, and decision-making has been more institutionalized at the top-level. The
country has established an integrated, multilevel nationwide bureaucratic system to
accommodate the requirements of economic reforms.
Most literature addresses the issue by identifying the actors, and examining their
functions and interactions. The National People’s Congress (NPC) and the State Council
are the two key institutions in policy making at the national level. The NPC holds the
power to make national laws, while the State Council drafts implementing rules,
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regulations, decrees and orders. Commissions and ministers affiliated to the State Council
can issue orders, directives and regulations, which shall be consistent with laws passed
the NPC and with regulations of the State Council. At the local level, the local congress
and government may draft separately additional regulations for local implementation.
In reality, the State Council, which receives substantial input from ministries
and commissions, holds the power in policy formulation and development, especially in
the economic sector. The National People’s Congress, plays a marginal role in the
drafting and consultation process, though its role for policy advisory and supervision has
been growing (Andrews-Speed 2004). In most cases, the agencies responsible for the
policy implementation in a specific sector may also take responsibility in drafting the
policies for that sector (Andrews-Speed 2004). Pang and Zou (2008) show a general
process of developing a policy in China. First, relevant experts and government officials
work on preparing policy drafts. The drafts will then be circulated among different
governmental departments to obtain comments and revisions. Next, the competent
departments submit a finalized draft to the State Council for approval. Some of the
policies will be promulgated in the form of laws that require the approval by the National
People’s Congress. Once approved, either the State Council or the relevant departments is
charged with implementing and refining regulations and measures.
China has tried to decentralize its decision making. The decentralization,
characterized by local governments and officials assuming more power and responsibility
in stimulating local economic growth, to some extent, weakens the authority of the
central government, which results in inconsistency, conflict and ambiguity of the policies.
To achieve compromise between competing agencies, China normally makes special
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organizational arrangements by forming leadership groups or committees that bring
together the functionally-related bureaucracies (Lieberthal 2004, 217).
The major stakeholders in China’s policy process include the government,
industrial sectors, academic institutions, media, the public and non-government
organizations (NGOs). The government in China is the dominant player in policy making,
while the NGOs have the weakest roles (Pang and Zou 2008). Although, in China, the
NGOs have been expanding and becoming more active, especially in environmental
issues; comparatively speaking, NGOs and the public voices are not loud and clear
enough in the policy making process (Op cit.).
Within the government system, the State Council, supported by its affiliated
ministries and local governmental administration, leads the policy making, puts into
effect the national economic plan, and oversees policy implementation and enforcement.
However, the implementation of policies in China runs into a series of obstacles, such as
insufficient institutional capacity, shortage of human resources, conflict and ambiguity of
policies, influence of informal rules, and personal relations (Chen 2003). Some
researchers point out that in China, there are other approaches to facilitate the policy
implementation led by the administrative agencies: one is the utilization of the power of
the Communist Party to set guidelines for policy making (Peng 2003, 45; Constantin
2007); the other is a trend towards greater legislative involvement in policy making and
implementation instead of political command, as the NPC has strengthened its institution
and improved its professionalization (Peng 2003; Saich 2004).
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2.2.2 Models of Analyzing China’s Policy Making Process
Several models have been developed and used to analyze the policy making
process in China. The first one is the broad rationality model. The model postulates that
decision makers attempt to pursue strategies that can maximize the expected outcomes of
the choices they could make (Howlett et al. 2009). When used to analyze China’s policy
process, it views China’s central state as a rational, unitary and coherent actor and
assumes that top-level leaders can exert considerable power over the political system and
can choose the most efficient means in achieving policy goals and advancing the national
interest (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 9-12; Constantin 2007; Lieberthal 1992).
The pure rationality model is regarded as nonrealistic and has serious limitations,
thus Herbert Simon (1955) puts forward an alternate notion of “bounded rationality.” In
general, the rationality model could not well capture the realistic complex dimensions of
the system. For example, the decision makers may have limited information and time
available; the policy might not be a direct response to the underlying problem; and the
efficiency of policy options is dependent on changing circumstances. In addition, the
closed nature of the Chinese political regime limits the study of the degree to which the
rationality of decisions is limited or bounded. Therefore, the rationality model cannot
“provide sufficiently powerful explanatory value to be used in isolation from other
approaches” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 14).
The second model is the power model, which assumes the policy outcomes are
the result of “struggles among the top leaders who are sensitive to the implications of
alternative policy choices upon their stature and power” (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988,
14). This model has been used extensively to analyze the complex dynamics of China,
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especially before its economic reforms when little information is available outside China.
The power model assumes that “Chinese political behavior is the result of interorganizational bargaining for budgets, status, and power” (Dreyer 2006, 17). The power
model holds that to study the bureaucratic politics, the crucial question is to identify the
most powerful bureaucratic organizations or alliances that denominate the policy process.
However, the model considers only the organizational constraints that have formed the
actors’ behavior, while ignoring ideological and cultural constraints, as well as the issues
at stake (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988, 17).
Arguably, the most impressive and influential model of understanding China’s
institutional setting and policy process is called the fragmented authoritarianism model,
developed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988) in the late 1980s with their study of
policy process of large-scale energy projects. The next section presents a brief overview
of the fragmented authoritarianism model.
2.2.3 Fragmented Authoritarianism Model
The fragmented authoritarianism model was first developed by Lieberthal and
Oksenberg (1988) to label the bargaining features of Chinese bureaucracy through their
case studies of China’s energy policy process. The model acknowledges the insights from
the rationality and the power approaches and integrates more available information to
study the impacts of decentralization of decision-making authority brought by China’s
economic reform in the late 1970s.
The fragmented authoritarianism model focuses on two dimensions of
centralization and decentralization to reflect the bureaucratic practice: one is the
structural distribution of resources and authority; the other is the process of decision
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making and policy implementation. The authors argues that the bureaucratic activity of
shaping and implementing policy in China takes place under a structurally “fragmented,
segmented and stratified” environment, and the affected institutions negotiate, bargain,
and seek consensus to pursue their own interests in the process. Correspondingly, policy
outcomes are shaped by the incorporation of interests of diverse actors, especially the
implementation agencies, into the policy itself. As a result, the policy making process in
China is governed by the “disjointed, protracted and incremental” changes.
With the term of “fragmented authoritarianism”, Lieberthal (1992) further
developed the idea of bureaucratic fragmentation and argues that bargaining and
negotiation are crucial elements of the political process in China, thus it is difficult to
predict accurately the policy outcome with one particular approach. Because of the
decentralization of decision making, the local levels have gained power to block upward
flows of information and frustrate the policies of the upper-level authorities. He suggests
the policy analysis should focus on the relationship of administrative hierarchies, in
particular between line agencies at the central level and the provinces and localities.
Lieberthal (1992) admits that one of the limitations of the fragmented authoritarianism
model is that it emphasizes the structural dimensions of authority and policy process and
gives less concern on value integration which can potentially affect policy process under
the complex political system and lacks focus on role of party.
Although the fragmented authoritarianism is regarded as one of the most
influential models of understanding the policy process in contemporary China (e.g.,
Dreyer 2006; Constantin 2007; Chen 2003), it has been frequently challenged by
researchers, because this static model of labeling Chinese policy making as “protracted,
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disjointed and incremental” fails in capturing the characteristics of current policy making
process in China (Wang 2006; Mertha 2008; Yu 2008; Lema and Ruby 2007; Constantin
2007). For example, Lema and Ruby (2007), through the study of wind project
development, argue that policy reforms in China have changed largely from a state of
fragmented authoritarianism towards policy coordination. Mertha (2008) claims that the
policy process in China has become increasingly pluralized and more non-state actors are
involved in the policy process. Yu (2008) argues that China's policy making in the area of
climate change diplomacy is highly coordinated, instead of fragmented.
2.2.4 State-Society Relationship in China
The actors involved in the policy process can be divided into two groups: state
actor, the one directly participates in the state policy making (Zhao 2002), and the civil
society actor, the one endowed with human agency (Long and Long 1992). The
relationship between the state and society is the relationship between two types of actors.
In China, economic reforms induce the changes of state-society relations. Literature has
given substantial attention to China’s transition of the relations between state and society,
especially since the collapse of the Soviet system in the early 1990s.
In general, China’s state-society relations have been undergoing a massive
change under the reforms. As Saich (2004, 223) notes, “The economic changes (in China)
have redefined the social structure and are changing the distribution of power between
state and society, have altered the principles on which society is organized and the ways
in which it interacts with the state apparatus.” However, debates continue on whether the
civil society or alternatively the state corporatism better describes China’s circumstances.
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Some scholars view the Chinese citizens’ more assertive behavior and the
emergence of more associations as contributing to civil society. Adherents of this view
argue that although there have been some setbacks, China is marching towards a vigorous
civil society (e.g., Dean 1993; Watson 2008). However, Lieberthal (2004, 300) claims
that evidence overall shows that in China, basic levels of the state and non-state
organizations are lack of powers and resources in limiting the ability of higher levels of
the state to penetrate influences, therefore the Western civil-society model does not apply
to China’s situation to date. Frolic (1997, according to Saich 2004, 228) uses the term of
“state-led civil society” to describe the situation that in China: “the civil society is created
by the state to help it govern, co-opt and socialize potentially politically active elements
in the population”. In studying the policy making process, Andrews-Speed (2004, 191)
claims that China still gives little emphasis “on protecting voluntary economic
agreements or on controlling the power of the state.”
State corporatism is a commonly applied model to describe state-society
relations. Given the limitations that in China, each non-state organization must register
with a government body and receive approval as a legal entity, and that only one
organization is allowed to represent each sectoral constituency, the state’s domination
over social organizations is clear. However, the applications of the state corporatism
model have come in various forms. Unger and Chan (2008, 48-68) view most of China’s
major associations and groups as state corporatist, especially at the national level,
because most of these organizations were founded by the state and firmly under the
control of a state or Party agency. However, at the periphery, the emergence of more
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small local organizations shows the possibility of shifts in the future toward societal
corporatism and even civil society.
Another scholar, Walder (1986) adopts the term of “Communist NeoTraditionalism” to draw distinctions with pluralism and authoritarian paradigm. It argues
that the political loyalty is rewarded systematically with career opportunities and other
rewards, and the evolution of the Chinese communism will create a highly
institutionalized clientelism network.
Although state corporatism model captures well the top-down nature of control
in the system, some scholars question its ability in explaining the complexity of dynamics
of the interaction between state and civil society (Foster 2008, 116; Kennedy 2008, 153174). Perry and Selden (2000) highlight the roles of local state institutions in controlling
social protests and opposition that happened frequently in China. They argue that “while
local officials frequently crack down on popular resistance, in numerous cases their
leadership is instrumental in shaping, legitimating and articulating the demands of social
movements, and in some cases in networking with state officials on behalf of local
interests” (Op cit., 11). As Kennedy (2008, 174) puts it, “no one label – civil society,
corporatism, or any other – adequately reflects the nature of government-business
relations in China.”
2.3 Global Climate Change Governance and China’s Response
2.3.1 History of Global Climate Change Regime
The development of scientific knowledge regarding causes and potential
consequences of global climate change has led to the increased concern of global
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warming issue. The nature of the climate change problem has made it clear that no
country can solve this issue by itself and global scientific and political cooperation would
be necessary to find solutions and create an effective response.
The creation of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) by the
United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) in 1988 marks one of the most important steps to transform the
climate change issue from a scientific issue into a policy issue. The IPCC issued its first
report in 1990 and reported an observed temperature increase of 0.3-0.6 °C (degree
Celsius) over the past century and predicted a 1-3 °C during the 21st century. Soon after
the publication of the IPCC report, the United Nations General Assembly authorized
formal negotiations on a global climate agreement. At the 1992 Earth Summit held in Rio
de Janeiro, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
which aims to form international climate policy architecture, was signed by 154 nations.
The four key elements contained in the agreement include a general long-term objective
to stabilize GHG concentrations, a near-term quantitative emission reduction goal for
industrialized countries; the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” as
the guidance of burden sharing; and the preference for the market-based measures. The
four elements have largely defined the international climate change policy regime since
1992 (Aldy and Stavins 2007).
The UNFCCC commitments were voluntary and did little to establish firm
governmental targets. In 1997, the Third Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP
3) met in Kyoto and adopted the Kyoto Protocol, which creates a comprehensive yet
flexible international GHG emission reduction regime. The industrialized countries
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agreed to reduce the GHG emissions by 5.2% below the 1990 level during the first
commitment period from 2008 to 2012. Besides, three market-based mechanisms were
designed to facilitate the compliance of legally-binding targets with lower costs. However,
because the United States refused to ratify the treaty, it was not until February 2005 that
the Kyoto Protocol gained enough ratification and finally entered into force.
The Kyoto Protocol has been both lauded and criticized (Wiener 2007; Victor
2004; Aldy and Stavins 2007). On the one side, it is the first step to create marketoriented rules to comply with quantified emission reduction targets set for developed
countries. On the other side, the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol is criticized
because it bypasses several key GHG emitters, such as the United States, China, India,
and has specific deficiencies in the design that make it ineffective and relatively costly to
implement. However, both sides agree that it is imperative to negotiate a successor
regime for the post-Kyoto period. The Thirteenth UNFCCC Conference of the Parties
(COP 13) held in Bali 2007 set four thematic building blocks for future actions:
mitigation, adaptation, technology, and finance. Parties agreed to establish an Adaptation
Fund to assist developing countries to adapt to the climate change impacts. The Bali
Roadmap also outlined a new negotiating process to be concluded in the COP 15 in
Copenhagen to feed into post-Kyoto international agreement on climate change. However,
in the COP 15 Copenhagen and the COP 16 Cancun climate change conferences,
although all parties have agreed to an accord that sets a goal of limiting global warming
to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, no legally-binding agreement has been
signed due to vast differences among countries.
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Notably, there are other forms of international climate negotiations, such as the
Asia-Pacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (AP 6), the G8 Gleneagles
Plan of Action, the GLOBE G8+5 Climate Change Dialogue (Williams 2007). These
negotiations complement the Kyoto Protocol regime and are undertaken between key
economies, which are also major carbon emitters. Besides, domestic climate change
actions are taken in various forms worldwide. For example, in the United States,
voluntary mitigation programs include the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI),
the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX), and other regional and sectoral programs.
However, the persistence of some voluntary programs could not be guaranteed. For
example, the emission trading in the Chicago Climate Change has been closed since
November 2010 because of the market uncertainties.
2.3.2 Structural Features of Global Climate Change Regime
The emergence and development of the international climate change regime has
gradually gained attention among researchers. The structure of the international climate
change regime has shown three features. First, not only governments, but also the other
non-state actors, such as businesses, NGOs, scientific community, and the public, are
involved in policy discussion and implementation, seeking to reduce the emissions of
GHGs. Although the national states still dominate the regime negotiations, and the role of
non-state actors remain limited to influence the action of governments, the non-state
actors have contributed to influencing human behavior more directly, which would result
in an improved performance in GHG emission reductions (Raustiala 2001).
Second, vast differences exist between developing countries and developed
countries; and within the two groups, coordinated actions could not be taken. The sources
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of differences are complex and include “levels of development, sources of GHG
emissions, national energy policies, key economic sectors, and expected impacts of
climate change” (Downie et al. 2009, 122). In developed countries, only the EU member
countries have committed to meeting emission reduction targets set by Kyoto Protocol.
The US refuses to participate unless other emerging economies, such as China, India,
Brazil, would accept quantified GHG emission reduction targets. On the other hand, the
developing countries argue that the priority for these countries is economic development,
and the developed countries should take on historical, legal and moral responsibilities to
reduce their emissions first, and provide financial and technical assistance to developing
countries.
Third, governance of climate change across all levels of government and
relevant stakeholders has emerged. According to Corfee-Morlot et al. (2009), the
multilevel governance encompasses two dimensions of action: vertical dimension and
horizontal dimension. Under the vertical dimension, government at the national level
cannot effectively deal with the climate change challenges alone without cooperation
with the international community and participation of lower levels of government; while
under the horizontal dimension, climate change issues and solutions overlap with other
global environmental and development issues, thus calling for policy integration and
coordination between departments and institutions when developing relevant policies.
2.3.3 The Adoption of Climate Change Mitigation Policy
The climate change mitigation policy arrangement is a portfolio of policies and
measures that fit specific national circumstances and aim to reduce or limit GHG
emissions across all sectors. Different policies and measures could have induced different
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outcomes, and the impacts may last for a long time. These policies can be broadly
divided into the climate-specific and the climate-related. Such a division has been widely
employed in discussing climate change issues and their connections with energy and
environmental issues (Willems and Baumert 2003; Burtraw and Toman 2001; Gallagher
2008; NDRC 2007; Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008).
Climate-specific policies refer to GHG emission reduction oriented policies.
The United Nations (UN)-sponsored climate mitigation mechanisms, i.e., the three
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, fall into this category. Much literature has
addressed China’s policies and actions that respond to the UN-sponsored mechanism, in
particular its performance in taking the CDM activities. Other climate-specific mitigation
actions include China’s participation in China-EU Climate Change Partnership, AsiaPacific Partnership for Clean Development and Climate (AP 6), and some bilateral
cooperative agreements (Pew 2007; IEA 2010).
The climate-related mitigation policies refer to the policies, regulations, and
measures that, though not directly driven by climate change concerns, treat GHG
emission reduction as a by-product activity of economic development. Compared with
climate-specific policies, these policies are much more inclusive (Burtraw and Toman
2001). They are broadly adopted in areas of energy production and transformation,
energy efficiency improvement and conservation, transportation, industrial processes,
forestry, and other sectors (NDRC 2007). Other policies, such as those affecting trade,
foreign investment, social development, can also affect emissions, but their relations with
mitigation are not direct, thus not taken as mitigation policies (IPCC 2007).

34

Since the 1990s, and especially over the past decade, China has begun adopting
a number of policies and taking various measures to address GHG emissions. These
policies and measures come in response to concerns about several interrelated issues,
including climate change, energy efficiency, air pollution, long-range planning, and
international opinion (Downie et al. 2009, 105). The International Energy Agency (IEA
2010) lists the climate change mitigation policies and measures that China has adopted
and that are in force. Of the 27 domestic mitigation policies, 6 were implemented during
1996-2004 period; 11 were taken during 2005-2006; 10 were taken after 2007. These
policies are taken in various forms: regulations and standards, taxes and charges,
subsidies, financial incentives, voluntary agreements, etc. Many of the policies and
measures have been laid out and reemphasized in the Renewable Energy Law of 2005,
the Energy Conservation Law of 2008, the Medium- and Long-Term Development Plan
for Renewable Energy of 2007, and the 11th Five-Year Program (2006-2010).
The most important climate change policy adopted is the National Climate
Change Program released by the Chinese government in July 2007. The Program outlined
activities that China has been planning to undertake in mitigating GHG emissions and
adapting to the consequences of potential climate change. However, some critics note that
it has only a symbolic role, because China does not set emission reduction goals and/or a
timeline. One year later, China issued a white paper titled China’s Policies and Actions
for Addressing Climate Change, indicating that China will actively participate in
worldwide efforts to address climate mitigation and adaptation, earnestly observe the
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, and play a constructive role in international
cooperation (State Council 2008).
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2.3.4 China’s Climate Mitigation Performance
There have been many debates and controversies about China’s performance in
mitigating climate change impacts. Regarding the impacts of climate change on China,
some hold that there are potential net gains to China from a warmer world (Nordhaus and
Boyer 2000; Weiner 2007), while other studies show that China will be one of the worstimpacted countries in the world if the climate changes as predicted (NDRC 2007; IPCC
2007).
Concerning how China has made contributions to the climate change mitigation,
based on Weiner (2007), some researchers claim that China would not limit its GHG
emissions, because, under the current Kyoto Protocol, it has no binding obligations and
politically, reducing GHG emissions will harm its economic development and influence
social stability. The only solution, therefore, is to promote international cooperation, and
provide incentives to China for mitigation actions. In contrast to that, others claim that
China has been more proactive on climate change actions and has made great efforts in
reducing carbon. A Pew report shows that the energy intensity and GHG intensity (GHG
emissions per unit of GDP) in China have fallen significantly over the past few decades,
largely through energy efficiency plan development and institutional effort. Weber et al.
(2008) show that with China becoming world’s manufacturing center, up to one third of
Chinese emissions were actually due to production of exports, rising from 12% in 1987.
This means that the importer countries, primarily industrialized countries, have exported
their emissions with large scale movement of manufacturing to China. In fact, there have
been a lot of debates that between exporters and importers, who should be responsible for
carbon dioxide emissions of the Chinese-made goods (Wang 2008; BBC 2009; Johnson
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2009). By comparing China’s involvement in three UN environmental programs,
Heggelund and Beacker (2007) claim that, although China is currently providing no
leadership, it has emerged as an active participant and stakeholder in the international
environmental arena.
Various scholars hold different opinions about the level of China’s climate
mitigative capacity. Gallagher (2007) argues that China still lacks many of the
institutions, policies and enforcement mechanisms, especially at provincial and local
levels; while Richerzhagen and Scholz (2008) argue that China’s climate mitigative
capacity has been considerably improved in areas of climate science and policy
coordination, but the main problem is that China’s climate-related mitigation actions are
not driven by climate consideration, but based on the desire to maintain economic growth.
It is almost impossible to generalize about China’s climate mitigation
performance from evaluating a single policy or program. Much literature has addressed
China’s participation in the UN-sponsored CDM scheme, in which the Chinese entities
can develop carbon emission reduction projects and trade the accredited emission
reduction credits with industrialized countries for funds and technology. The studies
cover a variety of aspects, such as sustainable development, institutional capacity
building, technology transfer, carbon market and finance (Saner 2005; Heggelund 2007;
Ganapati and Liu 2008; WWF 2008; Seres 2007; Hall 2007). Since 2007, China has
surpassed India and Brazil as the largest CDM credit supplier in the world, with 42% of
the issued CDM credits coming from China, almost twice the number in India (CD4CDM
2010). Researchers have identified some reasons that can explain China’s success, such
as lower abatement costs, more effective administrative arrangements, governmental
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manipulation, large emission reduction potential, as well as the flaws of this scheme
(Michaelowa 2007; Wiener 2008; Duan 2008; Lloyd and Subbarao 2009; Ganapati and
Liu 2009).
2.4 Policy Network Theory
Policy making takes place in policy domain-specific subsystems, which
“consists of a large number of state and non-state actors dealing with specific policy
issues” (Adam and Kriesi 2007). To have a closer examination of the emergence,
development and change of climate change mitigation policy in China’s political system,
an analytical framework is needed to build links between various factors and investigate
the relations between actors in China’s climate change mitigation policy process. In this
research, the policy network approach is employed to guide empirical inquiry, analyze
the development of China’s climate change mitigation policy, and explain the
mechanisms of policy making process. Relevant literature on the policy network
approach is reviewed in this section.
2.4.1 Concept of Policy Network
The concept of policy network has its roots in organizational studies, economics,
sociology, anthropology, public policy, political science, etc. (Hudson and Lowe 2004;
Berry et al. 2004). The term has been used in the study of political processes since 1970s,
and refers to “the set of political actors inside and outside government who are involved
in, or take an interest in, the making of public policy, and/or or relations between these
actors” (Compston 2009). Policy network theory holds that a large number of actors
(individuals and organizations) are dealing with specific policy issues. The political
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process is not controlled by state actors alone, but rather by the interactions of state and
non-state actors at all levels (Adam and Kriesi 2007; Marsh and Smith 2000; Hudson and
Lowe 2004). As an open and flexible system of relationships of actors, the policy
network integrates both macro-level trends and the impact of the implementation of
policy at the micro-level (Adam and Kriesi 2007).
There are different understandings and applications of the policy network
concept. In general, three major approaches exist (Borzel 1988; Adam and Kriesi 2007).
The first approach treats the policy networks as a specific form of governance that is
different from the conventional market and hierarchy. Networks, characterized by the
predominance of informal, decentralized, and horizontal relations, are autonomous and
self-governing in that they resist government manipulation.
The second approach analyzes the network structure through formalized and
quantitative procedures and often uses software. The quantitative analysis results in
images of network structures and summary indexes; however, this approach gives little
concern for actors’ characteristics, nor on the origins of the dynamic change of networks.
The third approach applies the network concept to different types of interactions
among actors in a policy subsystem. This approach interprets policy networks as a type of
interest intermediation between public and private actors in which resources are
exchanged. The basic assumption of this approach is that “the existence of policy
networks, which reflect the relative status or power of particular interests in a policy area,
influences (though thus not determine) policy outcomes” (Borzel 1998). Adam and Kriesi
(2007, 130) note that “These typologies often rely on the classic distinction between
pluralist and corporatist systems of interest intermediation.” and “Whereas pluralist
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concepts stress the wide range of actors involved in policy making and the resulting
competition among them, corporatist concepts point to the cooperation between a few
central actors.”
On the basis of the degree of integration, the restriction to the memberships and
distribution level of resources, Marsh and Rhodes (1992, 249) place policy network in a
specific sector on a continuum with two ending points: policy community and issue
networks. Policy community is a tightly integrated, well organized and access restricted
structure, which is often linked to the corporatist arrangements and characterized by
cooperation between a few dominant actors; while issue network is a loosely-organized,
more open and less coherent structure, which is associated with pluralist arrangements.
Thus the study of policy network on a policy community- issue network continuum has
been linked with the discussion of state-society relations. From the discussion on
contemporary China’s state-society relationship in Section 2.2.3, it is more appropriate to
broadly categorize China’s policy network as a form more prone to policy community;
however, the number and types of actors involved in the policy process have been
expanded under the reform and vary with the specific policy domains.
Policy network can also be defined by other classified dimensions. For example,
Van Waarden (1992) indentifies seven major dimensions, including the number and type
of actors involved, their functions, structures, degree of institutionalization, rules of
conduct, power relations, and strategies. Lieffererink et al. (2001) characterize policy
network with three dimensions: the distribution, mobilization and exchange of resources,
policy issues and actors, and interactions in the network.
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2.4.2 Network Approach in Analyzing Policy Process
The use of the policy network concept has been doubted by some scholars
because of its shaky theoretical basis (Dowding 1995, 2001; Richardson 2000). However,
some important progress has been made to strengthen the ability to explain policy
processes, especially over the past decade. Marsh and Rhode (1992, 262) argue that the
policy community is associated with policy continuity, and “the existence of a policy
network, or more particularly a policy community, constrains the policy agenda and
shapes the policy outcomes”. They also claim policy networks are central to
understanding the policy change and the ways in which political institutions and practices
adapt (Op cit., 267).
Marsh and Smith (2000) further develop a dialectical model to explain the role
of the policy network in the policy process. They point out that the relationship between
the network and outcomes is not simple and unidimensional, but interactive that “each
affects the other in a continuing iterative process” (Op cit., 5). They accordingly identify
three dialectical relationships: between the network and the context within which it
operates; between the structure of the network and the actors operating within them; and
between the network and the policy outcome.
Adam and Kriesi (2007, 129-149) treat the policy network approach more as an
analytical toolbox than a theory. In their model, a complete policy process is separated
into two causal events linked by the policy network: as dependent variables, the
structures of policy networks are determined by the external factors, namely the
transnational context, national context and policy-domain specific context; as
independent variables, the structures of policy networks, which capture two basic
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elements of networks – actors and their relations, affect policy outcomes. In particular,
the distribution of power determines the potential for policy change and the type of
interactions between actors influence the types of policy change.
The causal links of policy network features and policy change have been used
by some scholars to explain policy process and analyze the impacts of actor networks.
For example, Lynn et al. (2000) present a causal model of governance, where the
governance outcomes are explained by a set of “network” factors, such as environmental
contexts, actors, structures, treatments, and managerial roles and action. Mol et al. (2001)
use the policy network approach to examine the driving forces behind the emergence of
joint-environmental policy making through three case studies across three EU countries.
In addition, there have been a growing number of empirical case studies that adopt the
policy network approach to explain the policy outcomes and changes in specific policy
sectors (Jost and Jacob 2004; Zhou and Mori 2008; Compston 2009).
2.5 Policy Network as Analytic Framework
The aim of the present study is to gain a better understanding of how a set of
state and non-state actors in China have engaged in climate change policy making and
development. An analytic framework is adapted from the policy network model by Adam
and Kriesi (2007) to guide the empirical inquiry. The analytic framework frames the key
variables and is used to explain the dynamics of China’s climate change mitigation policy
process. In this framework, three components are highlighted. The first component
incorporates contextual factors that will lead to the focused issues and shape the specific
climate change policy network. The second focuses on structural and interactive features
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of the policy network as intervening variable. The third is the policy outcomes and
possible changes influenced by the policy network. Figure 2.1 presents a schematic
overview of the model.
Contextual Factors
International
Factors
Domestic
Factors

Policy Network
(Network actors and their
structures and interactions)

Policy
Outcomes/Change

Policy-Domain
Specific Factors

Figure 2.1 Policy Network Analytical Framework
Source: adapted from Adam and Kriesi (2007)
2.5.1 Contextual Factors of the Policy Network
A variety of factors influences the emergence and form of a policy network.
These environmental factors “vary with the territorial and functional specificities of the
policy network under study” (Adam and Kriesi 2007, 137). Adam and Kriesi (Op cit.)
suggest three contextual factors based on macro-political and domain-specific scope:
international, domestic, and the policy-domain specific contexts.
•

International Contexts

Whereas international contexts alone are not sufficient to explain the features of
policy networks (Cowles et al. 2001), the “internationalized policy environments” have
become important factors that influence the formation of policy networks and the shaping
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of domestic policies (Coleman and Perl 1999; Adam and Kriesi 2007). In the study of
climate change policy making process, global climate change regime forms the main and
direct internationalized policy environments, and should be given considerations when
analyzing of specific mitigation policy process. Section 2.3 has reviewed relevant
literature on historical development of global climate change regime and its main
characteristics.
•

Domestic Contexts

According to Adam and Kriesi (2007), the structural and interactive features of
policy network are influenced by the formal national institutional structure. Two
perspectives, namely corporatism and pluralism, are commonly used to analyze the
domestic institutional regime (Mol et al. 2001, 16). Katzenstein (1978) argues that the
level of centralization in state-society relations, and the degree of differentiation of
between the state and society are two critical variables in the establishment of policy
networks. In addition, some studies show the importance of informal domestic structures
for explaining the development of policy networks (e.g., Kenis 1991; Knoke et al. 1996).
Again, as regards climate change, the domestic institutional contexts are not sufficient
factors for the emergence and development of policies (Mol et al. 2001). Literature on
China’s policy process, including its institutional structures and ongoing changes under
the economic reform, has been reviewed in Section 2.2.
•

Policy-Specific Contexts

Even within the same country, the structure and function of policy networks
differ from sector to sector and from policy to policy (Atkinson and Coleman 1995).
Therefore, it is important to take a closer look at the policy-specific influences to the
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policy networks in different sectors and at different times. Researchers (Adam and Kriesi
2007, 141; Thacher 1998; Colman et al. 1997) claim that there are general and situational
policy-specific variables that need to be considered. General policy-specific variables
include policy incentives, the expectation, visibility/salience and traceability of the
effects; while situational variables focus on the reasons for change within policy network,
such as economic and technological development, and changes in ideas, values and
knowledge.
It should be noted that complex interactions of three contextual factors affect
the development of policy networks, and the influences of these contexts cannot be
distinctly separated. Furthermore, not all factors have the same weight, and some factors
are conditional upon others (Kenis 1991). Adam and Kriesi (2007, 143) suggest the
research should “look at the combined impact of different types of determinants”. In this
study of China’s climate change mitigation policy process, the development of the
international climate change regime and the development of Chinese political economy
are treated as independent contextual variables that occur before other variables and
impact the policy process; while policy-specific factor is treated as a “moderator”
variable that set conditions or modify basic relationships under which an independent
variable (policy network) exerts effects on a dependent variable (policy outcomes).
2.5.2 Network of Actors
The policy making process involves many actors. The actors come from three
key institutional sectors: government, market and civil society (Metz et al. 2007).
However, their roles, responsibilities and powers have changed in relation to social and
economic changes over the past two decades. Whereas the government, defined strictly

45

by the nation state, remains the central actor in policy making, businesses and civil
society actors are playing more prominent roles, although the specific level of
involvement remains a hotly contested subject. In addition, the concept of government
has become more inclusive and thus recognizes the contributions of various levels of
government. Figure 2.2 shows the three components that constitutes the entirety of a
society (state, market and civil society) and their actor compositions. Market and civil
society actors form the non-state group.

State

Market

Civil
Society

State actors include administrative bureaucracies at different levels,
legal systems, and military organizations. In this study, it is used
interchangeably with the term “government actors”.
Business actors include the commercial institutions which compete in
the market for profits. In this study, it mainly refers to the regulated
industrial companies of varying sizes, including public and private
businesses.
Civil society refers to the arena of uncoerced, voluntary collective
action around shared interests, purposes and values (Metz et al. 2007,
713). Civil society actors include business associations, NGOs,
coalitions, trade unions, self-help groups, mass media, professional
associations, registered charities, etc.

Figure 2.2 Structure of a Society and its Actors
Source: Metz et al. 2007; Howlett et al. 2007

In practice, the boundaries between state, market and civil society are often
complex, blurred and negotiated, reflecting the changing environmental contexts and the
actors’ changing roles and functions. In addition, the definitions often run into difficulty
when they are applied universally. For example, mass media play an important indirect
influence on public policy making and are taken as crucial links between the state and
society (Howlett et al. 2007). Unlike most other liberal-domestic countries, in China, the
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mass media are mostly created by the state; therefore, the media are most often led by
government officials and sometimes neglect their positions and voices. Another example
is the widespread existence of the GONGOs (Government Organized Non-Governmental
Organizations). In the Chinese context, they include trade unions, women’s organizations
and some registered charities. They also include industrial associations, some of which
are closely tied to industrial ministries, as well as public research institutes, which may be
finically independent but organizationally are still attached to ministries (Wu 2003).
The international system is increasingly influencing domestic political and
policy processes and consequently changing the nature and style of the civil society
actors involved in policy developments. For example, the IPCC is an international
organization that assesses the human-induced impacts of climate change. It also
facilitates discussions of domestic climate change polices and the development of
important epistemic or knowledge communities (Metz et al. 2007). However, to put
epistemic community as civil society actors is not without controversy. Biagiotti (2002)
views epistemic community as a separate non-state group, as opposed to civil society
actors and corporate actors.
2.5.3 Impacts of Policy Network
The policy network plays a crucial role in shaping and constructing responses to
external factors and creating policy outcomes (Adam and Kriesi 2007). In the empirical
study, researchers identify various dimensions for depicting policy networks and link
them with policy outcomes. For example, in Mol and his colleagues’ model (Mol et al.
2001, 26), network dimensions include resource dependence, boundaries of the network,
and interaction. In Compston’s (2009) model, policy changes are caused by network
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changes in dimensions of resources, preferences and strategies of network members,
perceived problems and solutions, as well as formal and informal rules. Adam and Kriesi
(2007) suggest the structural and interactive features within a network determine the form
of policy change. The present study follows Adam and Kriesi’s approach and takes the
actor identification, structure, and interaction as key dimensions in measuring features of
policy networks.
Policy outcomes, as the third component of the model, are measured with
different indicators. Mol and his colleagues (2001) use effectiveness and legitimacy to
evaluate the policy outcomes. Effectiveness is to evaluate the extent in which policy
arrangements reflect more general policy goals and the extent to which these objectives
are actually achieved. Legitimacy refers to the analysis of the fairness and
communicative qualities of participation. Policy change can also be classified into
different types. For example, Hall (1993) differentiates three orders of policy change: the
maintenance of status quo, incremental change, and the dramatic shift in policy goals and
arrangements.
Climate change mitigation policy development is a continued and evolutionary
process. The eventual effectiveness of policy design also depends on the implementation
of policy instruments, and policy outcomes induce impacts on the future policy change.
This study will incorporate the policy implementation into account and treat policy
making as a cyclical process. Such “dialectical” policy network – policy outcome
relations, as depicted by Marsh and Smith (2000), is diagramed with dotted arrow lines in
Figure 2.1.
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Notably, although such a model has not been used in the name of “policy
networks” to analyze China’s climate change policy process, scholars have given the
similar focus on the roles of the structures and interactions of public and private actors in
studying China’s energy and climate change policies (Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988;
Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008; Downs 2008; Zhou and Mori 2008; Bjørkum 2005;
Constantin 2007).
2.6 Hypotheses of the Research
As mentioned above, this research will employ the policy network analytic
framework illustrated in Figure 2.1 as a toolbox to guide empirical evidence acquisition
and interpret relevant findings of China’s climate mitigation policy making process. In
addition, the causal framework also provides insights on formulating research questions
and working hypotheses, leading to in-depth investigation and verification.
The policy network analytic framework, as shown in Figure 2.1 highlights three
components of policy networks in conducting analysis of policy processes: the
environmental context, the composition and features of policy networks, and the
corresponding policy outcomes. The research questions and working hypotheses are
drawn from some fundamental understanding of the interrelationships of these three
component factors on the basis of previous observations, experience and understanding of
China’s policy making process in general. Table 2.1 illustrates how the concern issues are
translated into research questions, and what hypotheses are generated to address these
questions.
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Table 2.1 Concern Issues, Research Questions and Hypotheses
No.

Concern Issues

Research Questions

Working Hypotheses

1

The functioning of the
climate mitigation policy
network

How do the policy networks
influence the proactiveness of
developing climate change
mitigation policies in China?

2

The contextual factors of the
policy network

3

The involvement of nonstate actors in the policy
network

How does the political reform
influence the choices of
innovative mitigation policy
tools, such as market-based
measures
and
voluntary
agreements?
How are the non-state actors
involved in China’s climate
change
policy
making
process?

4

The operation of the policy
network

Increasing interaction between
government, business, and civil
society actors will increase the
likelihood of China’s taking a
more proactive approach to
develop
effective
climate
change mitigation policy.
More fragmentation in the
distribution of regulative power
will increase the likelihood of
China’s
utilizing
more
innovative policy instruments
and measures.
Decreasing political control in
policy
development
and
implementation will encourage
other actors, in particular nonstate actors, to exert greater
effort in shaping mitigation
policy.
Increasing demand for shared
responsibilities
among
ministries
and
provincial
governments will increase the
likelihood
of
stronger
coordination by the central
government.

Under the rapidly changing
international and domestic
context, how does China
arrange its institutions to
organize
and
coordinate
climate change mitigation
actions?

2.7 Summary
In the first part of this chapter, literature of policy process theory, global climate
change regime, and China’s climate change policy development has been reviewed. To
better understand the dynamics of China’s policy process in general and climate change
mitigation policy process in particular, it is important to accept the fact that China has
experienced significant changes under the reforms in aspects of the center-locality
relationship and the state-society relationship. With regard to the study of climate change
policy process, the actors involved in the policy process are not exclusively limited to the
government regulators and decision-makers; rather, since climate change initiative is a
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dynamic and ongoing process, the more appropriate approach is to incorporate other key
state and non-state actors who participate in policy implementation and may have
influences in policy making. These actors, including government actors at central and
local levels, business actors (e.g., regulated businesses, in particular large-scale energy
companies), and civil society actors (e.g., industrial associations, NGOs, academic
institutions, mass media), get involved in network due to the specific policy needs and
may later influence the policy process through their interactions with others.
On the basis of the relevant theories of policy network, in particular the causal
policy network model proposed by Adam and Kriesi (2007), an analytic framework is
developed in Section 2.5. The framework conceptualized the policy making as a process
involving a wide range of actors who are mutually interdependent, and they form
networks to address the external factors and determine policy outcomes and changes.
This causal model is used to guide the empirical investigation and explain the working
mechanism of China’s climate change mitigation policy making process. Before
conducting the empirical inquiry of the mitigation policy process, the next chapter
outlines the research design and methodology that have been adopted in the research.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Chapter 1 has identified the area of study as the dynamic process in China’s
climate change mitigation policy making and implementation. In Chapter 2, an analytic
framework built on policy network concept and theory has been developed to guide the
empirical data collection and analysis. Chapter 3 describes the methodology issue used in
my research. In general, the methodology employed is a combination of grounded theory
and case study approach, which is qualitative and inductive in nature and evidenced by
data from interviews, observations and relevant literature.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 3.1 describes the overall research
design of this qualitative study. Section 3.2 presents the case study approach, including
the purpose, the case selection criteria, and a brief description of the three cases. Section
3.3 addresses the variable measurement issues and explains the dimensions in measuring
the concept of policy network. Section 3.4 outlines how the data are collected and used
for the research. Finally, Section 3.5 summarizes this chapter.
3.1 Overall Research Approach
To simplify understanding, Creswell (2007) has identified five approaches to
qualitative research, including narrative research, phenomenology, grounded theory, case
study, and ethnography. However, in real research, it is “possible to find two or more
variations or combinations of these approaches within a single study” (Fraenkel and
Wallen 2009, 427).
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The overall research approach can be categorized as combinations of grounded
theory and case study approach. Since few studies have addressed China’s climate
change mitigation policy process; therefore, one of the purposes of this study is to
generate grounded theories inductively from the collected data of China’s climate policy
development as a part of the study. Under grounded theory approach, the “substantive
and formal” theories are built and grounded in data of social inquiry through inductive
and exploratory process. Grounded theory approach relies on a set of clearly formulated
procedures for developing theory (Crotty 1998). According to Glaser and Strauss (1967,
3-5), grounded theory is the best way of generating “initial, systematic discovery of the
theory from the data of social research”, which helps to forestall the opportunistic use of
logic-deductive theories that have dubious fit and working capacity. In this study, the
propositions that reflect climate change mitigation policy making process in China will
be explored by testing the hypotheses through empirical inquiry. The results will be
referred and compared with the fragmented authoritarianism model, which has been
widely taken as the most important model in studying Chinese policy process. Case study
approach will be presented in detail in Section 3.2.
To enhance explanatory functions of the policy network approach, researchers
have tried to establish causal models to study relations between policy networks and
policy outcomes. This study follows this logic to conduct the empirical work. Through
inductive reasoning applied to three cases and guided by research questions, the research
tries to generalize some essential features of China’s climate change policy network and
understand how these features have influenced the outcomes of mitigation policies or
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programs. Such an exploratory approach aims to conceptualize the similarities of an
aggregate of individual cases and develop a set of logically-interrelated propositions.
Three cases have been selected to facilitate elaboration of the mitigation policy
arrangements under the Chinese specific circumstances. They are the national climate
change mitigation policy in general, the CDM management rules adopted in 2004; and
the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program initiated in 2006. All three policy
arrangements experience some changes, but remain in force till now. The next section
addresses case selection issues in more detail.
3.2 Case Study Approach
The aim of this research is to examine China’s climate change mitigation policy
making process and explain its working mechanisms. Employing the policy network
approach, it will study the features of the policy actor networks and explain how the
networks contribute to policy development. This section discusses the case study design
and the appropriateness of this approach.
3.2.1 Reasons for Case Study
There are several reasons why the case study method has been chosen for the
study. First, as discussed in the previous chapter, China has experienced rapid change in
the past three decades due to reforms, and its state-society relationship has experienced
profound changes accordingly. Despite substantial research on China-related issues, there
are few studies that have focused on the policy process, and none on the climate change
policy making process. Therefore, this study is largely exploratory in nature, and
consequently, a case study approach is more appropriate for this inquiry.
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Second, studying the policy process is a highly complex matter that requires
tracing the process of policy development to understand the interactions of various
factors. A quantitative approach based on statistics cannot cope with complex causal
patterns and is limited by the number of homogenous cases; while case study method is
sensitive to contextual factors and allows examining the multiple causes and interaction
effects of the complex social world in detail (Ragin 2005).
Third, on the basis of the International Energy Agency (IEA) information (IEA
2010), the adopted climate change mitigation policies in China are still relatively small in
number. Although all these policies aggregately contribute to the reduction of carbon
emissions, each of them is unique in nature and difficult to compare. From the network
perspective, each policy arrangement is matched with unique structures and interactions
of state and non-state actors. According to George and Bennett (2005, 19), the case study
method is generally strong to “closely examine the hypothesized role of causal
mechanisms in the context of individual cases”.
Finally, although the policy network analytic framework mentioned above has
reflected causal mechanism among contextual factors, policy networks and policy
outcomes in policy making process, it is still challenging to measure the indicators that
best represent these components. Instead of using statistical methods that lump together
dissimilar cases and rigidly require quantifiable variables, a case study approach “allows
for conceptual refinement with a higher level of validity over a smaller number of cases”
(Op cit., 19).
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3.2.2 Case Selection
In a country as large and diverse as China, the design of case study research in
climate change mitigation policy process presents special challenges. These challenges
come from the following four aspects. First, although China established the interministerial committee to address climate policy coordination issues as early as the 1980s,
the great majority of the climate mitigation policies had not been formulated in the form
of laws, regulations and guidelines until around 2005, the year when the Kyoto Protocol
entered into force. Most of the policy statements are in forms of speeches or articles,
presented by government officials, especially by those working with the inter-ministerial
committee (Qi et al. 2007).
Second, climate change-related policies overlap with other policies relating to
economic development, environment protection and energy development. These policies
are not climate oriented, but they treat the limitation and reduction of GHG effects as
accessory benefits. Evidence shows that with the increased concerns on climate
mitigation issues, governments at the central level and at the local level have paid more
attention on the improvement of policy coordination and integration. Third, in China, the
central government weighs much higher in initiating climate mitigation activities than
local governments. Finally, there is a geographical mismatch in mitigation capacity and
obligations among the regions. Provinces and regions in the western part of China that
suffer from climate change negative impacts most have weaker capacities and resources
to reduce GHG emissions compared with the coastal provinces and municipalities.
The sample case/cases shall be the subset of the population, which are the
climate change mitigation policies that have been adopted by the Chinese national
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government. As a reference, IEA (2010) has identified dozens of climate mitigation
policies, measures, and programs. These policies, in different forms, have mobilized a
wide variety of actors to interact in taking mitigation actions.
Stake (1995) claims that the case study should maximize what we can learn.
This means to ensure the sample case/cases be more representative of the population and
achieve maximum variability. Since the adopted climate mitigation policies, measures
and program are unique and involve diverse actors, multiple case study design is
preferable to a single case study. Each single case should be instrumental to learning
about particular effects of the policy networks, and generalization will be refined through
collective case studies.
Due to the time and resource constraints for this research, it is only feasible to
conduct a limited number of case studies. Criteria to select cases are important, especially
given the inherent complexities associated with the policy types, scales, involved actors
and time period under which mitigation policies take place. Given that many government
programs cover interrelated subjects and involve multiple levels of government, market
and civil society actors in operation, policy subsystem or domain is suggested as an
appropriate unit of analysis (Sabatier 2007a, 4). Accordingly, the study will take the
general national climate change mitigation policy development as a single case. The other
cases will be nested within this broad case, and aim to provide unique evidence linking
policy networks and outcomes. This arrangement generally belongs to the “hierarchical
time-series and comparative-historical” type of case research design developed by
Gerring (2004).
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Two nested cases for in-depth empirical inquiry within the research were
selected. The selection criteria are as follow:
- Independence of the case. Independence is an important criterion of case
selection (George and Bennett 2005). To this end, it is more feasible and appropriate to
select a mitigation program, which is a focused arrangement aiming to realize specific
policy goals and normally has a clear starting and ending points.
- Involvement of actors. To maximize the independence, the cases with the
“high degree of automaticity” (Salamon and Lund 1989) will be ruled out. These cases
normally do not require detailed administrative action. For example, tax incentives are
largely self-executing because individuals or entities will seek them out and make
corresponding changes. In this study, the better cases are the ones that attract actor
involvement, and incorporate relatively independent decision makings and a substantial
degree of management efforts.
- Representativeness of policy types. Since climate change mitigation policy can
be broadly divided into two types: the one taking carbon emissions reduction as key
objective (climate-specific) and the one taking it as accessory action (climate-related), the
case selection thus will follow this typology.
- Geographical and sector coverage. It is preferable that the nested cases are
programs that are comprehensive and involves actions from more than one sector. In
addition, the case policies are preferably policies that are formulated by the national
government and implemented nationwide.
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- Site and data accessibility. The selected cases should have achieved
observable and measurable mitigation results. The secondary data sources are accessible
and individuals knowledgeable about the cases are willing to be interviewed.
After the screening of China’s climate mitigation activities taken in the past few
years, three cases have been selected: China’s national climate change mitigation action,
China’s involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) regime and the Top1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program. The main features of the three cases are
summarized in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Main Features of the Three Identified Cases
Policy/Progra
m
Case1:
National
Climate
Change
Mitigation
Action
Case2: Clean
Development
Mechanism
(CDM)
Project
Management
(in force)
Case3: Top1000
Industrial
Energy
Conservation
Program (in
force)

Category/
Sector

Frame
policy

Climate
specific
policy/
variety

Climaterelated
policy/
variety
(industry)

Domestic
Governmental
Actors
State Council,
NDRC, MOST,
MOFA
and
other ministries,
provincial
governments
NDRC, MOST,
and
MOFA,
other
15
ministries;
(limited local
government
involvement)
State Council,
NDRC, NBS,
Provincial
government,
associations
(high
local
government
involvement)

Types
Domestic
mitigation
policies,
and
measures

Marketbased
approach

Voluntary
agreement
Voluntary
agreement
with strong
regulations

Time
Period
From
1988 to
present

From
2004 to
present

03/2006
10/2008
10/2008
present

Level of
Actor
Participation

Policy
Linkage
(Scales of
Action)

From
low
actor
involvement
to high actor
involvement

International
-nationalsubnationallocal

From
low
actor
involvement
to high actor
involvement

International
-nationalsubnational

From
low
actor
involvement
to high actor
involvement

Nationalsubnationallocal

According to Sabatier (2007a, 3), the policy process usually “involves time
spans of a decade or more, as that is the minimum duration of most policy cycles.” For
the climate change mitigation policy development in China, although the history is not
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long (almost two decades if counted from the time that China approved the UNFCCC in
1992), there have been substantial evolution with regard to policy development. Since
this study focuses on the evolutionary process of policy development and network
formation, the timeframe of each case can be broadly divided into several phases, instead
of only a static analysis on network actors and their interactions. Next section briefly
describes three cases.
3.2.3 Description of the Cases
Of three selected cases, Case 1 provides a holistic perspective of the
development of climate change mitigation policy and action in China. It focuses on the
regulatory evolution and the current advocacy for market-based instruments of China’s
climate change mitigation policy making. The case is also characterized by the rapid
growth of policy networks, in which a wide variety of government, business and civil
society actors have closely linked and interacted. The time period, ranging from 1988 to
the present, is divided into four phases, corresponding with the most important
development in the international climate change regime (The establishment of the
UNFCCC in 1992, the creation of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, and its entry into force in
2005, are set as demarcation lines). The first case also sets a broader context in which the
two other cases are nested.
Case 2 of the CDM management policy development is a case of a policy
subsystem, in which China is joining the international climate governance network and
developing market-based approach to mitigate domestic emissions. The Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM) is a project-based climate mitigation scheme under the
Kyoto Protocol, which entered into force in 2005. The dual goals of the CDM are to
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promote sustainable development in host developing countries and to allow industrialized
countries to trade the emissions credits from their investments in emission-reducing
projects in developing countries. The CDM allows China to develop emission reduction
projects and trade credits in international carbon market. The future development of the
CDM scheme depends on the international climate change regime after 2012. After
several years’ capacity building experience, in 2004, Chinese government promulgated
interim CDM management rules, established administrative institutions, and formally
initiated CDM project development. One year later, the interim rules was rescinded and
replaced by an updated one, which specifies new rules for actors involved in the project
activities.
The third case of the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program deals
with joint development of climate-related program in industrial sectors. Under this
program, governments at provincial level sign contracts with local enterprises and
oversee the enterprises to reach the contracted energy efficiency goals. Modeled on
international target-setting programs, the Program has been implemented since March
2006 and is frequently referred to as a voluntary program. The industries included in the
program are large-scale, financially independent enterprises widely dispersed in the
country, representing more than 33% of China's total energy demand and 47% of the total
industrial energy consumption in 2004 (Price and Wang 2007). Notably, this is the first
time that the central government has incorporated provincial governments to supervise
and monitor program implementation. Initially, only limited policies and incentives were
provided to the involved enterprises. However, realizing the goal of reducing energy
intensity by 4% per year was difficult to meet, from September 2008, China has adopted
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new financial and administrative measure to strengthen the enforcement, and expand the
program to a larger scale.
3.3 Dimensions to Measure the Policy Network
As shown in the analytic framework in Figure 2.1 of Chapter 2, the policy
network is shaped by the environmental contexts and will determine the policy outputs
and outcomes. Considering there are different approaches to use the policy network
concept and in order to guide data collection in three case studies, it is of importance to
define dimensions that can characterize the main features of policy networks.
Three dimensions are distinguished to identify the features of policy networks.
Since policy networks are a collection of mutually dependent actors, the first dimension
often refers to specifying the boundaries of the system, which include the membership of
the network and the attributes of these actors. The members are those actors that take part
in the exchange of resources (Liefferink et al. 2000). They can be institutional actors, as
well as the individual actors. The attributes of actors may include the goals, perceptions
of the issues, and the strategies the actors employed (Zheng et al. 2010; Adam and Kriesi
2007).
The second dimension of policy network deals with structural features, which
characterize the distribution and mobilization of power among the set of actors within a
policy subsystem (Adam and Kriesi 2007, 134). The dimension is “concerned with
whether power is concentrated in the hands of one dominant actor or coalition of actors
or whether it is shared between actors or coalitions of actors” (Op cit., 134). The relations
of power and resources inside the network are the core element of the policy network;
however, the policy process may also be affected by links with networks around adjacent
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policy issues, which are labeled by some scholars as “horizontal” element of the network
structure (Liefferink et al. 2000). In the case of studying national climate change policy,
not only the structural features of key state and non-state actors will be studied, but also
network structural links with other related policy issues will be included, such as issues
of economic development, environmental protection and energy management.
The interactions in policy networks, which are presented by the degree of
cooperation among actors, constitute the third dimension. Adam and Kriesi (2007, 134)
define three forms of interactions between network actors and put them into a continuum:
conflict/competition, bargaining/negotiation, and cooperation, in which “bargaining
constitutes an intermediate or ambivalent type characterized by both conflict/competition
and cooperation”. The interaction dimension allows a better connection of
“configurations of policy networks to policy dynamics” (Op cit. 134).
With the help of these three dimensions, the shape and functioning of China’s
climate change mitigation policy networks will be empirically investigated in the coming
chapters. At the same time, the features of the policy networks will be linked to the
analysis the policy contexts and policy outcomes.
3.4 Data Collection and Analysis
3.4.1 Data Collection Methods
The data collection and analysis are to provide sufficient and reliable
information to support project study. On the basis of the analytic framework, the
empirical data have been collected focusing on the three aspects of the policy processes:
policy contexts (international, domestic and policy-related), policy networks, and policy
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outcomes. Both primary data and secondary data have been used. They are from archival
records, documental research, in-depth interviews, and field research.
The major source of information for this study is from different kinds of
literature: books, newspaper, journal papers, articles, government documents about the
climate change regime, Chinese politics, and Chinese climate change policy. The reason
of taking literature as major source of information is because of its advantages in
accessibility and coverage. On the other hand, in China, interviewing relevant officials
inside the system has been proven hard, and governmental officials are reluctant to be
interviewed. However, some of the sources from literature should be used with caution,
given the fact that information is sometimes subject to governmental control in China,
and the reliability of Chinese data has frequently been questioned. It is not possible to
avoid these problems when doing research about China, therefore, in this study,
information from multiple resources has been triangulated to improve the reliability of
data.
In addition to literature, a series of semi-structured interviews have been taken
to collect primary data and deepen the understanding of empirical inquiry. The interviews
were conducted from November 2009 to February 2010 during the course of three-month
of fieldwork in two Chinese cities: Beijing and Shenyang. Beijing was selected because
of its position as the political center where key government agencies are located, as well
as the place where a variety of international and domestic society and organizational
actors are found. Shenyang is the capital city of Liaoning province, which is the home of
many of the heavy industries and has high stakes in implementing climate change
policies. The visited sites included regulatory agencies and participatory (or regulated)
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units related to the key climate mitigation policy making and implementation. The
interviewees were government officials, research scholars, business consultants, and
other practitioners from relevant governmental agencies, international organizations,
research institutions, and businesses. Interviews conducted in the two cities have
provided very useful background information about how the national climate change
mitigation policy is oriented to fit into local interests.
3.4.2 Within-case Analysis and Cross-case Analysis
In reality, it is almost impossible to apply experimental methods or make
perfectly controlled comparison to analyze processes and outcomes of policies, which
weakens the rigorous application of comparative method (George and Bennett 2005, 151153). However, within-case analysis provides an alternative approach that “compensates
for the limits of both statistical and comparative case analyses” (Op cit., 178).
To examine the institutional and historical development of China’s climate
change mitigation policy process in individual cases, the central task is to link numerous
observations within a case in particular ways to make them possible for casual inferences.
The policy network analytical framework developed in previous chapter provides a
causal linkage of some key factors to guide for empirical evidence acquisition. The
employment of the within case approach is thus to trace key policy changes in each of the
three cases, test hypotheses concerning roles and functions of policy networks, and
uncover a causal mechanism posited by the analytic framework.
On the other hand, since there is a paucity of research on the process of China’s
climate change mitigation policy making and implementation, it is expected that the
study can generalize some commonalities from the three cases through the cross-case
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analysis. The cross-case approach is taken as an alternative approach of within-case
analysis which focuses on examining individual causal links (Eisenhardt 1989). Although
the multiple case study design may implicitly enhance the representativeness of the study,
making case studies more generalizable, the cross-case analysis also suggests a weakness
of comparability. As Gerring (2004) claims, the tradeoff between comparability and
representativeness is intrinsic to the case study choice of research design. Given that three
selected cases are different but mutually related mitigation arrangements, it should be
noted that in the study, the cross-case analysis is used to comparatively generalize some
commonalities of key features in processing climate mitigation policies in China.
In a word, when analyzing empirical evidence, the within-case analysis is in
conjunction with cross-case analysis, in order to generate and verify some propositions at
the abstract level for theory testing and development. The within-case and cross-case
analyses will be taken in Chapter 8.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has presented the methodology to be used in conducting the
research. In general, the study is exploratory and inductive in nature. To study China’s
climate change mitigation policy process from the perspective of policy network
development, the multiple case study method has been employed.
Three cases have been selected from a pool of the climate change mitigation
policies that have been implemented and are still in force. These cases were used to
illuminate the main features of the specific policy network settings in shaping different
policy arrangements and influencing the outcomes in the Chinese context. The first case
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examines the regulatory evolution of China’s climate change mitigation policy making
since the late 1980s. The second and the third cases deal with sub-policies. Case 2
focuses on China’s involvement in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) regime,
and Case 3 studies China’s attempt to initiate industrial voluntary-agreement program:
the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program.
The main data source was documentary literature published in English and/or
Chinese, including government documents, books, journals, newsletters, newspapers,
research reports, and other materials on the internet. Fieldwork and interviews were taken
as supplementary sources of information. Important data are checked to improve the
reliability of information for analysis. In addition, within-case analysis is taken to test
relevant hypotheses; while cross-case analysis is taken to generalize some findings to
verify the prevailing understanding of policy process.
Before presenting the findings from the three cases, next chapter provides a
historical overview of China’s climate change policy development. Considering that Case
1 deals with generic evolution of China’s climate change mitigation policy making, and
Case 2 and 3 are nested within it, the presentation of overall policy development not only
traces substantive information for Case 1, but also provides contextual background for
the discussion of the other two cases.
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CHAPTER IV
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CHINA’S CLIMATE CHANGE ACTION
This chapter presents historical development of China’s national climate change
mitigation policy making and action, which is also taken as contextual background of the
three cases. The historical development is usefully divided into four phases: (1) the
Institutional Preparation Period, from 1988-1992, when climate change had been
transformed into a policy issue, and the Chinese central government began to establish its
first inter-ministerial committee to prepare for international climate negotiations and
cooperation; (2) the Pre-Kyoto Period, from 1993-1997, when international community
centered on negotiating a legally binding commitment that can be more broadly accepted
by involved parties; (3) the Kyoto Ratification Period, from 1997 to 2005, when the
Kyoto Protocol was stalled from its signing in 1997 and finally entered into force, and
when China had been hesitatively involved in pilot mitigation project cooperation; (4) the
New Development Period since 2005, when China began to adjust its strategies to be
more proactive in promoting mitigation policies and participating in international
negotiations.
4.1 Formulating Climate Institutions, 1988- 1992
In the late 1980s, climate change entered into the international political agenda.
As an intergovernmental scientific group to provide authoritative assessment of the
potential risks of climate change caused by human activity, the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) was created in August 1988 by the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). In
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response to the international scientific effort, at the same year, the Chinese government
established its first research group to coordinate participation in the IPCC-related work.
The Environmental Protection Commission of the State Council brought together four
agencies: the State Meteorological Administration (SMA), the State Science and
Technology Commission (SSTC), the National Environmental Protection Agency
(NEPA), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). Among the four agencies, the
SMA played the leading role in directing the studies on the science of climate change; the
SSTC was in charge of the development of relevant response strategies; the NEPA was
responsible for the assessment of the climate impacts; and finally, the MOFA coordinated
the international climate negotiations. At this early stage, the climate change issue was
taken more as a scientific and international relations issue, rather than an economic
development issue (Economy 1997, 24).
Substantial administrative reforms also were undertaken in 1988. The Ministry
of Energy (MOE) was reestablished, and the National Environmental Protection Agency
(NEPA) was separated from the Ministry of Urban-Rural Construction, forming as a
vice-ministerial agency. However, during this period, economic growth in China
experienced a big fluctuation under unstable political conditions. The serious inflation in
1988 was followed by a program of economic retrenchment imposed in late 1988 and
tightened after the Tiananmen event in June 1989, which led to serious economic
recession and subsequent social dislocation (Saich 2004, 74). Chinese decision makers
had to reconsider development strategies for economic growth, and at the same time, deal
with greater challenges of international relations with the end of the Cold War. In late
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June of 1989, Jiang Zemin was appointed to replace Zhao Ziyang as the General
Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party.
In 1990, the IPCC released its First Assessment Report, reporting that global
temperatures having increased by 0.3 to 0.6 C over the previous century. The scientific
discussions concerning climate change began and proceeded with more political
negotiations. In 1991, Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) for Framework
Convention on Climate Change (INC/FCCC) was established by the UN General
Assembly, with the aim of negotiating a convention containing commitments before the
UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), scheduled for June 1992.
At the same time, Global Environmental Facility (GEF) was established to help
developing countries fund projects and programs in the areas of climate change,
biodiversity, international waters, and stratospheric ozone protection.
Correspondingly, in China, the National Climate Change Coordination Group
(NCCCG) was established under the Environmental Protection Commission of the State
Council. The coordination group was chaired by Song Jian, then State Councilor, as well
as the Minister of the SSTC. The core member agencies included the four initiallyappointed agencies working for IPCC tasks, and two newly added ministerial agencies,
namely the MOE and the State Planning Commission (SPC). The Secretariat of the
NCCCG was placed within the State Meteorological Administration (SMA).
The functioning of the NCCCG was greatly driven by the international climate
scientific discussions and political negotiations. Three issues emerged as especially
critical for China. The first issue was the scientific uncertainties of climate change. The
scientific debates of climate change provided Chinese scientists an opportunity to
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participate in international cooperation. The SSTC and the SPC negotiated a five-year
global climate change research program, which encompassed 40 projects and involved
about 20 ministries and 500 experts (Economy 1997, 24). More importantly, under the
auspices of the IPCC process, the scientific community in China had gained tremendous
funding and technical assistance from international organizations, such as the World
Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Environmental Program
(UNEP) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (Op cit., 24).
The second issue concerned the relationship between carbon reduction and the
country’s energy and economic development. By 1990, with 10.6% of the global carbon
dioxide emission, China had become the third largest emitter in the world (EIA emission
database). China had felt pressures to respond to the climate change issues. It had to
adjust its coal-dependent energy structure, improve energy efficiency, and slow its
economic growth rate. Differences existed among the ministries within the NCCCG, in
which the MOE and the SPC gave more priority on the economic development, rather
than energy restructuring. Apparently, after the economic recession in 1989, the national
economic policy during 1990-1992 was set to increase the economic growth rate.
The third issue was the position and readiness that China would formulate for
the international climate change negotiations. Allying with other developing countries as
one group (G77 and China), China resisted any claims of the mandatory commitment of
reducing carbon emissions. The group argued that commitments should be differentiated
between developing countries and developed countries, because of the historical
responsibility and per capita emissions; and the developed countries should undertake the
responsibility to reduce emissions first; transfer energy-efficient technologies; and
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provide financial assistance to developing countries for capacity development. In addition,
the developing countries worried that strong institutional and implementation
mechanisms (such as detailed reporting requirements, noncompliance procedures) might
infringe on their sovereignty. Within the NCCCG of China, the traditionally powerful
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the State Planning Commission dominated the political
discussions.
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED)
was held in June 1992 in Rio De Janeiro, Brazil, with the Framework Convention on
Climate Change (FCCC) signed. Industrialized countries were required to adopt policies
that aimed to return emissions to 1990 levels by the end of the century. Aiming to
stabilize the GHG concentrations at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system, the FCCC set an overall framework for
intergovernmental efforts to tackle climate change. It calls on the international
cooperation on sharing information on GHG emissions, national policies and best
practices, as well as preparing for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. The FCCC
adopts the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities”, which requires the developed countries to take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof, and gives no specific responsibilities to
developing countries. The successful opposition of the differentiation among developing
countries based on their different levels of development matched very well with Chinese
interests (Bjørkum 2005).
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4.2 Pre-Kyoto Preparations, 1992-1997
Internationally, after the Rio Earth Summit, six more INC meetings had been
held till the FCCC finally entered into force in 1994. One year later, at the First
Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP 1), some significant outcomes were reached,
including the negotiation of a protocol that contains legally binding commitments for
developed countries for post-2000 period, and a initiation of a pilot phase of “joint
activities”, called the Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ).
The core issue of the COP 1 was the proposal of negotiating a protocol. On this
issue, the Chinese delegation was skeptical of the new proposal to follow up the
Convention, and expressed that it was not interested in negotiating it before the Annex I
Parties had implemented all their commitments in accordance with the Convention (ENB
1995, 4). In addition, together with the G77, China expressed their skepticism of the
proposed AIJ activities, fearing the AIJ scheme would launch mandatory commitments
for developing countries, thus shifting the responsibility of developed countries (ENB
1996).
Domestically, the year 1992 also proved to be a watershed of large-scale
transformation from planned economy to market-oriented economy. Shortly after Deng
Xiaoping’s south-tour speech on economic growth, a new round of economic reform was
launched, leading to a dramatic economic boom. In late 1993, the Third Plenum of the
Fourteenth Party Congress adopted the document of establishing a “Socialist Market
Economic System”. The reform, under the formulation of “socialist market reform”,
allowed market forces to play a great role in allocating commodities while retaining the
state the capacity to make macro-level adjustments and control (Saich 2004, 78).
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The rapid economic boom caused another round of overheating, forcing the
government to adopt some retrenchment policies to achieve an economic soft-landing. To
adapt to the needs of the market economy, the economic reform document adopted in
1993 proposed the need for restructuring the central-local financial system, which
signified a renewed role of central government in revising de facto economic
decentralization. At the same year, the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC)
was set up and the Ministry of Energy was abolished. With these efforts, the economic
growth rate has been calmed from 13.4% in 1993 to 8.8% in 1997, and inflation rate
reduced from 30% by the end of 1994 to 0.8% by the end of 1997. However, China’s
share in the global carbon emissions kept on growing, creeping up from 11.5% in 1992 to
13.4% in 1997 (EIA 2010).
During this period, the responsibilities of the NCCCG were diversified into four
groups, consistent with the group division of IPCC operation. These four working groups
dealt with specific tasks that link international climate change regime negotiations. The
four groups were (1) the Working Group for Scientific Assessments co-chaired by the
State Meteorological Administration (SMA) and the Chinese Academy of Sciences
(CAS); (2) the Working Group for Impacts and Response Strategies, co-chaired by the
SSTC and the NEPA; (3) the Working Group for Economic Analyses co-chaired by SPC
and Ministry of Eclectic Power; and (4) the Working Group for Negotiation co-chaired
by MFA and the SSTC (Tiempo 1997). Other ministries and agencies were also involved
in the relevant domestic policy discussions dependent on specific requirements of each
working group within the NCCCG. In January 1995, the National Climate Center was
established under the SMA and aimed at cooperating with international counterparts to
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enhance the research work of climate change. Whereas the SMA remains the nominal
leading agency of the NCCCG, its authority in policy coordination had been greatly
weakened. The structure of the NCCCG framed the future institutional arrangements for
China’s climate change governance.
A related program with the climate change negotiations is the Agenda 21, which
was agreed in the 1992 Rio Earth Summit and set blueprints for sustainable development
into the 21st century. In China, the State Council delegated the NDRC and the SSTC as
two leading agencies in coordinating activities for sustainable development. In March
1994, for guiding the implementation of projects under China’s Agenda 21, the
administration office was established under the SSTC (predecessor of the Ministry of
Science and Techonology). However, the institutional establishment of China’s Agenda
21 Program and its evolution are separate from the arrangements for climate change
issues (Zhou and Mori 2008, 196). With the entry of the new millennium, the roles of this
program have been gradually marginalized in practice.
In 1995, the First Conference of the Parties (COP 1) to the UNFCCC convened
in Berlin, negotiating detailed and binding commitments for industrialized countries to
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. After nearly three years’ intense negotiations,
in December 1997, at the COP 3 in Kyoto, Japan, an agreement, called Kyoto Protocol
was adopted, which required industrialized countries (Annex I countries) to reduce their
collective emissions of the six most important GHGs by an average 5.2% below the 1990
level by 2008-2012. Within this group, countries are committed with differentiated
targets. To facilitate developed countries in achieving targets with lower costs and
promoting the sustainable development in developing countries, the Kyoto Protocol
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contains three flexibility mechanisms: the International Emission Trading (IET) scheme
which creates a market to trade surplus emission credits; the Joint Implementation (JI),
which allows developed countries to cooperate in carbon reduction projects and transmit
emission credits on the basis of such projects; the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM), which allows developed countries to invest in emission reduction projects in
developing countries and count the reduction against their own commitments. Although
the details on operation of these mechanisms were not set out at the COP 3 and required
further negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol creates a comprehensive, yet flexible GHG
emission reduction regime and signifies the beginning of a long-term international effort
to address climate change.
During the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, China, together with the G77, resisted
any proposal that requires commitments from developing countries. They argued strongly
for obeying the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility” that has been
explicitly formulated in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Bjørkum
2005). China and other developing countries also objected to the emission trading
approach, stating that it would be an instrument that would make developed countries
exempt from domestic mitigation actions. In general, the developing countries proved to
be quite influential in Kyoto. No timetable and emission reduction targets were mandated
for developing countries (ENB 1997, 15).
4.3 Piloting for the Kyoto Protocol, 1997-2005
After the Kyoto Protocol was signed in 1997, the subsequent negotiations have
evolved around its rules of procedure and how to make the Protocol ready to enter into
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force. Although this had been more of a matter of how to make the agreement acceptable
for certain developed countries, China continued to argue against on any compulsory
emission reduction commitments to developing countries by emphasizing that its CO2
emissions per capita were sill 61% of the world average level and 21% of the OECD
countries 1 (He et al. 2007). Furthermore, being aware of the limited weight of acting in
isolation, China tried to strengthen its solidarity with the G-77 group to enhance their
joint negotiating capacity on all major issues. For the Chinese government, another
concern was how China could deal with the CDM scheme, once the Kyoto Protocol could
have been ratified (Harris and Yu 2005, 53). China took two approaches to seek some
breakthrough. On the one hand, it stressed that the emission trading through CDM is a
way for developed countries to avoid their responsibility and has the potential to exploit
the developing countries’ rights of ownership to the credits. On the other hand, China
initiated four Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) projects (precedent of the CDM
projects) by cooperating with Japan and Norway. The pilot phase of AIJ provided a
practical opportunity for developing methodologies and accumulating project
management experience (CCChina 2002).
To set up an administrative system adapting to market economy, in March 1998,
a new round of administrative reform was launched, marked by a more powerful
restructuring

of

governmental

institutions.

In

the

reform,

the

number

of

ministries/commissions decreased from 40 to 29. The SPC was reshuffled as State
Development and Planning Commission (SDPC), the NEPA was updated to a ministerial1
OECD stands for the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, an international
organization of 34 countries founded in 1961to stimulate economic progress and world trade. Most OECD
member countries are high-income economies and are regarded as developed countries.
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level agency: the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). Numerous industrial
ministries were dissolved or reshuffled as industrial bureaus attached to the State
Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). The grand administrative reform also
triggered the boom in the number of industrial associations at national level and
provincial level. These associations, in the form of Government Organized Nongovernmental Organizations (GONGOs), not only served as service delivery agencies for
the state, but also absorbed governmental officials who were laid off during the reform
(Wu 2003). At the same time, China worked hard to resume its membership under the
World Trade Organization (WTO). In November 1999, China signed agreement with the
United States on the terms of WTO entry.
A few months following the State Council’s institutional reconfiguration in
1998, the inter-ministerial climate change coordination committee was restructured, with
a view of improving the capacity of climate change related policy coordination. The new
committee, the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC) was
chaired by the SDPC. Other leading agencies included the Ministry of Science and
Technology (MOST), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the State Meteorological
Administration (SMA), and the State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA). The
move indicated a shift of decision makers’ viewpoint of climate change from a scientific
issue to a development issue. Zeng Peiyan, then director of the SDPC, held the position
of leader of the coordination committee. The Secretariat of the NCCCC was set in the
Department of the Regional Development of the SDPC.
In 2001, The IPCC released the Third Assessment Report on climate change,
indicating the evidence of human influences on the global climate is stronger than ever.
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In November, at the COP 7 in Marrakech, Morocco, the Marrakech Accords were
adopted, clarifying the modalities, guidelines and procedures for the implementation of
the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol. The Marrakech Accords paved the way for
Annex I Parties (developed countries) to ratify the Kyoto Protocol and thus bring it into
force. This was seen as a significant event after the newly-elected US President George
W. Bush had just announced in March that his administration would not support the
Kyoto Protocol because it does not limit the emissions from developing countries and
would be too costly to implement 2.
The imminence of the Kyoto Protocol implementation was clearly felt by the
Chinese government, which began to change its strategy from “reactive” to more
adaptive. In 2002, at the World Summit on Sustainable Development held in
Johannesburg South Africa, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji announced China’s ratification
of the Kyoto Protocol. After that, a number of capacity building projects were approved
by the National Climate Change Coordination Committee (NCCCC). Most of these
projects were focused on CDM project development and sponsored by international
donors and foreign governments through bilateral agreements. To ensure a balanced
distribution of these capacity building projects, the NDRC and the MOST negotiated with
the donors to ensure that the case studies in these CDM projects would focus on emission
reduction activities in different sectors and regions. Some of these pilot projects were
later developed into real CDM projects.

2

Notably, in 2002, U.S. President Bush announced a voluntary commitment to reduce the GHG intensity
by 18% in 10 years as an alternative to the mandatory reductions under the Kyoto Protocol.
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Although China had performed remarkably in quadrupling its GDP (Gross
Domestic Product) while only doubling its energy use between 1980 and 2000, a new
problem emerged at the turn of the century. After a steadily decreasing trend of Chinese
energy demand during 1997-2001, the figure bounced back from 2002; and the energy
demand grew more quickly than GDP. The principle driver of this rise is an increase in
the share of GDP provided by heavy industry, driven by the economic incentives (Downs
2010). As Hochman and Zilberman (2010) argue, globalization and capital flows have
lifted overall investment in China and contributed to China’s economic growth, which
leads to more demand for energy. In 2002, the year subsequent of China’s entry into the
World Trade Organization (WTO), the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in China reached
52.7 billion US dollars, increasing 12.6% compared with that of the previous year. China
had surpassed the US and become the largest economy to attract foreign investment.
Correspondingly, carbon emission has increased sharply. During 2001 to 2005, China’s
share in the global GHG emission had increased from 12% to 19.5%, getting close to the
United States, the traditional largest GHG emitter (EIA 2010). In 2005, China became the
world’s fourth largest economy and its third largest trading power.
The impacts of China’s rapid economic development were profound.
Domestically, China realized that it is essential to adapt to these new economic, social
and technological situations. With the new leadership under Hu Jintao (General Secretary
of the Chinese Communist Party and President) and Wen Jiabao (Premier), a new round
of administrative reform started in 2003 in order to accommodate the requirements of the
country’s entry into the WTO. New ministerial agencies, such as the Commission of
State-owned Assets Supervision and the Ministry of Commerce were established. The
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SETC (State Economic and Trading Commission), which had been responsible for
industrial sector activities, were integrated into the renamed National Development and
Reform Commission (formally named as the SDPC). In 2004, the Chinese Authority
raised the goal of “building a resource-efficient and environment-friendly society”, which
signified the leaders’ serious concerns on China’s resources and environment issues for
sustainable development. This led to a number of policies, programs and activities being
initiated to restructure the energy mix and improve energy efficiency.
The domestic climate change coordination committee was subsequently
reorganized and expanded, increasing its members from 7 to 12. In 2004, under the
NCCCC, the National CDM Board (NCB) was established, chaired by the NDRC and the
MOST. The NDRC was also appointed as the Designated National Agency (DNA), the
unit for approving CDM projects and coordinating international communication and
cooperation. In mid-2004, the NDRC, along with the MOST and the MOFA jointly
promulgated the Interim Measures for Operation and Management of Clean Development
Mechanism Projects in China, signifying China’s readiness for the implementation of the
Kyoto Protocol mechanisms. It soon approved its first CDM project. In August 2004, the
State Council approved the Initial National Communication on Climate Change. The
Initial Communication provides a detailed picture of the country’s emission inventories
and its activities within the context of climate change.
More flexibility has been witnessed in Chinese climate change diplomacy
during this phase. As an example, in July 2005, China negotiated a new climate pact with
the United States, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and India known as the “Asia Pacific
Partnership for Clean Development and Climate Change”. Six countries agreed to
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cooperation on developing and transferring technology to reduce GHG emissions. The
pact was non-binding and was announced to complement the Kyoto Protocol, not to
replace it (APP 2010).
4.4 Managing Changes, Post-2005
With Russia’s ratification despite the US nonparticipation, the Kyoto Protocol
reached the threshold and entered into force in February 2005. The entry into force
strengthened the global mitigation effort by committing the Annex I countries to the
legally-binding targets to limit or reduce their GHG emissions. The subsequent
international negotiations have been focusing on long-term GHG reduction targets and
timeframe, as well as agreement for the post-2012 period. As a party to the Kyoto
Protocol, China has been actively involved in climate change negotiations aiming at
creating a successor agreement. It stresses its lower per capita GHG emissions, and its
special development stage of industrialization and urbanization.
Although the CDM development had a relatively late start in China, this
position has changed dramatically after 2006. The CDM has been seen as a vehicle that
not only stimulates foreign investment in GHG mitigation projects, but also allows China
to be seen as a proactive country on climate issues. In 2005, China revised its CDM rules.
Three priority types of projects were identified: development of new and renewable
energy, energy efficiency improvement, and methane recovery and utilization. The
administrative approval procedures were also streamlined, making project development
and approval more efficient. Since 2007, China has become the leading CDM host
country in the world (As a single case, China’s CDM involvement will be studied as the
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second case in Chapter 6). The market-oriented emission trading system has become
accepted in China. In 2008, an emission trading exchange was established in Tianjin. The
exchange, duplicating the model of Chicago Climate Exchange, intends to develop and
promote the GHG emission trading in China. It aims to build partnerships with research
institutions, financial agencies, accreditation units, and industrial associations in China.
Continued economic growth in China has led to greater energy use and carbon
emissions. A number of policies and programs have been adopted since 2004 to reverse
the trend that energy consumption grew faster than economic growth. These domestic
policies were aimed at adjusting energy and industrial structure and improving energy
efficiency thus leading to the choice of energy intensity (energy consumption per unit of
GDP) as the key indicator to measure policy effectiveness. In 2005, China announced a
plan to increase the use of renewable energy from 7% to 15% of total energy production
till 2020. In China’s 11th Five-year Plan adopted in 2006, China pledged to realize the
reduction of energy intensity by 20% from 2005 levels during 2005-2010.
With the new slogan of “scientific development perspective”, the new
leadership under Hu and Wen has shown a higher degree of concerns about economic
development, resource management, and environmental protection. In August 2005, the
State Council issued the Notification on the Immediate Priorities for Building a
Conservation-oriented Society and Several Opinions on Accelerating the Development of
Circular Economy. In December, the State Council issued the Decision to Implement the
Interim Provisions on Promoting Industrial Restructuring and the Decision to Strengthen
Environmental Protection with Scientific Development Perspective. Various types of
reports have been formulated and publicized through inter-ministerial cooperation to
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reflect China’s concerns on sustainable development and strategies to address climate and
environmental change.

Some of these reports include: Climate and Environmental

Change in China (2005); National Assessment Report on Climate Change (2006);
China’s Scientific & Technological Actions on Climate Change (2007); China’s Policies
and Actions for Addressing Climate Change (2008); China’s Policies and Actions for
Addressing Climate Change —The Progress Report (2009); and Resolution on Making
Active Responses to Climate Change.
It is reported that since 2006, China has surpassed the United States as the
world's largest carbon emitter (EIA 2008). China realized the importance to explicitly
explain its stance on climate change and its interests in international cooperation. After
several years of gestation, in June 2007, China formally announced the National Climate
Change Program, which conveyed consensus among Chinese top leaders on climate
change mitigation issues (Li 2007). This new policy package focused on five key areas,
namely, mitigation, adaptation, technology, international cooperation, and participation in
the regional efforts. The program did not include mandatory quota and a timetable for
aggregate GHG emission reductions; but it tried to integrate existing policies that
appeared in relevant energy policies and the 11th Five Year Plan (personal interview with
NDRC official).
In the 11th National People’s Congress held in 2008, aiming to improve
efficiency, reduce the cost of policy making and its execution, and straighten out
problematic chains of command, several ministries were consolidated to form “Super
Ministries”. Five super-ministries respectively overseeing industry, transport, housing
and construction, human resources and the environment were restructured, including the
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Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), which was upgraded from the State
Environmental Protection Administration.
Under the leadership of the State Council, institutions dealing with energy
conservation and emission reduction were reformed to strengthen policy coordination and
enforcement. The new national climate change coordination institution, the National
Climate Change Leading Group (NCCLG), is chaired by Premier Wen Jiabao. The
Groups members are commissioners and ministers from 20 different ministerial agencies.
The NCCLG also acts as the highest-level policy coordination organ of energy
conservation and emission reductions, with the name of National Energy Conservation
and Emission Reduction Leading Group (NECERLG). These arrangements indicate the
central government puts three issues of energy saving, pollution reduction, and climate
change together and gives them parallel significance (Qi et al. 2008). The secretariat of
the NCCLG was set in the reshuffled Department of Climate Change. Su Wei, a veteran
climate change negotiator from the MOFA, was appointed to head the department (Wang
2008). The commissioner of the NDRC, Ma Kai, heads the secretariats of two leading
groups.
Another milestone in China’s climate policy development is the gradual
involvement of local governments. A series of capacity building projects or pilot projects,
covering mitigation and adaptation activities, have been initiated in selected provinces
and localities, under the supervision of local governments. The most prominent capacity
building program is the Program for Climate Change Mitigation and Adaptation in China,
initiated first in 7 pilot provinces in June 2008 and extended to 20 more provinces. In
addition, to ensure the achievement of intensity and pollutant reduction goals set in the
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11th Five-year Plan, the reduction targets have been delegated to provinces and their
related industrial businesses (to be studied in detail in the case of the Top-1000 Industrial
Energy Conservation Program). Through such a traditional top-down approach, the
government agencies beyond the center have been involved.
From late 2007, the global economy has undergone recession. International
climate change mitigation has confronted new challenges. With China‘s economy
maintaining stable growth, it successively overtook Germany and Japan as the second
largest economy after the US. Its position in international climate change negotiations has
received more attention. Although China declines to accept any mandatory commitments,
it has been mobilizing all forces at local, provincial and national level to address climate
change and develop low carbon economy. In November 2009, shortly before the COP 17
Conference in Copenhagen, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao announced that China would
reduce its carbon GDP intensity by 40% - 45% by the 2020, compared with 2005 levels,
and increase its renewable energy share to 15% of its total energy by 2020. This is
another ambitious goal after its 20% energy intensity reduction goal set five years ago.
Though it will not limit the possible increase in carbon emissions, it is the first time the
issues of carbon emissions and economic development will be linked. In the speech at the
Copenhagen Climate Summit, Wen Jiabao stressed Chinese efforts in carbon emission
cuts, “This is a voluntary action China has taken in the light of its national
circumstances. …… We have not attached any condition to the target, nor have we linked
it to the target of any other country. We will honor our word with real action. Whatever
outcome this conference may produce, we will be fully committed to achieving and even
exceeding the target.”
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Statistics showed that energy intensity was reduced by 19.2% during 11th Five
Year Plan period. With a view of completing the 40-50% carbon intensity reduction goal
by 2020, in March 2011, the reduction goal has been separated into energy and carbon
intensity goals and addressed in the 12th Five-year Plan: during 2011 to 2015, China
plans to reduce its energy intensity by 16% and its carbon intensity by 17%. This is new
progress of Chinese climate change mitigation policy.
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CHAPTER V
CASE 1: CHINA’S CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION INITIATIVE
5.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 has presented a historical overview of China’s climate change policy
development, which provides contextual background information for the case of China’s
climate change mitigation action. In the first case study, policy development is perceived
as a process in which a variety of actors have formed networks and become increasingly
involved in shaping and promoting climate mitigation policies through institutional
improvement and policy coordination, in response to increased international and
domestic concerns on climate change issues.
According to the policy network analytic framework, the policy process is
manifested in the evolvement of policy networks, in which the structures and functions of
policy networks are shaped by the interplay of transnational factors, national factors, as
well as policy-domain specific factors. In addition, structural and interactive features of
policy networks influence policy outcomes and possible policy changes.
Subsequent to the overview of the evolution of China’s climate change
mitigation policy, this chapter focuses on the study of features and roles of networks in
climate change mitigation policy process, and analyzes relationship between policy
contexts, networks and outcomes. Such arrangements generally follow the logic of the
policy network analytic framework. The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2, the
actors involved in the policy process are identified; and their roles and network features

88

are presented. Next, the outcomes of China’s climate change mitigation policy and
initiative are addressed in Section 5.3. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes the case.
5.2 Network Actors, Structures, and Interactions
5.2.1 Actors at Central Level
The most important and consistent players in developing China’s climate
change policy are the State Council and its affiliated ministries and departments. They
formed networks to address contextual requirements. Over recent years, the Central
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the National People’s Congress
(NPC) have actively promoted climate change mitigation policies and activities.
Since 1990, an inter-ministerial committee has taken on the role as the state
institution that participates in climate change negotiations and coordinates climate related
policies. Ministries and agencies within the committee vary in their degrees of influence.
Before the restructuring in 1998, responsibility for the coordination was with the Chinese
Meteorological Administration. After 1998, the NDRC, which represents the economic
development interests, has played the role of pivotal agency in the coordination
committee. Currently, the State Council leads national policy making and coordination
among around 20 ministerial agencies involved in the policy making process. Table 5.1
gives an overview of the evolution of the coordination committee.
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Table 5.1 Evolution of China's Climate Change Coordination Committee
Name of
the Interministerial
Committee
National
Climate
Change
Coordination
Group
(NCCCG)
National
Coordinatio
n
Committee
on Climate
Change
(NCCCC)
National
Climate
Change
Leading
Group
(NCCLG)

Year of
Formation

Chairperson

1990

Song
Jian
(State
Councilor/
Minister of
MOST)

1998

Zeng Peiyan
(Director of
SDPC)
Ma
Kai
(Director of
NDRC)

2003

2007

Wen Jiabao
(Premier of
the
State
Council);
Vice Premier
and
State
Councilor as
Vice Chairs.

Leading Agencies and
other Operational
Agencies
SMA;
SSTC
(Predecessor of MOST),
NEPA, MOFA, SPC
(predecessor of NDRC),
MOE (dissolved in
1998). Executive Office
at the SMA.
SDPC (NDRC after
2003) as chair agency;
MOFA, SMA, MOST,
SEPA, MOFA; and
other seven agencies.
Executive office at the
SDPC/NDRC.
External function of
climate
change
negotiations is led by
NDRC,
along with
MOFA, MOST, MEP
(SEPA prior to 2008),
and
SMA.
Internal
function
of
energy
conservation
and
emission reduction is led
by the NDRC and the
MEP, with involvement
of
other
20-odd
agencies.
Executive
office at the NDRC.

Mandates/Functions
-Participate
in
international
cooperation on climate
impact assessment
Frame
China’s
position in climate
negotiations
-Arrange
and
coordinate
related
capacity
building
projects
-Building
consensus
among agencies;
-Frame
national
interests in negotiations
-Study
and
draft
national
strategies,
policies and programs
- Review and develop
climate
negotiation
strategies
-Implement programs
in energy conservation
and emission reduction

It can be seen from the table above that the powerful macroeconomic agencies,
in particular the NDRC, have dominated the climate change policy making over the past
decade. And since the mid-2000s, with the implementation and enforcement of domestic
climate-related policies been given a parallel significance with other priority issues of
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energy saving, and environmental pollution control, the State Council has led the policy
integration and inter-agency coordination (Qi et al. 2008).
Among agencies within the coordination committee, there are clear divisions,
which have been formed by the requirements of international climate change cooperation
and negotiations, and domestic economic development. Five agencies, namely the NDRC,
the MOST, the MOFA, the MEP, and the SMA, are the most important ministerial
agencies that influence the national climate change policy process. Their divisions are
summarized in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2 Division within the Inter-ministerial Coordination Committee
Theme

Working Group

Chair Agency

Scientific Assessment
SMA and CAS
Impact Assessment and
Response MOST and MEP
International Climate Change Technological
Negotiations,
Cooperation Strategies
and Policy Development
Economic Implications
NDRC
FCCC-related Matters

MOFA and MOST

Domestic
Climate-related Energy Conservation and NDRC and MEP
Policy
Formulation
and Emission Reduction
Implementation

It is worth mentioning that besides the State Council and its departments, the
Chinese Communist Party and the National People’s Congress have shown their positive
position toward proactive mitigation activities. At the 17th Party Congress held in 2007,
the party secretary Hu Jintao addressed that, in order to promote economic development,
China should “improve energy, resources, ecological and environmental conservation and
enhance China's capacity for sustainable development. … …, (and) enhance the capacity
to respond to climate change and make new contributions to protecting the global climate”
(Hu 2007). At the UN Summit on Climate Change in 2009, President Hu pledged China’s
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continued efforts on addressing climate change and emphasizes that “climate change is
an environment issue, but also, and more importantly, a development issue” (Hu 2009).
Two workshops have been arranged for Politburo members of the Central Party
Committee during 2009-2010. The lecturers are influential Chinese scholars from
universities and institutions, who have been highly engaged in international climate
change negotiations and domestic policy discussions.
In addition, in August 2009, ahead of the COP 15 Conference in December in
Copenhagen, a resolution on climate change, named as the Resolution on Making Active
Responses to Climate Change, was approved by China’s top legislature, the Standing
Committee of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC). The resolution praised the
effectiveness of the State Council’s work on climate change, emphasized the importance
of the issue, and clarified guidelines, basic policies, as well as China's stance (NPC 2009).
In early 2010, Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee, reemphasized
the importance of strengthening the legislative work in promoting green economy and
developing low-carbon economy in China (China News 2010).
5.2.2 Local Governments
For a long time, climate change issues were treated as being well beyond the
responsibility of local governments. The trajectory has changed since the mid-2000s. Qi
et al. (2008) observed that three factors have caused the change: mandates from the
central government, internalized needs, and the international market. After two
mandatory targets (i.e., energy intensity and main pollutant emissions) were set in the
11th Five-year Plan in 2006, a majority of provincial governments have issued local
regulations and set up provincial Energy-Saving and Emission- Reduction Coordination
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Groups, with similar composition to the national one since late 2007 (Op cit.). Provincial
governments also established target responsibility and performance assessment systems.
Government at local levels (provincial, municipal and county) signed target contracts
with higher-tier government. Their performance will be evaluated annually to determine
the appointment of the relevant officials. For local governments, the activities to enhance
energy efficiency and renewable energy provide an opportunity to gain mitigation
benefits without compromising its local economic priority. Furthermore, CDM market
development has driven Chinese project developers to invest in carbon reduction projects.
The local governments and their agencies (such as local Development and Reform
Commissions, CDM promotion centers) have been important supporters and supervisors
of the CDM projects.
5.2.3 Academic Institutions, Industrial Associations and Individual Experts
A growing number of research institutions and academic organizations have
been involved in climate change policy cycles. Some of these institutions are entities
directly attached to the State Council, such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences; the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Some of the academic institutions have close
relations with member agencies of coordination committee, such as the Energy Research
Institute and the National Climate Center. In China, almost all ministries and agencies at
the central level have research institutes attached to them. These institutes are
traditionally government-sponsored, and now restructured as Government Organized
Non-Governmental Organizations (GONGOs). With the new status, these research
institutions undertake independent research normally delegated and financially supported
by decision-making agencies. Table 5.3 lists the key research institutes attached to
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leading agencies that deal with climate change issues. Their research broadly focuses on
two areas: one is climate change sciences and technologies; the other is the impacts on
development and China’s corresponding strategies. Since climate change covers a wide
variety of issues, in practice, there is much cooperation and information exchange among
these research institutions. They provide decision makers suggestions from different but
complementary perspectives.
Table 5.3 Research Institutes Involved in China's Climate Change Discussion
Research Institutions

Higher Authority

Chinese Academy of Sciences State Council
(a
number
of
relevant
institutes)
Chinese Academy of Social State Council
Sciences (In particular, the
Research
Center
for
Sustainable Development)

Main research areas
Scientific issues, and science-policy
interaction issues
Policy issues, sustainable development
strategy, climate change diplomacy,
international cooperation

Academy of Macro-economic NDRC
Research (in particular the
Energy Research Institute)
The Administrative Center for
China’s Agenda 21
National
Climate
Center;
Academy of Meteorological
Sciences
China Institute of International
Studies
Chinese
Academy
for
Environmental Planning
Chinese Academy of Forestry;
Chinese
Academy
of
Agricultural Science

Comprehensive climate change policy
issues, energy policy advisory, energy
development strategy, international
cooperation
MOST
Sustainable
development
policy
research,
national
science
and
technology policy
SMA
Climate change impacts, climate
adaptation policy advisory, IPCCrelated task work
MOFA
Climate diplomacy, climate change
and international relations
MEP
Environmental
protection
and
economic development, environmental
impact assessment
State
Forestry Afforestation and Reforestation
Administration;
Ministry
of
Agriculture

Universities also make great contributions to the research on climate change
policies. Some prominent contributors include Beijing University; Tsinghua University;
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Renmin University of China, Fudan University, etc. Sensing the great importance of
explaining China’s climate policy to the outside world, since the COP 6 in 2001, China
has sharply increased the share of delegates coming from academic agencies for
participating in the FCCC conferences. A top-level climate change expert panel,
consisting of 12 scientists from key Chinese research institutions was established in early
2007 to provide strategic scientific support for decision making at the central level
(personal interview). Another example is that for preparing the national communication
report, under the joint guidance of the SMA, the MOST and the CAS, six governmentaffiliated research institutes have jointly conducted national GHG inventory Project
(Zhou et al. 2008).
In China, industrial associations act as intermediaries linking government with
industrial businesses. These sectoral associations, in the form of GONGOs, have received
large amount of governmental resources, but the state also pushes them to be selfsufficient and partially separate from the government. Most influential industrial
associations evolve from industrial ministries and still have strong influences on
industries. Sectoral associations contribute more practically to the information exchange
and policy consultation on the study of climate change. For example, the Association of
Energy Conservation has been actively involved in the design and implementation of
industrial energy conservation programs.
In general, researchers, experts and the public have enjoyed more freedom to
voice their opinions which can reflect their individual ideologies and interests. Although
individual experts tend to receive less attention than the authoritative organizations, their
opinions can sometimes bring vibrant policy discussions. An example is that before the
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Copenhagen conference in 2009, there was a heated debate initiated by Hu Angang, a
famous scholar from Tsinghua University. With a more cosmopolitan perspective, he
challenged China’s unwillingness to accept a mandatory mitigation commitment during
the Post-2012 period (Liu and Yi 2009); however, his proposition was soon questioned
by others, including some from the Chinese climate delegation. Hu insisted that he would
not change his proposition and argued that was a better solution for China’s future
development.
5.2.4 Other Non-state Actors
Besides academic institutions and industrial associations, there are other
important non-state actors, including energy-intensive businesses, NGOs (NonGovernmental Organizations), mass media. In general, these actors are relatively weak
actors who have constrained space to play and limited resources to influence the state
actors.
Business groups have a wide variety of stakes in climate change policy
development. The major industries of interest are energy intensive companies in fields of
fossil fuels, automobiles, power generation, among others. However, the corporatization
reforms since 1990s have decentralized much authority of supervision from the central
government to provincial and other local-level governments and the state would no
longer subsidize enterprises that were unprofitable (Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008).
Because climate change policies are limitedly debated outside central government and
potential conflicts exist between local economic interests and mitigation measures,
industrial companies’ role in climate policy process has been marginalized. Still, about
100 large-scaled industrial businesses are under the leadership and supervision of the
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central government, represented by the State-owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission (SASAC) established in 2003. These companies have closer
linkage with central government agencies; but like the other companies, they are more
concerned with the impact of potential climate regulations on their economic
performance.
In Western democratic countries, NGOs can play a variety of roles, including
setting the policy agenda, providing policy advices recommendations, applying political
pressure, monitoring government actions, and assisting policy implementation (Raustiala
2001); while in China, the NGOs, especially the grassroots NGOs are not significant
actors in the policy making process, because of being constrained by government
administrative regulations and lack of funds and human resources (Economy 1997;
Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008). Over recent years, there has been some improvement in
that the NGOs in China are allowed and encouraged to initiate some awareness building
programs, providing a complement to official actions. According to Zhao and Mori
(2008), eight environmental NGOs have jointly proposed an action plan for combating
climate change. In 2007, forty NGOs launched Energy Saving Citizen Actions to raise
public awareness.
The media coverage on climate change issues has been increasing remarkably.
The media has been used to support official initiatives or provide supervision of policy
implementation (Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008). Most media and NGOs regard
themselves as cooperative partners with government, and they actively engage in
reporting the progress of international climate negotiations and domestic policy
development and practices.
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5.2.5 Interactive Features of Policy Process
The state and non-state actors identified above perform their functions in
climate change policy development process through their interactions. The interactions,
among and within state and non-state actors, are concentrating on major issues in which
actors form networks in negotiating and advancing particular policy options. These
interactions enable effective policy formulation and development. In China, climate
policy networks are primarily driven by key government agencies at the central level, and
can be broadly grouped into three functionally defined clusters, as shown in Table 5.4.
Each cluster has a number of different government agencies. The market and civil society
actors with distinctive tasks and functions are also involved in these clusters.
Table 5.4 Composition and Focused Issues of China's Climate Policy Network
Policy Focus
(Cluster)
Economic
Development
and Mitigation
Climate
Diplomacy
Climate Impacts
and Technical
Strategies

Decision-making
Agency

The State Council,
supported by the
Central Party
Committee and
the National
People’s Congress

Core Network
Membership

Other Key
Government Actors

NDRC

Relevant member
agencies
within
NCCLG;
local
government

MOFA,
NDRC
SMA, MOST,
CAS, NDRC

Relevant
agencies
NCCLG
Relevant
agencies
NCCLG

member
within
member
within

Market and Civil
Society Actors
Academic
research
institutions
and
universities; business
actors;
grassroots
NGOs, mass media
Academic
research
institutions
and
universities
Academic
research
institutions
and
universities

The interactions among actors of policy networks have been evolving, reflecting
the changes and interactive play of domestic and international contests. In general, the
interactions of the policy networks are characterized by following features:
(1) The State Council has led climate change policy making and implementation,
as well as policy coordination. Consistent with other findings of the Chinese policy
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process (Peng 2003; Pang and Zou 2008), in climate change mitigation policy making,
the administrative measures and relevant policies developed by the State Council are
reinforced by the political advocacy of the Central Committee of the Party. For example,
at the Politburo study meeting in the early 2010, President and also the Party General
Secretary Hu Jintao stressed that China must recognize the importance, urgency and
difficulty of dealing with climate change, and the leadership will be working hard to steer
efforts to realize the goal of 40-45% reduction of carbon intensity, of which China has
shortly promised at the Copenhagen Climate Summit (ChinaDaily, 2010). In addition, the
domestic climate policies and regulations have been facilitated by more legislative
involvement of the National People’s Congress, as shown by the passage of a resolution
on responding to climate change in 2009 (NPC 2009).
(2) The NDRC maintains a pivotal position at the ministerial level in
coordinating and advancing the domestic climate policy process. Institutional and
personnel arrangements within the NDRC are continuously adjusted in response to
international and domestic political and policy needs. For example, in 2008, two new
departments were established within the NDRC, i.e., the Department of Climate Change
and the Department of Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection. The two
departments are responsible for external and internal climate-related issues respectively
(personal interview). In order to strength communication and dialogue in international
climate change negotiations and cooperation, China also adjusted its personnel
arrangements. Xie Zhenhua, former minister of the SEPA, became the vice-minister of
the NDRC and the chief climate change negotiator. Su Wei, a veteran climate change
negotiator from the Department of Laws and Regulations of the Ministry of Foreign
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Affairs (MOFA), now acts as the chief of the Department of Climate Change and
participates intensely in international climate negotiations.
(3) Although climate change policy is primarily discussed within a small
number of institutions (Liu and Yi 2009), expert consultation has gained more weight.
Numerous academic institutions, universities, associations and think-tanks are involved
in the process and contribute to the policy agenda setting, alternative policy discussions,
public awareness building, and capacity development activities.
(4) The climate change actor network in China has expanded to cover local
governments, businesses and civil society actors, who have diversified interests and
capacity; however, they are still peripheral actors. With the implementation of more
climate mitigation policies and programs, more active performance of network actors can
be expected, which interacts with the ongoing political and administrative reform
initiatives.
5.3 Climate Change Policy Outcomes
5.3.1 Policy Outputs
In the early phases of climate policy development, China’s climate mitigation
policy was not found in forms of laws, regulations or guidelines by government, most of
the policy statements existed in speeches and articles of government officials, with a view
of clarifying the national position on climate change issues (Qi et al. 2007). Although
China still rejects a mandatory mitigation cap on the ground of its unchanged status as a
developing country, with mounting pressures on its growing contribution on carbon
emissions and its climate stances, the central government has shifted its perspective of
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climate change challenges from more of a scientific and environmental issue to
predominantly a development issues. Without sacrificing the economic development
which may cause higher unemployment and social instability, an important measure is to
decouple the link between development and energy use, and to integrate the climate
change into national development plans. In 2002, in the Communist Party Congress,
China’s leaders outlined a goal of quadrupling the country’s 2000 Gross Domestic
Products (GDP) by 2020, while only doubling energy consumption.
Over the past decade, a number of policies and measures have been adopted and
implementation, which involved a variety of state and non-state actors in the process.
Table 5.5 shows major climate change policies and measures adopted that contribute to
mitigation benefits.
Some of these policies cover a wide range of sectoral areas that require a group
of specialized agencies to negotiate a policy solution, and the Eleventh Five-year Plan
provides a comprehensive development framework to guide relevant ministries or local
governments to develop policies in a reasonably coherent way. Another feature is that
diverse policy tools have been introduced, such as regulative measures, administrative
rules, laws, voluntary action, and market-based measures. The policy goals set by these
policies and measures have been used as reference scenario for evaluating policy
performance and analyzing future potential. In addition, the participation of climate
mitigation activities has permeated to local areas, and local governments work in
matching climate change issue with the local priorities.
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Table 5.5 Major Climate Change Policies and Measures Adopted in China
Policy/Measure Name

Agency

China’s
Targets
on
Carbon Emission Cuts
beyond the Kyoto

State
Council

Program for Climate
Change Mitigation and
Adaptation in China

NDRC

China’s Policies and
Actions for Addressing
Climate Change
National Building Codes
for
Residential
and
Commercial Buildings

State
Council
Ministry of
Construction Plan

National Climate Change
Program

State
Council

Closing
Inefficient
Industrial Plants

NDRC
Plan

Medium and Long Term
Development Plan for
Renewable Energy

NDRC
Plan

Energy
Efficiency
Appliance Standards

NDRC
Plan

Top-1000
Industrial
Energy
Conservation
Program (presented as
Case 3 in Chapter. 7)

Interagency
plan, led by
the NDRC
National
People’s
Congress

China’s 11th Five-Year
Plan

Objectives/ Mitigation Targets
Reducing carbon intensity (carbon
emission per unit of GDP) by 4045%, below 2005 levels by 2020
Helping local governments build
capacity; Drafting local climate
strategies in accordance with the
national program.
Proposing a coordinated response
toward national and international
challenges
a 50% reduction of building's total
operation load based on a building's
energy consumption during the 1980s
Outlining activities both to mitigate
GHG emissions and to adapt to the
impacts of potential climate change
Closing inefficient cement and steel
factories with outdated production
capacity of 250 million tons and 55
million tons, respectively, by 2010.
An investment of 263 billion USD by
2020 on renewable energy, and raise
the percentage of renewable energy
to 10% of total energy consumption
by 2010 and 15% by 2020.
Reduce residential electricity use by
10% by 2010, by promoting
mandatory minimum efficiency
standards

Type

Year

Policy
Statements

2009

Pilot
Projects
(from
7
provinces)

2008

Framework
Policy

2008

Regulatory
Instruments

2008

Framework
Policy

2007

Regulatory
Instruments

2007

Policy
Framework

2007

Regulatory
Instruments

2007

Cutting energy use of the 1,000 most
energy-intensive enterprises from 9
industrial sectors

Voluntary/
Regulatory
Program

2006

Reducing energy intensity by 20%,
and reducing the main pollutants by
10% below 2005 levels by 2010

Framework
Policy

2006

Regulatory
Instruments

2005;
2008
(Phase
Two)

Regulatory
rules
for
carbon
market
trading

2004;
revised
in
2005

Vehicle Fuel Economy
Standards

NDRC
Plan

The standards will be implemented in
two phases. By 2008, average
domestic passenger vehicles are
required
to
meet
36
mpg
requirement.

Clean
Development
Mechanism
(CDM)
Management Rules
(Presented as Case 2 in
Chapter 6)

Interagency
committee
led by the
NDRC

Regulate
the
CDM
project
Management (entry requirement,
priority
projects,
approval
procedures)

Source: Pew 2007; Leggett et al. 2008; IEA 2010
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With the experience accumulated, China has identified focused areas of
mitigation-related action, as shown in China’s Policies and Actions for Addressing
Climate Change, issued by the State Council in 2008. These action areas include (1)
Restructuring the economy and enhancing industrial competitiveness; (2) saving energy
and improving energy efficiency; (3) developing renewable energy and optimizing
energy mix; (4) developing recycling economy to reduce GHG emissions; (5) promoting
afforestation campaign and enhancing carbon sequestration capacity; and (6) intensifying
R&D efforts (State Council 2008).
5.3.2 Policy Performance
As discussed above, the main climate change mitigation actions promoted over
the last decade was largely due to the increased international pressures and domestic
concerns on the impacts of resource and environmental constraints on sustained
economic development. However, with rapid GDP growth, in absolute values, China’s
energy consumption and carbon emissions have been continuously on the rising trend.
Figure 5.1 shows China’s carbon emissions during 1990-2008, compared with the US and
the EU countries. Before 2001, carbon emissions in China were 45-55% of the US level
and 60-75% of the EU countries. However, driven by its rapid and persistent economic
growth, especially after entering into the WTO, China’s carbon dioxide emissions
increased quickly and overtook the emissions of the EU in 2003 and those of the US in
2006.
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Figure 5.1 Growth of China's Carbon Dioxide Emissions
Source: EIA 2010

In fact, what made Chinese leaders worried most since early 2000s was the
situation that the energy consumptions, as well as accessory carbon emissions may have
risks of increasing at higher rates than the GDP growth rates (see Figure 5.2 below).
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Figure 5.2 Annual Growth Rate Changes of GDP and Carbon Emissions in China
Source: EIA 2010; NBS 2009
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Seen from the Figure above, the annual GDP growth rate in China stabilized
around 10% in recent years, while carbon emissions have undergone a sharp growth
during 2001-2005. With a number of policies and measures implemented during this
period, from 2006, the abrupt carbon growth trend has been stopped.
The Chinese government has employed carbon intensity as key indicator to
measure its energy-saving and corresponding mitigation performance. The decrease of
carbon intensity shows the country’s achievements in energy efficiency improvement and
its strategy in avoiding the economic slowdown. The central government seriously treats
energy intensity reduction (20% reduction during 2006-2010) as a political target and
requires relevant agencies, localities and sectors to strictly follow it.
Internationally, China confronts increased pressure to reduce absolute GHG
emissions. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) project development provides
such a scheme that China can voluntarily participate and the GHG reductions are
measured in absolute terms. Although disputes exist, the credits from CDM are
measureable, reportable and verifiable. The CDM institutional arrangements in China
effectively strengthened its competence in the global carbon market (Ganapati and Liu
2008). With more experience gained, China attempts to establish its own cap-and-trade
system domestically. Two carbon-trading exchanges have been put into operation in
Tianjin and Beijing, which are supposed to provide an innovative platform for trading
surplus credits among regulated businesses domestically, and successfully linking with
other international carbon trading schemes.
The absolute carbon emission reductions are also calculated to demonstrate
China’s efforts in reducing or slowing down the GHG emissions. For example, in the
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National Climate Change Program promulgated in 2007 (NDRC 2007), China announced
that an accumulated 800 million tce (tons of coal equivalent) of energy were saved by
economy restructuring and technical improvement during 1990-2005, which is equivalent
to a reduction of 1.8 billion tons of CO2 emissions. Besides, through promoting new
energy efficiency policies, a further 670 million reduction of CO2 emissions has been
achieved during 2006-2008 in China (State Council 2009).
However, using absolute CO2 emission reduction figures to evaluate policy
performance is not without problems. One is credibility of the identification of reference
scenarios. Can the historical development trends be taken as reference scenario or the
targets set in the policies taken as the reference? The selection and measurement is still
murky. The other problem is the lack of transparency and capacity in reporting some
sensitive emission data in China. For example, research conducted by the Chinese
Academy of Sciences (CAS) in October 2008 projected that China’s GHG emissions may
more than double within the next two decades; however, Tu (2009) notes that the current
GHG emission data was not given in the research. In addition, Seligsohn (2010) claims
that China has less experience in GHG emission data collection and analysis, so it is
urgent to improve its capacity primarily in emission data analysis and in creating a
replicable and updatable system.
5.4 Conclusive Summary
China has been involved in global climate change scientific discussions and
political negotiations since late 1980s. Consistent with the development of international
climate change regime, the focus of domestic policy discussions on climate change has
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shifted from a scientific issue to a development issue. More bureaucratic agencies have
been involved in policy making and implementation; and the NDRC, the MOFA, and the
MOST have gradually become the leading ministerial agencies in shaping China’s
climate change mitigation policies. Most formal climate change mitigation policies were
adopted and implemented after the mid-2000s, reflecting the requirements of
participating in the negotiation of global climate change regime, and the constraints of
domestic environmental and energy resources. In general, China is regarded as an active
participator in climate change mitigation activities.
There has been increasing interaction among government, market and civil
society actors in participating in climate change mitigation activities. However, in China,
the state government at central level, led by the State Council, dominates the climate
policy making process. Local governments, private businesses, and other civil society
actors, with diverse interests and capacities, are still weak actors. However, research
institutions (such as universities, research institutes, and industrial associations) have
gained more weight in policy consultation and advising. In addition, seen from the
history of China’s climate change policy development and implementation performance,
on the one hand, with the adoption and implementation of various types of climate
change mitigation policies, the interactions among government, market and civil society
actors have significantly increased; on the other hand, with the capacity enhancement and
experience accumulation, China has demonstrated greater proactiveness and enthusiasm
in promoting mitigation activities. However, China’s readiness and proactiveness is the
result of joint influences of international, national, and specific-policy factors, not a
single one.
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China’s reforms since late 1970s have clearly led to an extremely varied pattern
of administration and development. With economic transition towards market economy
and economic integration with the world, structures and interactions of actor networks
have kept on evolving. Although the extent of government’s intervention in economic
and social development is frequently in debate, the relations between government and
enterprises have been transforming towards more market-based, and localities have
earned greater freedom from the higher levels. Under these contexts, innovative climate
change mitigation policies have been allowed to pilot and diffuse to a larger scale. These
policies include management rules that promote market-based CDM project development
(presented as Case 2), and the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program
(presented as Case 3), which owns strong voluntary origins. It is fair to say that
fragmentation of power between state and society is accompanied by the wider adoption
of market-oriented policies and other flexible policies.
The economic reforms in China led to a relaxation of political control over the
economy and society, in part by design and in part by default (Saich 2004, 222).
Accordingly, the social structure is redefined and civil society actors have gained more
freedom and flexibilities in pursuing their own economic interests. Although a variety of
civil society actors have been involved in the climate change mitigation activities in
China, there is no evidence that their engagement is spontaneous and in tune with the
mission targets set by government. Therefore, it is fair to say that roles and status of nonstate actors in ensuring effective policy implementation have been well recognized;
however, as a group, their impacts on policy formulation and decision making are still
limited.
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Finally, climate change mitigation covers a wide range of sectors. With the
development of international climate change regime, China has established a network of
actors to conduct and coordinate national climate related action. The complexity of
coordinating climate change mitigation and adaptation activities between diverse
ministerial agencies, between central government and local governments, and between
state and society has increased. Seen from the historical restructuring of Chinese interministerial coordination committee, no single agency has such a powerful organizational
authority to coordinate complex interests and concerns from other ministerial agencies.
Therefore, the State Council becomes an inevitable institution to chair the institutional
coordination and organize policy integration. Along this process, both the central party
committee and the national congress have provided important support to the State
Council.
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CHAPTER VI
CASE 2: CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM IN CHINA
6.1 Introduction
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) regime is a project-based scheme
under the Kyoto Protocol. It enables developed countries with emissions reduction
commitments to use the credits generated, named as the Certified Emission Reductions
(CERs), to count against their obligatory compliance targets through investing in
emission reduction projects in developing countries. On the other hand, developing
countries, through voluntarily participation, can gain access to necessary technologies
and funds needed for sustainable development. The CER trading between developed
countries and developing countries is realized in a global carbon market. According to the
CDM regulations, host developing country government takes the responsibility to
approve proposed projects based on national priorities.
As a result of its increasing GHG emissions and great mitigation potential,
China’s role and action in developing project-based CDM projects have been given
serious international concern. At the same time, the CDM provides China with an
important incentive to enhance capacity and participate in global carbon reduction effort.
With the country becoming the world leader in gaining CER credits, China has learned
how to use the CDM scheme to its advantage.
This chapter uses the policy network approach to examine how the state and
non-state actors have formed networks in promoting CDM projects in China. Following
this introduction, the next section contextualizes the environment of CDM
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implementation, focusing on how the CDM scheme has been initiated in China.
Subsequently, Section 6.3 describes the further development and improvement of CDM
institutions and actor network in China, which lead to the market performance and other
outcomes in Section 6.4. Finally, the concluding summary is presented in Section 6.5.
6.2 Contextual Background
6.2.1 CDM Background
The introduction of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) concept started
years before the Kyoto Protocol was formally negotiated in 1997. As the precursor to
today’s CDM and JI (Joint Implementation) projects, the Activities Implemented Jointly
(AIJ) initiated its pilot phase from 1995 till 2000 and developed about 150 GHG
reduction and sequestration projects in over 40 countries (Michaelowa 2002). The AIJ
contributed to the experience learning in the GHG emission reduction activities prior to
the Kyoto Protocol. With the AIJ’s progress in awareness building and capacity
improvement, the CDM gained gradual recognition though the concerns on the
procedures and risks remained (Kaupp et al. 2002; Bhandari 2003). It was not until the
Seventh Conference of the Parties (COP 7) to the UNFCCC in 2001 that the CDM
modalities, guidelines and procedures were adopted, which paved the way for further
CDM institutional development.
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting
of the Parties (CoP/MoP), the Executive Board (EB), and the Designated Operational
Entities (DOEs) are the key entities to the governance of the CDM. The CoP/MoP has the
overall authority over matters pertaining to the CDM, in that it provides guidance to the
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EB, makes decisions on rules of procedure, and maintains an equitable distribution of the
CDM projects amongst non-Annex I countries. The EB is charged with the supervision
and approval of the CDM projects through affiliated panels or working groups. The
DOEs are accredited by the EB to specifically perform the validation, verification and
certification functions for a CDM project. Project proponents can select one DOE to
validate its project and another DOE for project verification and certification.
To promote a standardized system in project approval and decide whether the
project would generate sustainable benefits, the host country is required to establish a
focal agency, called Designated National Authority (DNA). The DNA performs functions
of establishing national criteria and management rules; elaborating the national guidelines
and procedures for project approval; and ensuring the compliance of CDM projects with
relevant national policy and regulatory regimes (UNEP 2004).
A complete CDM project follows a number of essential steps, known as CDM
cycle. Figure 6.1 below shows the processes of a CDM project, the needed documents
and the responsible entities involved in the process.
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Activity

Output

Project Identification
& Formulation

PDD

PP

National Approval

Letter of Approval

DNA

Validation

Validation Report

DOE A

Registration

CDM-EB

Project Financing
Monitoring
Verification/

Issurance of CERs

Responsibility

Investor
Monitoring Report

PP

Verification/
Certification Report

DOE B

CERs

CDM-EB

Figure 6.1 Processes and Parties Involved in a CDM Project
Note: PP-Project proponents/participants; DNA-Designated National Authority; DOE-Designated
Operational Entity; EB-Executive Board; PDD-Project Design Document; CER-Certified Emission
Reductions

Source: UNEP 2004, 12; CCPO 2004

Clean Development Mechanism gained momentum after the Kyoto Protocol’s
entry into force in early 2005 and the emergence of the global carbon trading market,
especially the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). As of March 2010,
4968 CDM projects have been developed by 76 developing countries in the world. In
terms of the stages of project development, 2062 projects have been registered by the EB
and more than 600 projects have been issued the Certified Emission Reductions (CERs).
The accumulative emission reductions from these projects are expected to be 2835.6
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million tons of CO2 by 2012 (CD4CDM 2010). Although there is uncertainty about the
global climate change regime after 2012, there is no indication that the enthusiasms for
the carbon trading industry among companies and investors worldwide have been
weakened.
6.2.2 Capacity Building Projects in China
As mentioned in Chapter 4, during the early international negotiations, China
opposed many of the market-based international mechanisms and argued against a
compulsory mitigation commitment for developing countries. China’s position is to insist
the “common but differentiated responsibilities” principle, which can be explained that
developed countries should take the lead in reducing GHG emissions as well as providing
financial and technical support to developing countries, while the first priority for China
remains sustainable development and poverty eradication.
During this early stage, China’s attitude towards initiating CDM project was
reluctant and noncommittal and Chinese officials repeatedly stressed the importance of
studying potential costs and benefits of the CDM, in particular the disputable issues of
technical risks and political risks (Szymanski 2002). During the mid-1990s, China
initiated four AIJ pilot projects in cooperation with Japan and Norway (MOFA 2002).
The preliminary evaluation of the four AIJ pilot projects was positive and beneficial. This
made China realize that capacity building should be enhanced through exercises of
learning-by-doing with regard to baseline-setting, project management, and national
institutional processing issues.
Capacity building is reflected in many ways, such as research and development,
business communication and negotiations, technology transfer, product renovation, and
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market information. After the COP 6 Conference in 2001 when the CDM modalities and
procedures were established, numerous CDM activities were implemented in China under
the sponsorship of international and bilateral donors. There are several reasons that
donors were keen to support CDM capacity building in China. First, they expect great
potential of getting carbon credits from China with lower costs. Second, the donors feel
the significant need for China to gain more insights into the CDM. More importantly,
such cooperation can enhance the host country’s capacity to initiate the carbon emission
reduction activities. Table 6.1 lists several major capacity building projects.
Table 6.1 Major CDM Capacity Building Projects in China
UNDP/ UN
Foundation

EU

Building
Capacity for
the CDM in
China/ NDRC

EU/China
Partnership in
CDM
Development

Donor

WB/ GTZ

CIDA

ADB

Project Title/
Chinese
Counterpart

China
CDM
Study
on
Methodology
and
Its
Application/
MOST

Canada–
China
Cooperation
in
Climate
Change/
NDRC

Opportunities
for CDM in
the Chinese
Energy
Sector
/MOST

Sectors

Power sector and
renewable
energy field

Renewables,
urban
transportation,
and sinks

Renewables

Methodology
study, capacity
building, 6 CDM
case
studies,
assessing
the
Chinese
CDM
market

Capacity
building and
poverty
reduction
to
meet Canada’
s international
climate change
objectives

Capacity
building,
providing
consulting
service
for
small-scale
CDM
projects

Renewables,
energy
efficiency, and
coal
bed
methane
Capacity
building,
project
approval
process, 3 pilot
projects,
information
dissemination

Donor’s
Contributions

US$ 970,000

C$ 5,000,000

US$ 775,000

US$ 1,458,000

Euro 907,574

Duration

2002 - 2004

2002 - 2004

2002 - 2003

2003- 2006

2003 - 2004

Project
purposes/
Activities

Renewables
Capacity
building,
identify
barriers
and
opportunities,
evaluate
the
emission
reduction
benefits

Note: WB-World Bank; GTZ-German Agency for Technical Cooperation; CIDA-Canada International
Development Agency; ADB-Asian Development Bank; UNDP-United Nations Development Program;
EU-European Union; MOST-Ministry of Science and Technology; NDRC-National Development and
Reform Commission

Source: World Bank 2004; Zhang 2005
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These projects had a wide variety of coverage, including the CDM country
studies, capacity building activities, international workshops for awareness, CDM
methodologies, market opportunity studies, CDM technology options, case studies, as
well as barrier analysis and promoting policies and initiatives. The NDRC and the MOST
were jointly responsible for program identification, site selection and relevant
coordination activities.
Not all the cooperative capacity building projects got access to Chinese market.
An example was the withdrawal of Dutch CERUPT (Certified Emission Reduction Unit
Procurement Tender) Program in 2001, because of domestic bureaucratic hurdles and the
changing priorities by both sides (Zhang 2005). Nevertheless, the emergence of more
capacity building projects indicated that the Chinese government attempted to make the
best use of the projects to develop its expertise and improve the institutional and human
capacity. In fact, some projects from these case studies became real CDM projects.
One of the important prerequisites for CDM credit trading between developing
countries and developed countries is the establishment of a carbon market, where the
transaction can be operated. Although China is a party to the Kyoto Protocol as early as
2002, making it an eligible party to participate in the CDM scheme; however, the Kyoto
Protocol had not entered into force until 2005. Fortunately, along with the Kyoto
Protocol’s taking into effect, the European Union (EU) commenced operation of its own
Emission Trading System (ETS) from January 1, 2005 across the 25 member states.
The essence of the ETS is the trading of limited EU emission allowances (EUAs)
which were allocated to 11400 installations, accounting for around 52% of the EU’s total
CO2 emissions or about 30% of its overall greenhouse gas emissions (EEA 2005, 28; EU
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2005, 7 ). The National Allocation Plans for the EU ETS transferred a big share of the
credit demand to the covered installations, so the private sectors are supposed to increase
their demand in the future; on the other hand, the EU emission allowances (EUAs) were
allowed to link with JI/CDM credits, making the EU emerging as the center of carbon
trading in the world.
At this time, China began to realize it can receive economic and political
benefits through more involvement in CDM project development and diffusion (personal
interview). The CDM has become a vehicle that not only stimulates investment in the
cleaner energy technologies and economic development; it also allows China to be
viewed as a proactive player on climate change issues. However, because of the longterm “wait and see” climate mitigation policies, it soon found itself lagging far behind
many developing countries, such as India, Brazil, and Mexico, in the number of pipeline
projects. The key issue for the decision makers to tackle was to develop a set of
institutions that can synergize its development benefits and help domestic developers
gain market competence.
6.3 Developing CDM Institutions and Actor Network
6.3.1 CDM Policy Development
With the progression of the CDM regime and the development of international
emission reduction trading market, the Chinese government realized the imperative to
promulgate and implement domestic CDM rules in order to strengthen effective
management of the CDM projects, safeguard national rights and interests, and ensure the
proper operation of project activities.
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In June 2004, the NDRC, the MOST, and the MOFA jointly promulgated the
Interim Measures for Operation and Management of CDM Projects in China (hereinafter
referred to as “Interim Measures”), specifying the legal framework for CDM projects for
the first time. According to the “Interim Measures” (NDRC 2004), Chinese CDM project
activities should comply with Chinese laws and regulations as well as China’s sustainable
development strategies and policies, and should meet the general requirements of national
economic and social development planning. In addition, the CDM project activities
should promote the transfer of environmentally sound technology to China.
The “Interim Measures” also identified three priority areas for implementing
domestic CDM projects: energy efficiency improvement; development and utilization of
new and renewable energy sources; and methane recovery and utilization. Nevertheless,
China did not stimulate specific measures to boost these projects in a CDM form. The
reason is that the three areas are already embedded in other policies, in particular energy
policies, so the incentive policies were not specifically made just favorable for CDM
projects.
The “Interim Measures”, which offers trial management rules for guiding CDM
project implementation, had left several important issues unclear, such as credit
ownership, possibility of unilateral CDM, royalty fee collection and usage. On October
12, 2005, the “Interim Measures” was rescinded and replaced by Measures for Operation
and Management of CDM Projects in China (hereinafter referred to as “Formal
Measures”). By approval of the National Climate Change Coordination Committee
(NCCCC), the “Formal Measures” was jointly issued by the NDRC, the MOST, and the
MOFA, as well as the Ministry of Finance, The document has been regarded as the
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essential CDM management policy in China, that promotes and supports the efficient
completion and systematic progress of CDM project activities (ERI 2009, 3).
With regard to ambiguous issues of credit ownership, possibility of the
unilateral CDM project, royalty fees, some clarifications were made in the new measures.
Table 6.2 compares the concerned items in the two measures, which reflected the CDM
policy adjustment by the Chinese government.
Table 6.2 Comparison of the CDM Measures of Two Versions
Items
Project owner
Unilateral
CDM project
Ownership of
CERs
Royalty fee
(CER
distribution)

Interim Measures (June
30, 2004)
Chinese
funded
or
Chinese
holding
enterprises
Not mentioned
CER revenues are owned
jointly by the government
and the owner
Be decided by the
Government of China.
Before
the
decision,
revenue belongs to the
project owner.

Use of the
Not mentioned
royalty fees
Source: NDRC 2004; NDRC 2005

Formal Measures
(October 12, 2005)
Same
If no foreigner buyer is determined when the project is
submitted for national approval, the emission reductions
generated by the projects will be transferred into the
national account
Same. (Reasons given: Emission reduction source is
owned by the Government of China; emission reductions
from specific CDM projects belong to the project owner.)
For projects in the priority areas, royalty fees of 2% of the
CER revenue are charged. The fee for N2O projects is 30%
and for HFC and PFC projects, it amounts to 65%.
Projects already approved by the DNA before October 12,
2005 are exempt from fees.
Detailed provisions will be in formulation

By comparison, the central government has not loosened the strong CDM entry
requirements. The “Formal Measures” allows development of the unilateral CDM project,
but with the premise of transferring the emission reductions to its national account. Also,
the second version regulates the royalty fee that project owners must pay to the national
government, differentiated by the project types. Obviously, the emission reductions in
China are treated as “national resources”. All these rules facilitate the government’s
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intervention of the CDM activities, and more importantly, government also maintains a
say in setting the CER price, in case the CERs are traded at dumping prices (Abele 2005).
The CDM “Formal Measures” had remained intact since its promulgation in
2005. However, to improve the management of CDM projects and accommodate new
development requirements, the Chinese DNA, namely the NDRC, has issued a series of
supplementary regulations in the form of gazette or notes. Some of the important
regulations include the improvement of CDM project application and approval
procedures, the CDM project implementation arrangements in Hong Kong, and regional
grid baseline emission factors (CCChina 2010).
6.3.2 CDM Institutional Actors in China
China adopted three-tiered model as its national CDM management structure.
The three-tiered institutions include the National Coordination Committee on Climate
Change (NCCCC), the National CDM Board and Designated National Authority (DNA).
Their responsibilities and compositions are shown in Table 6.3.
Seen from Table 6.3, on the top level of national CDM management institutions
is the NCCCC, which is responsible for the review and coordination of CDM policies.
The National CDM Board (NCB) lies at the second level. The NCB conducts the
concrete CDM project review and management activities. The third level is the NDRC,
which is appointed by the Chinese government as DNA. The NDRC plays a vitally
important role on China’s CDM management and implementation. Both the NCCCC and
the NCB are chaired by the NDRC, which issues formal project approval on behalf of the
Chinese Government. The Department of Climate Change set up in the NDRC in 2008
(the Office of Climate Change during 2003- 2008) serves as the secretariat of the
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NCCCC and the National CDM Board, and organizes the review of the CDM application
documents. China’s three-tiered institutional structure not only allows multiple ministries
and actors to participate in the project review and approval processes, but also enables
broader stakeholder participation in CDM implementation (ERI 2009; personal
interview).
Table 6.3 Features of China’s CDM Institutions
Institutions

Set-up Time

Main Responsibilities

Members

National
Climate
Change
Coordination
Committee
(NCCCC)

1998
Reshuffled
as NCCLG
after 2007

 Formulate and coordinate national
climate change policies, measures;
 Review CDM policies, rules and
standards;
 Approve members of the CDM
Board.

Chaired by the NDRC; Vice
Chairmen and members are
senior officials from 14
ministerial agencies.

National CDM
Board (NCB)

2004

 Examine and assess CDM Co-Chairs:
projects;
NDRC
 Transfer CERs generated in MOST
unilateral projects;
Vice Chair:
 Report to the NCCCC on the MOFA
progress
of
CDM
project Board members:
activities;
SEPA (MEP after 2008),
 Make recommendations on the SMA, MOF, MOA.
operational measures.
Designated
2004
 Accept CDM project application;
NDRC
National
 Issue national approval letter,
based on the Board’s decision;
Authority
 Supervise the implementation of
(DNA)
CDM project activities;
 International Communication and
cooperation
Note: NDRC-National Development and Reform Commission; MOST-Ministry of Science and
Technology; MOFA-Ministry of Foreign Affairs; SEPA-State Environmental Protection Administration;
SMA-State Meteorological Administration; MOF-Ministry of Finance; MOA-Ministry of Agriculture;
NCCLG-National Climate Change Leading Group

Source: NDRC 2004; NDRC 2005

The national CDM management and implementation institutions have been
gradually improved over the past few years, signified by the establishment and operation
of two new centers: National CDM Project Management Center and China CDM Fund
Management Center.
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National CDM Project Management Center was established under the Energy
Research Institute (ERI), a policy advisory organization under the NDRC. The Center is
under the guidance of the Department of the Climate Change of the NDRC to promote
the development of CDM and international cooperation on climate change. The
Management Center has provided the NDRC administrative support for CDM project
approval since 2007, including expert review, project monitoring and supervision,
inventory registration, data management, consultative service, international cooperation.
The CDM “Formal Measures” had introduced the use of royalty fees generated
from CER revenues as a pool fund for encouraging specific CDM projects. The
management and operation of the fund came into effect with the establishment of the
CDM Fund Management Center. The Center, established in November 2007, is under the
sponsorship of the Ministry of Finance, and serves as secretariat of the CDM Fund
Examination Council, which comprises NDRC, MOFA, MOF and MOST and other
relevant agencies.
The fund comes from royalty fees collected from current CDM projects, as well
as donations and loans from financial institutions. In ways of grant, concession loan and
other financial instruments, the fund is used to provide support for energy efficiency and
clean energy projects and other climate change activities, including capacity building,
public awareness, mitigation and adaptation (ERI 2009). Since the Fund was established
in 2007, the detailed information about fund use has not been revealed (personal
interview).
Although national CDM institutions dominate CDM project management, there
has been increased involvement of local governments in CDM project promotion and
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supervision in recent years. More than 27 provinces and municipalities have established
CDM centers to market CDM development activities, provide capacity trainings, and
help project proponents seek potential credit buyers (Schroeder 2009). From 2007, the
CDM projects are required to get approval from local governments before the
applications are sent for Board review. Industrial associations with strong government
background have also been involved. Many of these associations have the advantages of
close ties with the business sector and a good knowledge of governmental preferences
and policies.
6.3.3 Non-State CDM Actors
The international design of CDM scheme allows for the participation of nonstate actors in rule-setting and policy implementation. As a result, constellations of nonstate actors have been involved in the CDM project development in China. The non-state
actors under the CDM scheme mainly include project proponents (state-owned
enterprises or private companies) and consulting companies who work together with
project proponents in various CDM processing stages. But compared with the state actors,
non-state actors play only minor roles in policy making and implementation process.
Although the project developers are voluntary to participate in the CDM activity,
many local businesses in China, lacking awareness, motivation and capacity, follow the
will of the government to implement CDM projects. At the early stage of the project
development, the preparation of the Project Design Document (PDD) was mainly
prepared by a few recommended foreign businesses. Owing to governmental agencies’
support and the incentives from carbon market, dozens of domestic companies have
emerged and provided comprehensive consulting services for the project proponents,

123

especially project design and document compilation. With more entrants involved, the
market has become more competitive and the developers get more choices to choose
cooperators and compare the offers. Although abilities to provide services by these
consulting companies differ in terms of quality in general, their competence has greatly
strengthened due to capacity enhancement, lower fee charging, and the advantages of
being familiar with the local situations (Abele 2007).
Academic institutions also actively facilitate CDM project development by
participating in methodology design, technical advisory, and CDM policy analysis. The
work has expanded from focusing on natural and technological sciences to the topic of
economics, market analysis and project management. In the case that the projects are
consistent with national economic policies and have great potential to duplicate in CDM
forms, but there are no existing methodologies for new CDM projects to take for
reference, the government agencies, led primarily by the NDRC and the MOST, will
invite and support experts from universities, research institutes, and think tanks to
conduct relevant research and develop methodologies (personal interview).
With more and more CDM projects entering the pipeline, the relative slowness
of the Designated Operational Entity (DOE) and the CDM Executive Board (EB) in
project validation, registration and verification has become the bottleneck of further
project

development

(personal

interview).

In

addition

to

strengthen

regular

communications with these international CDM regulatory agencies, China has cooperated
with the EU to develop China’s own DOEs. The main purpose of such arrangement is to
shorten project processing time and reduce the transaction costs, mainly for domestic
projects. Currently, two entities have been selected: China Quality Certification Center
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and China Environmental United Certification Center. Both entities have close relations
with the ministerial agencies (ERI 2009).
The NGOs in China are rarely involved in CDM activities. Most Chinese NGOs
regard other environmental issues; their concern on the climate change issues has just
begun (Schroeder 2009; Mertha 2008). Foreign investors, businesses and financial
institutions have been active in promoting China’s CDM project development. Besides
capacity building projects in the early stage, these actors have displayed great initiative in
providing training and marketing service, and participating in appropriate methodology
development. Although CDM project development and credit trading in China rely
extensively on these foreign firms; compared with the government actors, their influence
on the development of more favorable CDM rules is still limited. Instead, only the
representative agencies of foreign governments are active in trying to influencing CDM
policy making through bilateral political advisory programs (Schroeder 2009).
6.3.4 Domestic Project Approval Procedures
CDM project approval procedures were established in the CDM measures. The
project developers first submit application to the DNA (the NDRC in China). The CDM
Board then reviews CDM projects from the aspects of participation qualification; PDD
document; baseline methodology and emission reductions; price of CERs; terms relating
to funding and technology transfer; crediting period; monitoring plan; and expected
sustainable development effectiveness. Figure 6.2 shows the normal CDM project
approval procedures in China.
The days to approve a CDM project by the NCB have been greatly shortened.
Currently, the CDM Board holds biweekly meetings to discuss the proposed projects.
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Before the NDRC (China’s DNA) passed on the project request for decision by the Board,
it solicited comments by expert review. The NDRC then approves or rejects the request
based on the decision reached by the National CDM Board in 20 days. Since 2007, when
the projects are submitted to the NDRC for approval, the proponents also need to notify
the local NDRC branch, so that the local governments can keep track of the development
of local CDM projects.

Project Proposal
No-objection letter
issued by the NDRC
CDM Application
Submission to NDRC

Be reconsidered
if made further
improvements

Expert Review
National CDM Board
Meeting

Rejection

Decision Making

Letter of Approval

Figure 6.2 Flowchart of CDM Approval Procedures
Source: IGES 2005

In practice, some CDM projects are submitted for validation before they get
approval by the DNRC. This is mainly because project developers and the partners want
to test the validity of methodologies. Even so, the DNA’s approval is prerequisite before
the projects are later sent for EB’s registration.
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6.3.5 Interactions of Network Actors
The CDM scheme involves a variety of state and non-state actors, and it has
initiated a new form of network that collectively contributes to the emission reduction
activities. Generally, interactions among network actors are shaped and influenced by
three factors. The first one is the procedures and directives of the CDM rules, formulated
by the Executive Board of the FCCC. All the CDM project developers from developing
countries follow the same rules. The EB has the power to review the applications and
decide whether the project can be processed to next level of the project cycle. The second
influencing factor comes from the carbon credit market. It is the vitality of the carbon
market that drives non-state actors, in particular private businesses to involve in the CDM
development in order to pursue their economic benefits. The third factor is traditional
top-down policy process, where the higher government leads the policy making and
implementation, and makes the decision of approval. Since the project developers have
insufficient capacity and resources in initiating CDM projects by themselves, the relevant
governmental agencies take initiative in providing capacity-building service, such as pilot
projects, technical and financial assistance, and training programs. In terms of the CDM
management in China, these three forces act together and could not be distinctly
separated. Under the political uncertainties of international climate change regime, China
has taken a pragmatic approach and made deliberate arrangements in maximizing the
benefits from this carbon offset market.
Within the Chinese CDM policy making network, government agencies at the
central level are closely interacted. The NDRC, as a comprehensive macro-economic
regulatory department, acts as the nexus agency in directing and coordinating the project
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development. Such an arrangement highlights China’s centralized governance structure
and NDRC’s dominant role in policy evaluation. It also allows central government to
balance institutional interests among related ministries without exerting big changes. The
involvement of multiple government entities enables a broader integration of the CDM
scheme into national development policy making.
In order to promote CDM projects in a larger scope, local governments have
been assuming more responsibilities in developing CDM projects to accommodate to the
local development priorities. This is supported by the following evidence: (1) local
governments are responsible for disseminating the CDM information and arranging
relevant training activities; (2) local governments should be knowledgeable of the CDM
scheme since it can potentially generate additional benefits other than traditional benefits
from project operation; (3) local government can participate in CDM project
identification, and formulate incentive measures to encourage project development; and
(4) local NDRC branches need to present the approval letter to the proposed CDM
projects within its jurisdiction, before the projects are submitted to the CDM Board for
approval. Therefore, the support from local governments has become important
prerequisite for the project approval by the National CDM Board.
The interactions among non-state actors themselves and between state and nonstate actors are generally low in China. Two reasons have been identified (Schroeder
2009). One is due to the nature of carbon market competition: all market actors are
competing for economic profits, so they remain a healthy distance. The second reason is
that with China’s transition from planned economy to market economy, the direct
intervention from the state actors has reduced. However, the strong position of state
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actors has forced market and civil society actors to prefer more cooperative measures,
instead of lobbying against governmental regulations.
6.4 CDM Project Development and Policy Adaptation
6.4.1 CDM Market Performance
Since the CDM is a market mechanism that embraces competition among credit
suppliers, it is possible to outline the competence by comparing the certified credits
among host countries. Since China has developed its rules for CDM management, the
CDM projects have been developed under the fast track. Until October 2010, China has
developed 2211 CDM projects at the different stages of the pipeline, accounting for 40%
of the total projects. The expected CERs generated from these projects till 2012 are
estimated to be 1.54 billion CERs, 54.4% of the total. In terms of CERs that have been
issued and can be used for trading and banking, 223 million CERs have been issued, 2.8
times of the figure of India, which ranks the second in the market (CD4CDM 2010).
China’s CDM projects are mixture of various types. Though a great majority of
the projects come from renewable energy projects (e.g., hydro, wind, biomass) and
energy efficiency projects, however, industrial projects, especially 11 HFC (hydrofluorocarbon) projects and 27 N2O projects, generate one third of credits (CD4CDM
2010). Although the approval of such industrial CDM projects has been abandoned since
2007, China has been unfavorably commented for flooding the carbon market with huge
amount easy-to-get credits. In addition, there are doubts about whether the carbon
reduction credits generated are really additional, since there is insufficient convincing
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evidence to prove that the project activities would not have happened without the CDM
(e.g., Lewis et al. 2010).
The CDM projects are dispersed widely in China. Almost all provinces have
CDM projects developed. However, the geographic locations of projects roughly have
two features: the industrial projects with large credits are mainly from the east, which is
much higher in economic outputs and personal income; the majority of renewable
projects with less credit generation are normally from the west, which is rich in natural
resources but poor in term economy.
6.4.2 Evolution of CDM Policy Measures
The domestic CDM Measures, which has not been changed after its adoption in
2005, is only a framework rule to guide CDM project approval and management.
Although CDM is in essence a carbon offset market mechanism that is driven by carbon
price, however, the whole project process, from its preparation to full operation and
credit trading, is significantly influenced by a series of international and domestic
political factors. In China, to ensure the CDM project development to achieve the
maximum benefits and compete for larger market share, the NDRC, China’s DNA in the
CDM project management, has made supplementary adjustments to adapt to new
situations. These adjustments have been widely regarded, by foreign carbon market
actors and some policy researchers, as deliberate interventions of the Chinese government
to the market-oriented carbon reduction activities. Table 6.4 shows some of
supplementary policy regulations in the form of notices adopted since 2005.

130

Table 6.4 Supplementary CDM Policy Regulations in China
Name of Notice

Year

Type/sector

Main Content

Standardizing CDM Project’s
Consultation
Service
and
Evaluation
Examination
and
Approval
Procedures Concerning CDM
Project Application
Determining Baseline Annual
Emission Factors of Power Grids
Adding RMB into the CER Price
Unit

2006

Market
regulations

Regulate the CDM Consultation
Service and consulting fee
collection
Standardize
CDM
project
approval procedure; involve local
government in the process
Set baseline for electricity
generating CDM projects
Counteract the impacts of
continued change of exchange
rates on the project examination

2006, 2007

Procedure
improvement

2006, 2007

Electricity

2008

Market
regulations

Arrangement of CDM Projects in
Hong Kong SAR

2008

Market entry
regulations

Encourage Hong Kong
develop CDM projects

Informing the NDRC of CDM
Projects after 2 August 2008.

2008

Procedure
improvement

Income Tax Policies concerning
the CDM Fund and the Involved
Project Enterprises
Explanation to Issues concerning
China’s Wind Power Capacity
Discount

2009

Market
regulations

2009

Renewable
energy

Demonstrate
the
prior
consideration of the CDM before
undertaking project
Provide corporate income tax
incentives available to CDM
enterprises and China CDM Fund
Explain the pricing system of
wind projects in China

to

Source: ERI 2009; CCChina 2010

There have been many debates about China’s CDM regulations. For example,
during 2005-2007, eleven HFC (Hydro-fluorocarbons) CDM projects were approved and
registered. The HFC-23, a by-product of HCFC-22 (Hydro-chlorofluorocarbons)
manufacturing, is a potential greenhouse gas trapping 11700 times more heat per unit
than CO2. The international community criticized the projects of contributing little to
sustainable development. China subsequently argued that a rate of 65% of the revenue
from HFC CDM projects would be charged for supporting priority projects in the future.
On the other hand, starting from 2007, no HFC abatement projects have been approved
by the central government.
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Another example is the entry requirements for the CDM development.
According to the CDM Measures, only Chinese funded or Chinese-holding joint-venture
enterprises within the territory of China are eligible to develop CDM projects with
foreign buyers. This has been regarded as an important constraint to foreign investors’
involvement in the emissions reduction activity promotion and willingness in technology
transfer (ERI 2009; Schroeder 2009). After a few years’ insistence by the Chinese
government, a new measure was promoted recently that Hong Kong enterprises are
allowed to implement CDM projects on the Mainland (China5e 2010).
Theoretically, the price of CER credits from CDM projects shall be determined
by the credit demand and supply. However, since China leads in the CDM registration
and CER supply, to avoid vicious price competition among domestic developers, the
NDRC has set the unofficial contract price for the CER credits, unwilling to approve
CDM projects valuing CERs below 7-9 Euros per ton, depending on the types of projects
(ERI 2009). Although this has induced many complaints from investors of developed
countries and to some extent limited domestic developers’ interests, the government’s
reply was to keep transaction fair for domestic firms and no vying-for-lower-prices is
allowed. Since China is the dominant supplier in the CDM credit market, many countries
began to use China’s pricing for negotiating equivalent prices with credit buyers.
6.4.3 Sustainable Benefits
Although sustainable development is much reiterated in China’s political and
economic life, there is no officially recognized set of indicators for a quantified
assessment of a project’s contribution to sustainable development. The proposed CDM
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projects are evaluated more on the basis of their impacts within clearly defined priority
areas than strictly by a quantified measurement of sustainable development (IGES 2005).
Sustainable development goals are arguably met in China’s CDM projects. The
project which could contribute more to the local communities is less competitive and not
specially treated with preferential fiscal and taxation conditions at the moment. The large
industrial emission reduction projects, to some extent, have restrained the development of
small priority projects. This is not unusual because CDM is basically a market-based
mechanism and the cheaper credits from industrial projects are more cost-competitive
and more attractive to market buyers.
6.5 Conclusive Summary
China’s participation in the CDM scheme significantly contributes to the global
climate mitigation activities. Although it initially resisted the scheme, arguing that
developed countries may shift carbon emission reduction burdens to developing countries
through this trading system; however, with the implementation of some pilot projects and
final establishment of CDM operating regulations, China has gradually accepted this
market-based scheme. Like other developing countries, no cap targets are set for China’s
emissions under the Kyoto Protocol, meaning that emission reductions generated
voluntarily from CDM projects can be traded with developed countries. For the Chinese
government and relevant project developers, the CDM scheme is regarded as an
opportunity to make full use of its incomparable emission reduction potential and low
abatement costs. The effective management of CDM projects means to promote
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mitigation efforts for sustainable development and enhance competence in the carbon
trading market.
Though a latecomer, China has led the CDM project development since 2007.
Well-organized networks consisting of a wide range of state and non-state actors have
contributed to China’s leading status in the CDM governance and market competition. In
the early stage of the CDM development, relevant agencies at central level promoted pilot
projects in selected provinces and sectors under the technical and financial assistance
from international donors. Later, awareness and capacity building projects had been
established nationwide to effectively disseminate relevant knowledge and expertise of
CDM development and carbon trading to actors involved. With the Kyoto Protocol’s
entry into force, it is the vitality of the carbon market that attracts project proponents and
local governments to involve in the CDM development and pursue economic benefits.
Meanwhile, the National CDM Board concentrates on the identification of priority
projects, and ensures the project development in line with the national sustainable
development needs. In general, China’s CDM governance network facilitates its higher
manageability in promoting CDM and reallocating funds for maximizing national
interests.
Seen from the current CDM development in China, administrative and market
forces are two major forces that affect the CDM development process. The NDRC in
China acts as the nexus agency in the action network for project review and approval.
Such an arrangement highlights China’s traditional centralized governance structure and
the NDRC’s dominant role in domestic CDM-related policy making. It also allows
central government to balance the institutional and sectoral interests without incurring
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more uncomfortable changes. With the aim of gaining maximized economic and social
benefits from CDM development, the relationship between the NDRC and other Board
agencies is generally collaborative.
CDM is a market mechanism that allows China to trade certified credits with
developed countries. Although the carbon credit trading is among businesses; however, in
China, the governments at central and local levels have both been highly involved in the
process of CDM development. At the local level, governments act much like profitseeking businesses (Qi et al. 2008). Though a streamlined project approval system has
been established and more domestic actors have gained more competence, there is no
indication from this case that shows the activeness of the project development is due to
the decreased political control in the policy process.
China adopts the three-tiered system to manage CDM activity. The ad hoc
management committee, the National CDM Board, which is co-chaired by the NDRC and
the MOST, ranks between the national climate change coordinating committee and the
Designated National Agency (i.e., the NDRC). The members of the Board are relevant
departments from member ministries and agencies. There are regular communications
within ministries, and for important issues, to be discussed among coordinating
committee members. In 2007, the coordinating committee at the top-tier was reshuffled
and the State Council has been chairing the committee since then. Therefore, the
authority and power to coordinate CDM project development have enhanced.
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CHAPTER VII
CASE 3: TOP-1000 INDUSTIRAL ENERGY CONSERVATION PROGRAM
7.1 Introduction
The early 1990s witnessed the explosive growth of voluntary environmental
programs in industrialized countries, which reflects the changing relations between
government and business and political recognition of this less intrusive approach (Mol et
al. 2000). Voluntary environmental programs can affect behavior and provide
environmental benefits. However, the importance, form, and results of such policy
arrangement differ according to countries and political-institutional settings (Mol et al.
2000). Though still characterized by its centralized regulative tradition, however,
modeled on international sectoral target-setting programs, China formally adopted a pilot
voluntary program in 2003 and attempted to diffuse it countrywide through the Top-1000
Industrial Energy Conservation Program (Top-1000 Program).
Chapter 7 examines the emergence, shape and functioning of China’s Top-1000
Industrial Energy Conservation Program, as the second case. The program, implemented
since March 2006, covers China’s 1000 largest industrial enterprises from nine energyintensive sectors, which account for one-third of China’s prime energy consumption. The
program requires the provincial governments to sign contracts with local enterprises and
supervise the enterprises to reach the energy efficiency goals.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 7.2, the contextual background
of the program is presented, which mainly focuses on issues of international development
of industrial voluntary programs, and domestic contexts of promoting energy
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conservation activities. Section 7.3 documents the development the Top-1000 Program
and the features of the policy networks. The Program has generated from an initial pilot
project in Shangdong Province, and evolved to a nation-wide relevant large-scaled
enterprises, and finally became a comprehensive target-setting program that involves
governments at provincial and local levels. Section 7.4 studies outcomes of formulating
and implementing the Top-1000 Program. Finally, conclusions of the case are drawn in
Section 7.5.
7.2 Contextual Background of the Program
The contextual environment poses impacts on policy making and development.
Framed by the policy network approach, this section outlines three contextual factors that
have influenced the emergence and shaping of China’s voluntary energy efficiency
program, in particular, the Top-1000 Program. These three factors are: (1) the practice of
international voluntary agreements in industries; (2) domestic industrial administrative
structures; and (3) the needs to improve energy efficiency in industrial sectors.
7.2.1 International Voluntary Agreements
Many industrialized countries have adopted wide variety of policies and
programs to improve energy efficiency and reduce carbon emissions in industrial sectors.
These policies include: regulations and standards, taxes and charges, voluntary
agreements, subsidies, financial incentives, research and development programs and
information dissemination (IPCC 2007). In practice, these policy instruments are
integrated to address various industrial energy efficiency improvement needs (Price and
Jiang 2001). Since 1990s, Voluntary agreement programs has emerged as a pragmatic
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and flexible way to the need of dealing with energy efficiency challenges in many
industrialized countries in Europe, Japan and North America (Price 2005; Mol et al. 2000;
Morgenstern et al. 2007).
Voluntary agreements take on many forms with varying levels of scope and
stringency; however, virtually all voluntary agreements involve some agreements
between government and industry to facilitate voluntary actions to achieve desirable
environmental and social objectives beyond compliance to regulated obligations
(Morgenstern et al. 2007; Storey 1996). Some drivers of promoting voluntary agreements
include offering flexibility both to participating firms and to government agencies;
increasing the cost efficiency; reducing production costs; improving corporate reputation;
accelerating the application of best available technology and avoiding a strong political
opposition (Eichhorst and Bongardt 2009).
Although the voluntary agreements can potentially affect the participants’
behaviors and offer environmental and social gains, and they are normally set at the same
or slightly stricter than the business-as-usual scenario, evaluating and comparing the
effectiveness of voluntary agreements proved to be difficult, because of the lack of
realistic, agreed-upon baseline, overlapping of relevant activities, different metrics and
evaluative criteria employed (Price 2005; Morgenstern et al. 2007). A series of
evaluations show that most voluntary agreements have failed in achieving significant
reductions in emissions beyond business-as-usual scenario and contributing to the major
changes in behavior (Johannsen 2002; Helby 2002; Darnall and Carmin 2003;
Morgenstern et al. 2007). Based on some comparative studies among countries, voluntary
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agreements can be better developed in the countries with a history of good cooperation
between government and industry (De Clercq 2002; Mol et al. 2000).
7.2.2 Administrative Structure in Industrial Sectors
China has established an integrated, multilevel bureaucratic system to regulate
and supervise the industrial activities. In China, the most important hierarchical
relationship in industrial economic development is between the center and localities,
which is supposed to be a relationship of leading and implementation (Zhao 2002). In
reality, however, two forms of hierarchy co-exist in the Chinese bureaucratic system,
which are commonly termed as “line and area relationships”. Line relationships refer to
the direct vertical relations between higher and lower level functional units of regulative
administrative hierarchies. For example, the provincial bureaus of environmental
protection replicate the functions of the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP), and
receive directions from the MEP. Area relationships represent administrative hierarchical
relations between local governments and administrative units within their jurisdiction,
with the local government holding full authority for administrative management and
economic development at local levels. For example, the provincial-level bureaus of
environmental protection are financed by provincial government, which also holds the
power to determine the key leaders of the agency. The dominance of line relationships
leads to the development of industrial systems; while the dominance of area relationships
supports a policy of local self sufficiency. Although the line and area relationships vary
over time in China, the localities have gained greater independence and influence through
the reforms to “pursue their own development strategies within broadly defined
guidelines” (Saich 2004, 123).
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Administrative reforms of central government have been conducted to make it
more suitable for a market economy. In 1998, most of the ministries that traditionally
feature command and control policies in industrial sectors merged into one newly
established institution: the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). In 2003, the
SETC was abolished and many of its functions were transferred to the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), which is mainly responsible for
comprehensive planning and policy coordination. Some disbanded industrial ministries
were transformed into industrial associations and currently function as linking agent
between the government and industry.
The enterprises are important economic and corporate actors in China, but
traditionally, they are owned and organized by the government. The state-run enterprises,
normally in manufacturing and large in scale, were divided into two types: ministerial
enterprise and local government enterprise. The reform has transformed more ministerial
enterprises into the local government enterprise group. In the case of the Top-1000
Program, almost all the enterprises were traditionally owned and managed by industrial
ministries; however, currently only 20% of these enterprises are under direct control of
central government, while 80% of them are owned by provincial governments.
The design and implementation of the industrial management programs take
place within the webs of relatively stable and ongoing relationships between some of the
key government agencies and enterprises. Figure 7.1 frames the relations of these key
government and corporate actors.
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Figure 7.1 Framework of Actors in China’s Industrial Management

7.2.3 Imperative for Enhancing Energy Efficiency
From 1980 to 2000, energy intensity (the amount of energy used per unit of
GDP) in China declined steadily at an average annual rate of 5 percent (Kan 2008).
Despite this improvement, the overall efficiency of energy utilization is still low by
global standards. The energy intensity in China is two times the world average, and unit
energy consumption for major energy-consuming products is 20-40% higher than
advanced international standards. Since early 2000s, GDP has maintained high growth
rates, but the progress rate in energy intensity reduction has slowed. From 2003 to 2005,
with the dramatic growth of heavy industry and energy demand, the downward trend in
energy intensity was reversed (Table 7.1). The key environmental pollutant emissions of
SO2 and Chemical Oxygen Demand (COD) increased fast.
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Table 7.1 The Growth Rates of Selected Energy-related Indicators (2000-2005)
2000
8.4%

2001
8.3%

2002
9.1%

2003
10.0%

GDP
Energy
3.53%
3.35%
6%
15.28%
Consumption
Energy Intensity
-4.52%
-4.57%
-2.82%
4.77%
SO2
-2.4%
-1.1%
12.0%
COD
-2.8%
-2.7%
-2.5%
Note: GDP-Gross Domestic Product; COD-Chemical Oxygen Demand

2004
10.1%

2005
10.4%

16.14%

10.56%

5.5%
4.5%
0.5%

1.13%
13.1%
5.6%

Source: NBS 2001-2006

In response, since 2003, the Chinese government has taken new approaches to
deepen its reforms in energy-related sectors, including the restructuring of energy
management agencies and the adoption of a series of policy instruments (Andrew-Speed
2009). The National Energy Leading Group under the State Council and the Energy
Bureau of the NDRC were set up in 2003. The Department of Resource Conservation and
Environmental Protection (DRCEP) under the NDRC was established to take over energy
conservation oversight missions left by the disbanded SETC, as well as to strengthen the
policy coordination with environmental protection agencies. Moreover, the central
government introduced the key slogan of building an “environment-friendly and
resource-saving society”.
A disconnection between national policies and local implementation has been
identified as the main reason that drives the increase of the energy intensity in China,
because economic development is given a top priority, and the unwillingness or lack of
capacity have made the implementation of top-down approach at the local levels very
weak (Eichhorst and Bongardt 2009; Andrew-Speed 2009). To make the reform stepwise
and incremental, implementing voluntary agreements in industrial sectors is regarded as
important in energy efficiency improvement, at least in the near future (Hu 2007).
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7.3 Network Development of the Top-1000 Program
7.3.1 Pilot Voluntary Program in Shandong Province
In 1999, the US-based Energy Foundation funded a research program to
evaluate and develop innovative energy-efficiency policies for China’s industrial sectors.
The program was directed by the then State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC).
China Energy Conservation Association (CECA), an independent non-profit social entity
under the leadership of the NDRC and the General Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection and Quarantine (GAQSIQ), are responsible for the program implementation,
with the technical assistance provided by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
(LBNL). After assessing various domestic policies and guidelines for energy
conservation, as well as international advanced energy efficiency policies, in 2000, the
program team suggested to the SETC that voluntary agreements that result from the
negotiation between government and business could provide an innovative approach
more compatible with the market economy.
A series of surveys and investigations had been conducted for selecting the most
appropriate pilot projects. The iron and steel sector was chosen because of its features of
larger energy-efficiency potential, stronger capacity in sector management, and more
motivation for improved international competitiveness following China’s accession to the
WTO (World Trade Organization). Regarding location, Shandong Province was chosen
mainly due to its advantages of well-established energy efficiency regulations at the
provincial level and the presence of a number of energy service agencies, which could
provide assistance to pilot enterprises in the areas of energy auditing, assessment, data
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collection, and information dissemination. Finally, Jinan Iron and Steel and Laiwu Iron
and Steel were identified as pilot enterprises for voluntary program.
After negotiations between the Shandong Economic and Trade Commission
(ETC) and the two enterprises, the voluntary agreements were signed in April 2003. The
program set a base year of 2002 and a target year of 2005, and developed performance
targets based on physical energy intensity measured by energy consumption per ton of
steel. According to the consensus reached, the two enterprises agreed to take measures to
improve efficiency and realize the goal of saving 300,000 tce aggregately within three
years, which was 137,500 tce higher than the original enterprise energy saving targets
(Hu 2007). The Shandong ETC agreed to adopt a list of supporting policies for the two
enterprises, including information dissemination, positive publicity, tax exemption and
financial assistance. The CECA, as the third party, was to provide necessary technical
support and advisory service for the enterprises and Shandong ETC. The network of the
pilot program is shown in Figure 7.2.

Shandong
Province

CECA

SETC

(third party)

Shandong ETC
Agreement

LBNL

Pilot Plants

Figure 7.2 Framework of Actors in Shandong Pilot Voluntary Program
Note: SETC-State Economic and Trade Commission; ETC-Economic and Trade Commission; CECAChina Energy Conservation Association; LBLN-Lawrence Berkley National Laboratory (US)

144

The voluntary pilot program was considered a success due to its compliance of
the 3-year energy efficiency targets and the experience and knowledge accumulated.
Over this period, the energy consumption per ton of steel in two enterprises had reduced
by 9-9.5%, and a total of 422,000 tce had been saved, 40% more than the target listed in
the voluntary agreement (Price et al. 2010). The successful implementation of the
voluntary pilot program in Shandong provided a stimulus for adopting this tool at the
national level.
7.3.2 Initiation of the Top-1000 Program
The development of the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Consumption Program
began as early as 2005 (Sinton 2006). The Program drew many conceptual and practical
elements from other international and domestic energy efficiency programs, including the
voluntary programs. The NDRC lead the program design, with the support of the Energy
Foundation. As one of the key initiatives of the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010) for
improving industrial energy efficiency in China, the Program was launched in April 2006
by the Department of Resource Conservation and Environmental Protection (DRCEP) of
the NDRC, together with some other central agencies.
The program covered 1008 large-scaled, financially independent enterprises
from nine major energy consuming industries (i.e., iron and steel, petroleum and
petrochemicals, chemicals, electric power generation, non-ferrous metals, coal mining,
construction materials, textiles, and pulp and paper) that each consumed a minimum of
180,000 tce in 2004. The energy consumption of these enterprises accounted for more
than 33% of national and 47% of industrial energy use in 2004 (Price and Wang 2007).
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The goal of the Top-1000 Program was to reach the aggregate energy saving of 100
million tce during the period of 2006-2010.
The Program set 2005 as baseline year. The unit energy consumption levels,
based on the domestic best practice, international best practice, and sectoral best practice,
are considered important evidence for determining energy saving targets. On the basis of
the analysis of the energy-saving potentials in the industries and the location of the
enterprises, the NDRC separated the 100 million tce energy-saving targets into provinces.
Target-setting for the Top-1000 enterprises is generally a top-down process, although
there are constant information exchanges between NDRC, provincial functional units,
and enterprises. In mid-2006, the targets for each enterprise were publicized. A two-tier
contracting system was set up to ensure the program monitoring and implementation. At
the upper tier, provincial governments signed the responsibility documents with the
NDRC; and at the lower tier, similar to the voluntary program piloted in Shandong,
energy-saving target contracts were signed between local governments and participating
enterprises.
7.3.3 Actors and Policy Network
Although getting access to the reliable information about which agencies or
individuals have been involved in designing the program is hard, with the implementation
of the program, it is easier to examine the development of the action network. This also
provides an alternative option to study the features of the policy network and its
influences to the policy outcomes. The actors involved in implementing the Top-1000
Program have clear divisions of responsibilities. They can be broadly categorized into
three groups: government actors whose main responsibilities are to design the
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management rules and supervise the program implementation; business actors which
refer to the Top-1000 enterprises involved in the program; and civil society actors which
include industrial associations that provide technical assistance. The number of Top-1000
enterprises declined during 2006-2008 due to closure and combination. Table 7.2 shows
these actors and the functions.
Table 7.2 Actors and Their Functions in the Top-1000 Program
Type of Actor

Government Actors
(Central)

Name
NDRC
NELG
NBS
GAQSIQ
SASAC

Government Actors
(Provincial)
Civil Society Actors
(Government operated)

Provincial
Functional
Units
Industrial
Associations
(e.g., CECA)

Function
Program design and coordination, daily administration
Overall guidance and coordination
Statistical information collection and management
Supervision of quality of the program operation
Supervision of major state-owned enterprises (supervising
197 state-run enterprises)
Tracking, supervision, and management of the energy
saving activities of the enterprises under their jurisdictions
(supervising 811 enterprises)
Creating indicator and evaluation system, providing energy
auditing service, and assessing energy-saving potentials

Undertaking energy audits, reporting implementation
progress, improving technical and management capacity to
Business Actors
reach energy saving targets (1008 enterprises in total in
2006)
Note: NDRC-National Development and Reform Commission; NELG-National Energy Leading Group;
NBS-National Bureau of Statistics; SASAC-State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission; GAQSIQ-General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine; CECAChina Energy Conservation Association
Top-1000
Enterprises

Source: NDRC 2006

No supporting policies and measures were established at the commencement of
the Top-1000 Program. The initial implementation plan developed in 2006 only provided
general policy guidelines for energy-saving activities. In this plan, administrative
measures were underlined to ensure the effective achievement of the energy-saving
targets (NDRC 2006). The administrative award and punishment rules were adopted to
regulate the province-level governments and involved enterprises. The responsible
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government officials would be evaluated annually on whether the energy conservation
targets have been met. The well-performing entities would be awarded and their
achievements publicized. The enterprises which fail in meeting the targets would not be
given the annual rewards or honorary titles, and the leaders would not be promoted.
7.3.4 Evolution of the Top-1000 Program Network
Over the first year of the Top-1000 Program in 2006, total energy saving of 20
million tce had been realized (NDRC and NBS 2007). However, the national energy
intensity reduction target set in the 11th Five Year Plan was not accomplished. National
energy intensity reduced by 1.23% in 2006 against 4.4% per year, the equivalent annual
reduction rate needed to meet the national plan of 20% intensity reduction between 2005
and 2010.
To guarantee the target accomplishment, the State Council enforced more
rigorous measures. The national 20% energy intensity reduction targets were
disaggregated to all provincial levels. Depending on the local conditions and capacities,
the reduction targets in each province vary from 12% to 25%. The allocation plan of the
targets was first drafted by the NDRC and its attached research institute, namely Energy
Research Institute, was highly involved. After soliciting comments from all provincial
parities, the NDRC finalized the implementation proposal and submit to the State Council
for approval. The provincial targets were in turn broken down the required quota to a city
level, but not to a company level (personal interview). Stronger administrative
accountability requirements were added as the government at lower level is responsible
for assessing the progress and reporting to the upper-level government regularly.
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Thus, the Top-1000 Program became incorporated into a much larger scale of
energy efficiency initiatives for application in China, however, the program began to be
less voluntary, but more obligatory. Figure 7.3 shows the policy network of actors that
are involved in the Top-1000 Program and the later extended initiatives. In this network,
the interactions with clearly defined targets to achieve are marked with bold lines.

National Energy Efficiency Action
State Council
Top-1000 Program
Relevant
Ministries
Industrial
Association

Provincial
Government

NDRC

Provincial
Functional Units
Top-1000
Enterprises

City
Government

Other Industrial
Enterprises

(Bold: links with concrete targets to achieve)
Figure 7.3 Top-1000 Program Actor Network and its Extension

With the parallel implementation of the energy efficiency improvement
initiative and the Top-1000 Program, a series of supporting policies and measures have
been formulated and adopted by central government. The Ministry of Finance, the State
Bureau of Taxation, the Ministry of Science and Technology and The Ministry of
Environmental Protection, though without formal role, all participated in designing and

149

implementing supporting policies. Table 7.3 broadly categories these activities into three
areas: capacity building activates, funding and financial incentives, and complementary
programs and policies adopted. These policies have effectively changed the participants’
behavior and contributed to the target fulfillment (personal interviews with policy
researchers from Liaoning Province). A series of legislative regulations, policies,
measures, and programs have been developed and enforced to complement the program
implementation, such as the Ten Key Energy Saving Projects, National Climate Change
Program, Energy Conservation Law (revised), and Monitoring and Evaluation Measures
for Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Activities (Kan 2008; Price et al. 2010;
State Council 2010).
In addition, to ensure the effective achievement of the energy-saving targets, the
administrative award and punishment rules were adopted to regulate the province-level
governments and involved enterprises: the responsible government official will be
evaluated annually on whether or not the energy conservations targets have been met.
The well-performed entities that have typical values will be awarded and their
achievements will be publicized. The enterprises which fail in meeting the targets will
not be given the annual rewards or honorary titles. The leaders in the state-owned
enterprises will not receive the annual award and the responsible officials will not be
promoted.
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Table 7.3 Follow-up Activities of the Top-1000 Program
Follow-up
Activities
Capacity
building
activities

Funding
financial
incentives

and

Complementary
programs and
policies adopted

Description

Achievements

• In October 2006, a series of training sessions for the
Top-1000 enterprises in five regional locations, covering
topics of energy conservation measurement, energy
auditing and statistics, case study, energy-saving
technology options.
• A series of energy statistics training sessions were held
by the NBS. The development of a national auditing
standard is in process.
• In 2007, the Top-1000 enterprises undertook energy
audits and identified energy-saving opportunities.
Outside experts from public and private agencies
provided technical assistance for the energy auditing.
• Technical assistance and on-site training
• In 2007, a total of 23.5 billion RMB ($3.4B) were
allocated to support energy-efficiency activities. In
2008, 41.8 billion RMB ($3.9B) were allocated.
• The detailed rules of rewards and rebates for industrial
energy conservation were adopted.
• Most provincial governments received financial support
to develop local energy conservation centers.
• Central government announced to reduce the tax rebates
for exports of energy-intensive products.
• The enterprises with higher energy intensity level will be
charged with higher electricity prices. Since 2007, the
local governments have gained authority to allocate the
levied fees.
• International donors are encouraged to invest in China’s
energy conservation activities.
• The Eleventh Five-Year Plan of Energy Development
(April, 2007)
• Comprehensive
Working
Scheme
of
Energy
conservation and Emission Reduction (May, 2007)
• National Climate Change Program (June, 2007)
• Energy Conservation Law (Revised, October, 2007)
• Statistical Monitoring and Evaluation Measures for
Energy Conservation and Emission Reduction Activities
(November, 2007)
• National Climate Change Action Plan (October, 2008)

By August 2007, a
total of 967 energy
audit reports and 836
energy conservation
plans
had
been
complemented and
submitted to the
NDRC.

There were strong
incentives for energy
conservation
and
industrial
restructuring towards
less energy intensive.

Energy conservation
and
emission
reduction activities
have been identified
as key priorities to
support sustainable
development.

Source: Price et al. 2009; Wu 2009

7.4 Results of the Program
The energy savings of the Top-1000 enterprises came from the improvement of
energy management, retrofits of industrial processes, as well as closure of small,
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inefficient production processes within enterprises. According to the official data, the
initial program target of absolute energy saving of 100 million tce to 2010 had already
been reached by the end of 2008 (NDRC 2009). The government at all levels then began
to turn its attention to reaching the national energy intensity reduction targets, which is
still hard to accomplish. Price et al. (2010) have estimated that, depending on the GDP
growth rate, the Top-1000 Program could contribute to somewhere between
approximately 10% and 25% of the savings required to support China’s efforts to meet a
20% reduction in energy intensity by 2010. Table 7.4 shows the outcomes of the Top1000 Program, as well as overall progress of energy efficiency improvement efforts.
Table 7.4 Progress of the Top-1000 Program and the National Program
Targets during
2006 - 2010

Item

Top-1000
Program
(April 2006)

- save energy
of 100 million
tce

Aggregate
energy saved
(million tce)
Number
of
involved
enterprises

National
Action on
Energy
Intensity
Reduction
(June, 2007)

-reduce energy
intensity (EI)
by 20%
-reduce
SO2
emissions by
10%
-reduce COD
by 10%

Program

Aggregate EI
change rate
Aggregate SO2
change rate

2006

2007

2008

2009

20

70.48

106.2

-

Remark

C
998

953

922

-

-1.23%

-

-10.1%

-14.4%

OP

-8.95%

-13.1%

C

-6.61%

-9.66%

OP

1.8%

Aggregate
COD change
rate

1.2%

3.14
%
4.66
%

Note: C- target completed; OP- target on progress

Source: NDRC and NBS 2007; NDRC 2009

It should be noted that the Top-1000 Enterprises Energy Use Report 2007
(NDRC and NBS 2007), jointly released by the NDRC and the National Bureau of
Statistics (NBS), includes a more complete analysis and comparison of sectoral
performance. In the subsequent years, the NDRC has become the only body reporting on
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program performance and no information on sectoral progress has been provided.
Furthermore, according to Price et al. (2010), there is little transparency in the data
reporting for the Top-1000 Program, and there is no third party reviewing or verifying the
reported results at all levels.
What has caused the Top-1000 Program deviate from the route of voluntary
program? Liu (2010) identifies three reasons: (1) the urgency and stringency of the
compliance of the goal set in the 11th Five-Year Plan; (2) the increased probability of
disagreement among involved actors, who have varying interests and resources; and (3)
the realistic complexity in arranging such a voluntary agreement in a country that is
experiencing significant changes.
7.5 Conclusive Summary
The Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program was derived from the
pilot industrial voluntary project implemented in Shandong Province, which was modeled
on foreign practices and guided by international agencies. The original idea of
introducing voluntary agreement was to test whether policy instruments built on the
consensus between government and industry can be taken as an alternative approach to
top-down controls. Although the pilot project in Shandong showed a promising start, and
the initial design of the Top-1000 Program did enable governments at local levels and
involved enterprises to jointly make and implement energy efficiency plans consistent
with the national goals; however, the case study shows that the Top-1000 Program has
deviated from the voluntary approach, and the traditional top-down regulations and
management are treated to be more effective and irreplaceable.
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The Top-1000 Program acts as an important policy experiment that encourages
more communications between local governments and the enterprises in their
jurisdictions. The program also provides incentives to local governments and involved
enterprises to cooperate in enhancing industrial energy efficiencies. However, the
effective implementation of the program needs to be coordinated with other relevant
policies, and eventually depends on the capacity improvement of the involved actors. In
addition, the network members within the program are not well-connected, due to the fact
that all government, business, and civil society actors do little in sharing and exchanging
information and other resources, or arranging concerted efforts for mutual goals. Instead,
the local governments and the enterprises passively accepted the targets set by the central
government, with little involvement from the civil society actors.
Same as the other two cases, the economic reforms have, to a great extent,
separated the business with the government, leaving enterprises more maneuver in
making their own decisions according to market development. But the enterprises in
China lack resources and powers to negotiate with the governments; even numerous
industrial associations are incapable. As seen from the case, the resultant implementation
and follow-up activities of the Top-1000 Program privileges central government decision
making against negotiation of voluntary targets.
As for the influence of political control on the participation from non-state
actors, the decrease of the political control is seen as a trend in the development of
Chinese political regime, and could not be clearly revealed in a case that covers a
relatively short period of time, nor could it be taken as the causal factors that influence
the proactiveness of non-state actor performance. As a matter of fact, in the Top-1000

154

Program, the initiatives of the non-state actors have been marginalized during the
program process.
Finally, the Top-1000 Program was initially designed by the NDRC and some
other agencies at the central level, but its effective implementation could not be achieved
without participation of provincial governments. With the expansion of the program to
cover almost all industrial enterprises at all scales, the needs for shared responsibility and
policy coordination between ministries and provinces increased. The case demonstrates
that since 2007, the State Council has been leading the policy development and
integration, and the promotion of energy conservation activities.
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CHAPTER VIII
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
The historical and institutional development of China’s climate change
mitigation policy process has been presented through three selected cases, namely the
national climate change mitigation initiative in general, and two specific cases of the
CDM project management and the Top-1000 Industrial Energy Conservation Program.
This chapter contains a comprehensive comparative analysis of the findings presented in
the previous three cases. Such a comparative analysis sheds light on key features of
policy networks in different policy arrangements, which can facilitate in-depth
understanding of the dynamics of China’s policy making processes.
This chapter is arranged as follows. Section 8.1 conducts the within-case
analysis, which treats each case of policy arrangements individually and tests hypotheses
concerning relationship between environmental contexts, features of policy networks, and
policy outcomes. Subsequently, in Section 8.2, specific policy features across cases are
analyzed to generate some commonalities to understand China’s policy process. In the
final section of 8.3, findings from the within-case analysis and the cross-case analysis
will be synthesized to test the validity of the fragmented authoritarianism model
developed by Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988).
8.1 Hypothesis Testing through Within-case Analysis
As shown in Section 2.6, four hypotheses have been suggested as follows based
on the preliminary study of the policy network approach. These hypotheses highlight the
formulation and functions of policy networks in China’s climate change mitigation policy
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processes. The present section summarizes the hypothesis testing results from the
empirical findings of the three cases (within-case study). Table 8.1 shows the results by
taking three cases together. As seen in the table, the impact of state-society interaction on
the policy proactiveness provides a good approximation in two of the three cases.
Furthermore, the involvement of the State Council in decision making can be positively
predicted by the complexity of responsibility sharing among state actors, although the
degree and approach to which the State Council is involved varies in different policy
arrangements.
Table 8.1 Empirical Support for the Hypotheses
Hypotheses
H1: Increasing interaction between government, business, and
civil society actors will increase the likelihood of China taking a
more proactive approach to develop effective climate change
mitigation policy.
H2: More fragmentation in the distribution of regulative power
will increase the likelihood of China’s utilizing more innovative
policy instruments and measures.

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

+

+

0

0

N/A

N/A

H3: Decreasing political control in policy development and
implementation will encourage other actors, in particular non0
N/A
N/A
state actors, to exert greater effort in shaping mitigation policy.
H4: Increasing demand for shared responsibilities between
ministries and provincial governments will increase the
+
+
+
likelihood of stronger coordination by the central government.
Scale: +: confirming; -: disconfirming; 0: neither conforming or disconfirming; N/A: not applicable

Hypotheses 2 and 3 are not applicably tested in Case 2 and 3. Both cases failed
in providing enough long time to exhibit clearly the trend of fragmentation of the power
distribution, as well as the extent of the political control. Although Case 1 is applicable in
testing both hypotheses, however, being lack of direct causal relationship between
underlying variables the case study neither confirms nor disconfirms the hypotheses.
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It should be noted that although empirical studies in the three cases generally
support the first hypothesis and the last hypothesis. But the reliability is not without
limitations. The primary reason lies in the fact that all hypotheses are on the basis of
personal familiarity of the practical China’s climate policy process and the understanding
of features and roles of the working policy networks. Although the policy network
analytic framework is in theory a casual model, it only contains some inclusive concepts
in the model and could not capture numerous influencing variables in the real life. Given
nonlinearity of a policy process and complex causal-effect relationships in the cycle of
policy development, it might be more appropriate to claim that the relationship among
variables tested in above hypotheses are

not causal, but instead, dialectic and

correlational.
8.2 Results of the Cross-case Analysis
The purpose of the using multi-case study approach is to enhance the generality
of understanding a broader phenomenon (Gerring 2004), and enhance the probability of
capturing novel findings that may exist in data (Eisenhart 1989). The three cases of
different policy arrangements can contribute to a better understanding of the nature of
China’s policy making process on climate change and of roles and influences of policy
networks involved in the process. In this section, the cross-case analysis is taken to
summarize some commonalities and features from policy making processes of the three
cases.
Notably, in this study, it is risky to claim that the comparability requirement of
doing multi-case study is favorably met, since the controlled comparison across cases is

158

almost not possible for nature events (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2004), and the
three cases are hierarchically at two levels (one generic case of national mitigation policy
making and two nested cases of specific mitigation programs). However, since all the
three cases follow the same analytic framework and share overlapping timeframe, some
factors and features are summarized to reflect the commonality or uniqueness of China’s
climate change policy processes.
The section first addresses key features of policy network development in the
three cases. The analysis, conducted from 8.2.1 to 8.2.3, is framed by the three
components in the policy network analytic framework, namely, policy contexts, network
features; and policy outcomes. Treating the policy making process as dynamic and
cyclical, Section 8.2.4 summarizes key features of the mitigation policy process in China.
8.2.1 Contextual Factors that Affect the Policy Network
Contextual factors provide precondition for understanding the origins of policy
networks. Although three cases vary with their scopes and functional specificities, as
identified in the case studies, the emergence and form of policy networks are all
influenced by three major factors of international, domestic, and policy-specific contexts.
Policy networks evolve with the development of these contextual factors. Table 8.2
summarizes the key contextual factors in the three cases.
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Table 8.2 Key Factors in the Three Cases
Environmental
Contexts

International
factors

Domestic Factors

Policy-Specific
Factors

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

-Development of the
climate change regime
(FCCC, Kyoto
Protocol, and other
agreements);
-Global economic
development
-Diplomacy and
international relations
-Status of economic
development
-Progress of political
and economic reforms
-Administrative
restructuring reform
and impacts
-Coordination of
climate policy with
other development
-Experience and
capacity in
implementing similar
policies
-Division of
responsibilities among
governmental agencies

-Development of the
Kyoto Protocol and its
mechanisms
-CDM Institutional and
organizational
development
-Development of global
carbon market

-Experience from
international joint
environmental policy
making
-Experience from targetoriented energy efficiency
programs

-Experience of adopting
market-based measures
-Priority areas of
developing CDM
projects
-Administrative
restructuring and impacts
-Domestic CDM
measures and changes
-CDM approval and
management
-Experience of CDM
Pilot Projects

-Economic Goals set by the
national government
-Energy and industry related
policies
-Administrative
restructuring and impacts
-Top-1000 Program design
and improvement
-Experience gained from
pilot projects in Shandong
-Imperative of enhancing
energy efficiency in
industrial sectors

The three contextual factors are also not independent from each other. Rather, a
complex combination of the contextual factors has led to the variations of policy
networks. In general, the development of international climate change regime and the
development of Chinese politics and economy are the most important determinants.
Furthermore, these contexts do not affect policy networks in the same way. For example,
although both the CDM project management and the Top-1000 Program were formally
initiated in the mid-2000s, the former case is more influenced by the international factors
of Kyoto Protocol’s entry into force and carbon market development, while the latter case
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is more determined by the imperatives of reducing the domestic energy consumption of
key industrial enterprises.
Since Case 2 and 3 are nested within Case 1, the national mitigation policy
development provides context for the cases of specific policy arrangements. Furthermore,
experience and knowledge accumulated from international and domestic practices are
common factors of the three cases and affect existing policy systems and actor
relationships.
8.2.2 Structural and Interactive Features of Policy Networks
Policy networks play a crucial role in shaping responses to external factors. As
presented in the cases, a variety of state, market and civil society actors have been
involved in policy processes. The state actors include the central governing apparatus
(mainly the State Council, and the numerous commissions and ministries affiliated with
the State Council), the provincial and local governments, and diverse kinds of civil
society actors (research institutions, universities, public media, NGOs, etc.). Table 8.3
summarizes the extent of the involvement of some of the key actors presented in the three
cases.
Since Case 1 dealt with the general climate change policy process, the State
Council, which receives substantial input from ministries and commissions, leads policy
formulation and development, as well as policy implementation. Among the ministerial
level, a coordination committee has been evolving, focusing on the issues of economic
development, international negations, and national mitigation and adaptation strategies.
Among ministerial agencies, the NDRC is the core agency in coordinating and advancing
domestic climate policy process.
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Table 8.3 Levels of Actor Involvement in Climate Policy Making in Three Cases
Actors

Case 1

Case 2

Case 3

The State Council
++
/
NDRC
++
++
MOFA
++
++
MOST
+
++
SEPA/MEP
+
/
SMA and CAS
+
/
Provincial governments
+ (after 2007)
+ (after 2007)
Research institutes, universities,
+
+
think tanks, etc.
Industrial Associations
+
/
Large-scaled enterprises
+
+
Other Industrial enterprises
+
+
Public media
+
+
Traditional NGOs
/
/
Market intermediaries
+
+
Scale: ++: very strong influence; +: moderately strong influence; /: Some influence but not
directly

+
++
/
/
+
/
++
+
+
+
/
+
/
/
strong or not

Case 2 and Case 3 deal with two specific policy arrangements: Case 2 focuses
on the national response of the international carbon emission trading system, while Case
3 focuses on domestic industrial energy efficiency enhancement issues. Both cases were
adopted at the same period. The two departments within the NDRC play as the key actors
in managing the two programs: the Department of Climate Change (also the Secretariat
of the NCCLG) for the CDM project management and the Department of Resource
Conservation and Environmental Protection (also the Secretariat of the NECERLG) for
the Top-1000 Program.
The provincial governments have been playing increased roles in supervising
the program implementation. For the CDM case, studies show that since 2007, many
provinces have become enthusiastic in promoting CDM project development (e.g., Qi et
al. 2008), even though the project approval decision is still made by the National CDM
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Board at the central level. As for the case of the Top-1000 Program, the engagement of
provincial governments in energy conservation is through contract signing with involved
enterprises and accepting annual performance evaluation by the central government.
Comparatively, the provincial governments have a higher involvement in the policy
process in Case 3.
Market and civil society actors are important policy implementers, thus their
involvement influences policy processes and outcomes. However, their roles and levels
of involvement vary depending on the forms of the policy arrangements. Under the CDM
scheme, attracted by the potential benefits from carbon trading, market and some civil
soceity actors are spontaneously involved in the activities. Their performance is affected
by the interplaying factors of carbon prices in the market and the extent of government
interventions. The role of the government is to regulate the trading behaviors and ensure
that the projects contribute to sustainable development. Alternatively, under the Top1000 Program, the provincial governments and involved enterprises are networked by the
mandatory targets. The members of the actor network increase when more rigorous
targets are set to accomplish. Whereas detailed award and punishment rules have been
made to strengthen administrative management, few market-based measures and
incentives have been provided to strengthen the effective cooperation between local
governments and enterprises.
8.2.3 Policy Outcomes
This section analyzes the policy outcomes of the three cases from two general
criteria: effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness is analyzed by the extent how the
policy arrangements are consistent with the more general policy goals and the extent to
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which the objectives of the policy arrangements have been achieved. Legitimacy is
evaluated from the accessibility of actors and the communicative quality of participation.
China does not accept a binding commitment on carbon emission reductions. Its
climate change mitigation policy is to emphasize its position as a developing country and
the validity of following the principle of “common but differentiated responsibility and
capacity” in international climate negotiations. Realizing its increased carbon emissions
due to rapid economic growth, China has made continued effort in limiting the growth of
energy intensity, and actively participated in international climate change negotiations
and cooperation. The CDM project development and the Top-1000 Program are
important activities within China’s climate change policy framework. Table 8.4 shows
the objectives and performance of the three presented cases.
Generally, the three cases have shown China’s transition towards proactiveness
in promoting climate change mitigation activities. Case 1 and 2 do not have compulsory
quantitative targets to reach; therefore, China’s activities are actually voluntary. The
implicit purpose is to balance the economic development and emissions reductions and
gain co-benefits from them. Furthermore, China’s position towards active participation
and international cooperation also reflects that the country is sensitive to its international
image of a rapidly growing power. For Case 3, the Program was initially implemented
with a clear but fixed quantitative energy-saving target; however, when the proposed
target had been achieved, the program failed in providing further incentives to the involve
actors to save energies. In addition, unlike the CDM project development, the calculation
of the amounts of real energy conservation in the Top-1000 Program case lacks rigorous
measurement and verification.
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Table 8.4 Effectiveness of Policy Arrangements in Three Cases
Policy
Effectiveness
Included
Policies

Attributes

Policy
Objectives

Leading
Agency
Consistency
with Other
Policies

Performance
and
Objective
Accomplishme
nt

Follow-up
Activities

Case 1
A series of climatespecific and climaterelated policies
Various types: regulatory
instruments, incentives,
voluntary agreements,
public investment, etc.
- to promote energy
conservation and enhance
energy efficiency
-to promote renewable
energy development
-to reduce energy
intensity by 20% during
2005-2010
The State Council and
cabinet ministries
The energy intensity
reduction objective is
consistent with goals set
in the Five-year Plan.
China had reduced its
energy intensity by 15.6%
at the end of 2009, and
the 20% reduction goal is
within reach (Xie 2010).
The final result was
19.1% reduction by 2010.
The 2020 carbon emission
intensity goals have been
set and will be
decomposed into
provinces

Case 2

Case 3

The Interim Measures in
2004; formal Measures in
2005 and other related
adjustments
Domestic response to the
international market-based
emission trading scheme

Top-1000 Industrial
Energy Conservation
Program and related
measures
Domestic regulatory
policy with voluntary
features

- to streamline the project
approval process
- to promote the CDM
project development and
contribute to sustainable
development

- the involved 1008
enterprises should reach
the aggregate energy
saving of 100 million
tons during 2006-2010

The NDRC, MOST, and
MOFA
- the priority areas were
identified encourage CDM
projects

The NDRC

- No quantitative CDM
development targets.
- The leading CDM host
country in the world
- Positive impacts on
China’s sustainable
development
- Be consistent with priority
areas.
- Further actions depend on
the development of
international climate regime
- Possibility in initialing
domestic carbon emission
system

- The Program becomes
part of national action
in reducing energy
intensity
By the end of 2008, an
aggregate energy saving
of 106.2 million tce has
been reached. Thus the
original objective was
achieved two years in
advance.
The enterprise energy
efficiency activities will
be incorporated in the
provincial target setting

In terms of the legitimacy of the policy arrangements, the three cases have
shown the improved involvement of various actors in policy making processes. The
climate change coordination committee has extended to cover more than 20 ministerial
agencies, and effective mitigation activities have been implemented with the adoption of
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policies and measures. The information concerning the development of climate change
regime and its relevance to China’s policy and practices has been widely reported by
public media and become more accessible to the public. Another significant feature is the
growing power of local governments and government-operated research institutions in
shaping the relevant policies and providing feedback advice for policy change. However,
as shown in Case 2 and 3, the governmental actors are still dominating the policy
discussion and decision making, with little participation from business actors. Important
information about policy progress and possible disputes is lacking due to issues of
transparency and openness.
8.2.4 Key Features of Climate Change Mitigation Policy Process in China
When treating policy making as a dynamic process, multiple case studies have
reflected some key features of Chinese climate change mitigation policy process, as
indicated in the following:.
•

Encouraging policy experiment and diffusion
In China, climate change policy making, implementation, and coordination is

complex and actor participation is dispersed over many different levels and sectors. To
ensure policy practicability and consistency, China normally begins with testing policies
or programs on a smaller scale. Once pilot projects prove to be successful, the experience
and practices will be diffused on a large scale and will involve more actors. As needed,
necessary improvement and adjustment will be made. The CDM project development
takes this approach, starting from the AIJ cooperation projects and CDM capacity
building projects and later moving to projects that can be certified and traded in the
market. China’s Top-1000 Program adopted in 2006 represents an exemplary case. The
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Program is derived from experience gained in two voluntary pilot projects implemented
in Shandong Province (Price and Wang 2007). The most recent case is the launch of the
Locality Low Carbon Pilot Program. To explore an effective low-carbon governance
system nationwide, five provinces and eight cities have been selected by the NDRC to
promote energy conservation and emission reduction (People’s Daily 2010).
•

Active employment of policy tools
The importance of climate mitigation policy is seen in the adoption and

implementation of a series of regulatory, financial and information-based climate change
policies (NDRC 2007; Richerzhagen and Scholz 2008). New policy tools include
voluntary agreements and carbon market trading. These reflect the changes in statesociety relations and government-market relations. The adoption of new policy tools
exerts influence over the structure of the network, as well as the behaviors and
interactions of the actors involved. The case studies have shown China’s proactiveness in
promoting innovative policy tools.
•

The central government’s strong roles in the policy process
The strong dominance of the central government ensures the state’s ability to

develop policy in a significant and large-scale way. The cases reflect that in China, the
transformation of the climate mitigation issue from the international level to the local
level is highly reliant on the mandates of Chinese central government. Debates exist
concerning to what extent localities can be freed to make decisions; however, the
capacity building, information dissemination, and technological assistance are all reliant
on the mobilization and support of the central government. The current climate mitigation
policy making process has been institutionalized. Comparatively, Chinese administrative
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bureaucracies, which influenced by the Communist Party, are less influenced or
pressured by interests groups or other external political forces. Their institutional features
can facilitate policy making and promote effective policy implementation, although they
may harm the interests of other groups in an “implicit” manner by minimizing their
ability to influence policymaking.
•

More focus on the action network development
In China, decision making takes place from a top-down approach. However, the

policy making process in China remains flexible, even though it may not be transparent
to less informed outsiders; thus the analysis of structural and interactive features of actor
networks is more focused on the policy implementation stage. The decision makers attach
importance to the effectiveness of the policy implementation and are ready to make
changes on the basis of past successes or failures. For this purpose, a variety of civil
society actors, especially actors from academic institutions and universities have been
encouraged to get involved in the policy process as a way to link policy implementation
with potential policy changes.
8.3 Reflections on the Fragmented Authoritarianism Model
After having summarized findings of case studies through the within-case
analysis and the cross-case analysis, this section addresses the general policy making
process issue by verifying whether the widely referred to fragmented authoritarianism
model is still viable to explain the climate change mitigation policy process in
contemporary China.
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As introduced in Chapter 2, the fragmented authoritarianism model was
developed to capture the main features of the Chinese policy making process. According
to the model, despite the authoritarian nature of the Chinese political system, in most
cases, the bureaucratic structure of authority below the very peak of the Chinese political
system is highly fragmented. Consensus building is central to the policy process, and the
policy processes are protracted, disjointed and incremental (Lieberthal and Oksenberg
1988, 22-24). Lieberthal (1992) further argues fragmentation and disjointedness in
decision making is structurally based and has been enhanced by reform policies regarding
procedures. In addition, the fragmented authoritarianism model recognizes the impacts of
procedural changes on the decision making under the reform: the extent to which
bureaucratic organs respond in disciplined fashion to instructions from higher levels has
been reduced (Lieberthal 1992, 9).
According to Lieberthal (1992, 10), “the fragmented authoritarianism model
acknowledges the great insights offered from elite-oriented rational-actor approaches and
from a cellular conception of the system.” And it “adds a third necessary ingredient to the
equations: the structure of bureaucratic authority and the realities of bureaucratic practice
that affect both the elite and the basic building blocks of the system”.
However, the stereotypical characteristics of the fragmented authoritarianism
model do not totally fit with the empirical findings from these case studies of China’s
climate change policy development. In fact, to a significant degree, the development of
China’s climate change mitigation policies have shown some features that might raise
question about some aspects of the fragmented authoritarianism model.
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First, although various bureaucracies have been involved in policy formulation
and implementation stages, which certainly increased difficulties to achieve agreement
among an array of bodies; however, there is clear division of responsibilities among
government units and policy communities formed around generic and specific climate
change mitigation policies. Government is often the initiator, and later, the manager of
the policy networks; and the central government dominates the policy process. Such
“networked” communities cut across formal bureaucratic lines and evolve with policy
development. In addition, since governments at lower levels generally accepted the
targets set by the upper-level government and have been seriously trying to accomplish
the objectives, little evidence indicates that bureaucratic agencies involved in policy
process are trying to promote and protect their own interests and compete with others.
Although there remain complaints and disputes from provinces about the distribution of
energy intensity reduction shares, the central government has responded with persuasion
and some adjustments. The aggregate targets have not been lowered.
Second, the fragmented authoritarianism model, through studies of economic
decision making in China, argues the policy making process in China is protracted,
disjointed, and incremental because of the structural fragmentation and procedural
bargaining. However, the case study findings showed that the policy making process is
not always slow in China and that beyond structural and procedural features of
government institutions, there are other factors that have influenced the responsiveness of
decision making. These include pressures and assistance from the international
community; actions of developed countries and some developing countries, as well as the
environmental and resource constraints of domestic economic development.
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Third, the model gives much focus to the decision making of authority below
the very peak of the Chinese political system, and assumes that policies are the outcomes
after a series of negotiations, bargaining, and resource exchanges towards consensus
building. Alternatively, the policy network approach employed in this study views the
policy making process as a dynamic and iterative policy learning cycle. Due to a lack of
experience and consensus, policy making is most often action-oriented and takes a testand-trial approach. As the case studies have shown, most of the Chinese climate change
policies are shaped after long deliberation and continual improvement, derived from a
series of pilot projects. Given the sheer size and diversity of the country, the approach, to
some extent, breaks the deadlock of policy coordination and development. The
government leads the development of the action network. On the basis of information
feedback from policy implementation and advices gained from relevant actors, the
government makes policy adjustments and changes.
The fragmented authoritarianism model suggests that bargaining among
bureaucracies is the approach to create consensus to mitigate the conflicts of interests. It
makes no reference to Chinese cultural heritage. As a matter of fact, a cultural analysis
provides some explanations of why both hierarchy and consensus can simultaneously
apply in China. Culturally, China has the heritage of Confucius, which demands loyalty
and obedience. Subordinate disagreement and defiance are not tolerated in order to
maintain the image of unity. This may give the impression that the policy actor networks
in China are distinct from those of Western democracies and are more collaborative,
which definitely reduces the costs for policy bargaining and persuasion, but this may also
be the result of a situation of feigned compliance (Pye 1992; Nordqvist 2007). Currently,
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the information is still limited and less accessible as regards the extent and permanence of
the consensus reached among all involved government, market, and civil society actors.
It is undeniable that by adding structural and procedural ingredients into
consideration, the fragmented authoritarianism model has enhanced our understanding of
the Chinese policy process. However, to strengthen its explanatory power and incorporate
important observations and conclusions from the case studies, the prescribed focus on the
structures among government agencies shall be expanded. Gaining insights from the
policy network approach, Figure 8.1 suggests some broader relationships that have
emerged with China’s market-oriented reform and integration into the world economy,
and deserve future in-depth study. In addition, the roles and influences of the Communist
Party and cultural values should be considered.

Focus of the FA model:

Government

Relations between
Government
and
Business

Other factors:

-Relations between center and localities
-Relations among bureaucratic agencies

Relations between
State and Society

- Culture/values
- CCP

Market

Civil Society
Relations between
business and society

Note: FA-Fragmented Authoritarianism; CCP

Figure 8.1 Relationships among Actors in Expanded Policy Networks
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It should be noted that although China has become more active in promoting
climate change mitigation policies and action, the overall strategies to deal with
international climate regime negotiations are still hesitant and cautious. Fearing that more
action might cause more commitment and that the international regimes established by
the developed countries might damage the country’s interests, the Chinese central
government has acted strategically to protect its economic and political autonomy. This
explains why even though many innovative policies and measures have been introduced,
they are complementary options designed to achieve broader development goals.
Through cooperative governance and collective action, the Chinese government believes
it can build consensus with core economic sectors and retain core political values which it
believes will fit its needs and the society in the long run.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
In this last chapter, a concluding analysis of the implications of the policy
network approach and the case studies of the emergence and implementation of climate
change mitigation policies in China will be made. This chapter is divided into four
sections. Following this introductory section, Section 9.1 presents conclusions drawn
from the three detailed case studies of different mitigation policy arrangements. Next,
limitations of the study are discussed. Finally, in Section 9.3, suggestions for future
research are presented.
9.1 General Conclusions
Guided by the policy network analytic framework, and through performing
three case studies, this study examines the historical development of China’s climate
change mitigation policy making process. The within-case analysis was conducted to
verify the hypotheses concerning causal relationships among key policy network
constructs. The cross-case analysis was taken to compare the key features of policy
process related with different policy arrangements. The generalized findings were
subsequently used to study the viability of the fragmented authoritarianism model in
analyzing current policy process in China.

In general, major conclusions to be

formulated on the basis of this study can be summarized as follows:
First, although Chinese climate change mitigation policy outcomes cannot be
claimed to be an unambiguous success, the increased openness of the policy network in
China, reflected from the wider accessibility and involvement of the state actors and non-
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state actors, can be positively related with the proactive engagement in promoting policy
performance. The aspect of the openness of networks proved to be improved in all three
cases, as seen from the fact that since the mid-2000s, local governments and various nonstate actors have been more involved in the policy development, especially at the policy
implementation stage. Generally speaking, greater openness of network relations, linked
by either market forces or regulative forces, appeared to induce positive policy outcomes
and they allowed for pragmatic participation and resource exchange. However, too great
an openness of networks may potentially bring higher levels of conflicts, thus eventually
weakening efficiency and effectiveness, and add difficulties to consensus-building and
cooperation within the network.
Second, under the Chinese unitary political regime, the state actors, especially
the central government, play paternalistic roles in the climate change policy making
process by setting up initiatives to encourage exchange and cooperation among various
players. The Chinese government has established the coordination committee in the late
1980s to integrate relevant policies and coordinate international negotiations and
domestic action. To better coordinate the interests of various parties, the State Council
has led the coordination committee and promoted energy intensity reduction activities.
The strong dominance of central government in the policy making process, on the one
hand, facilitates the application and diffusion of carbon emission reduction activities; on
the other hand, it limits the full exertion of market forces and induces negative impacts on
the formation of authentic voluntary agreements, which are jointly developed and
implemented by government and the regulated actors.
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Third, with respect to the emergence and functioning of climate change
mitigation policy arrangements, it can be concluded that domestic factors weigh more
than international contextual factors and the policy-specific factors. This should not be
surprising in that China is still in the process of urbanization and industrialization, and
does not accept any obligatory emission reduction commitment unless the developed
countries take the lead in doing what it perceives to be their duties. On the other hand, the
reforms of Chinese political system have provided more space and freedom for selecting
innovative policy instruments and measures, and improving policy effectiveness by
valuing policy evaluation and incremental change.
Fourth, although the fragmented authoritarianism model, as a popular policy
process model, depicts the impacts of China’s decision-making actor network structure
on its policy process, it has some difficulties in explaining China’s current climate change
policy making process, which is characterized by the fact that China has established and
continuously been retrofitting its institutionalized policy making system. In the Chinese
context, the climate change policy process can be seen as action-oriented, incremental,
and heavily relying on trial and error exercises. This is because from a dynamic
perspective, policy development is also a learning process as all the involved actors seek
to manage conflicts and accumulate experience for achieving goals.
Fifth, with respect to the application of the policy network approach in studying
the policy process, it can be concluded that the approach can be used to reflect the
institutional features of the Chinese policy making system. Although in general, the
Chinese policy structure is fairly hierarchical, the system is adapting to the changes and
reshaping influences. The study of the Chinese “policy network” serves as a means to
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investigate how these actors interact and to help explain the dynamics of their functions
in the policy development process. Networks exist when the actors have differentiated
power and resources and they are dependent on others to reach goals. Of course, the
policy network in China has distinctive features. Notably, the policy network approach
does not provide the full story of policy development and change. Certain factors such as
capacity and cultural features need to be integrated in the study. In addition, given the
complexity and randomness of natural events, the causal relations implicit in the policy
network model are better to be taken as “probabilistic”, rather than “deterministic”.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning here that this comprehensive examination of
China’s climate change mitigation policy development treats policymaking as an
interactive and learning process, and the explanation is from a Chinese perspective. As
an important determinant of policy processes and changes, policy performance evaluation
has a stake in the understanding of policy development. However, no real consensus has
been reached as regards the evaluation of China’s performance in climate change
mitigation policy and action. Because the relevant discussions are mixed with disputes on
ethics, equitability, and moral values, it makes an objective evaluation of policy
performance very difficult, if not almost impossible. China insists that because of its
status as a developing country, priority should be given to development and developed
countries should take the lead in terms of mitigation activities. Such a stance and
viewpoint has been supported by a majority of Chinese government officials, researchers
and the public; however, this viewpoint has been increasingly challenged by other
countries. To reconcile the controversy over the evaluation of China’s actural policy
performance, more international exchange and cooperation is likely to enhance the
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country’s mitigative capacity and readiness to be more responsible. Similarly, more indepth analyses of process-oriented policy study, combining theoretical reflections and
historical and empirical examinations are needed. In this regard, it is fair to say that this
study provides an explanation of China’s climate change policy making process with the
emphasis more on Chinese viewpoints and is designated to supplement the ongoing
discourse in the Western academia.
9.2 Limitations of the Study
The research has made a significant step forward in explaining China’s climate
change mitigation policy development by adopting the policy network approach and
employing multiple-case study method. It has contributed to a better understanding of the
dynamics of policy making process in contemporary China; however, the following
limitations should be pointed out.
First, the study largely relies on the case study approach, and three cases are
selected. However, the latter two cases are nested within the first case. Although the
CDM project management case and the Top-1000 Program case do deepen our
understanding of the policy making process beyond generic national policy arrangements
and contribute to the generalization of some important findings, the two cases are not
parallel with the first one, making the cross-case comparison lack validity. In addition,
with more policies and measures being adopted and implemented, to gain greater access
across these specific policy arrangements could have revealed further findings of process
features, but could have been impossible with the constraints of time and resources
available.
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Second, the policy network analytic framework has been employed to guide the
search for empirical evidence in the three cases. Although the adopted framework
provides the required structure and direction to address the research questions, it only
covers some broad construct factors to simplify the complexity of policy processes, and
may lose some other important messages that did not fit the model. As seen from the case
studies, the issue of mitigation capacity in China has been neglected, but it is undoubtedly
the basis for policy development and decision making. Moreover, the framework is
developed as a causal model, which has strong power in making a controlled comparison
to draw causal inferences, but it is more preferable to identify the historical juncture point
in advance. When the long timeline of policy development is considered, policy
outcomes are more often influenced by complicated “historical and institutional” factors
that could not be easily identified by the model itself.
Third, in this study, the policy network in the policy-making process is heavily
focused on formal relationships among institutional members. In reality, the formal
networks among institutions are intertwined with individual networks, such as kinship,
colleagueship, and “Guanxi” (personal relationships); and the relationships between
network members are not rigid and linked by other strands, depending on specific policy
issues. Future research is needed to observe and study how these multi-strand networks
are connected, interrelated, and evolved in shaping and influencing policies.
Fourth, compared with Western democracies, the divisions of actors into
government, private sector, and civil society in studying a Chinese “network” is not
without controversy. How independent are these actors? Doesn’t the Chinese government
have strong influences on business and civil society? Over-dependence on the
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government makes the analysis of other actors’ independent attributes or behaviors (e.g.,
preference) very difficult. To what extent is or should the actor network be integrated is
an unavoidable puzzle that the country continues to address and hopes to solve through
its policy reforms.
Lastly, although a series of interviews and site visits have been conducted, the
accessibility to high-level officials proved to be difficult and a transparent policy
processing system is still lacking and remains a very sensitive issue in China, especially
at the decision making stage. Most Chinese interviewees showed their sympathies for
China’s current active behavior (though they have not been better recognized by the
international community), instead of having great interest in discussing the process issues.
In the Chinese context, to get access to governmental officials or other key persons,
researchers need the ability to build and develop personal relationships and gain their
trust. At the same time, the ability to deal with the access problem will also depend on
government’s willingness in promoting administrative reforms towards more
accountability and transparency.
9.3 Suggestions for Future Research
China’s development is changing itself and influencing the world. To examine
China’s climate change policy making process, one must go beyond the understanding of
“what has happened”, but “how” and “why” these have happened in such manners. By
doing so, one also provides an empirical case for further understanding the changing
political and policy system in China. Although the study generates some useful results,
they are not exhaustive, and it opens up a number of future research directions.
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To understand China’s climate change policy process not only depends on the
theories that link the potential variables, but also requires rigorous empirical evidence to
verify relevant theories. Currently, the explanatory functions of using policy network
theory need to be strengthened; potential variables that have impact on policy processes
need to be identified. On the other hand, the multiplicity and complexity of causes of
social phenomena make it difficult to explain with one single approach; therefore, it is
important for the policy network approach to combine or complement other explanatory
paths.
The analysis of the policy network can be conducted in a quantitative and
formal way, and this has induced growing academic interest. In general, such type of
analysis, the so-called social network analysis, is descriptive in nature; but it can
graphically portray the structures of issue-specific networks based on the collected
attribute data of actors. Social network analysis is conductive to the understanding of
network structures and interactions, and even the corresponding changes if dynamic
model is used; therefore, the method deserves more attention.
One of the foci of the research is on studying the roles and functions of
networks. Under the context of global efforts to mitigate climate change impacts,
comparative research on mitigation policy formulation and implementation between
China and other countries is needed in order to share relevant experiences. In addition,
more thorough research on comparing the outcomes of different policy arrangements
deserves further attention.
Another interesting topic remaining for further research is the issue of climate
change governance, which has been heatedly discussed in recent years. Governance
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addresses the “interrelated and increasingly integrated system of formal and informal
rules, rule-making systems, and actor networks at all levels of human society (from local
to global)” (Biermann et al. 2009). This study of China’s climate change mitigation
policy process has great relevance for the governance study. Among other things, one of
the major difficulties in governance study is that, unlike many Western developed
countries, China is a moving target, a state undertaking radical changes. Therefore,
further research on governance is needed to reflect the dynamics of the political regime
and the changes within the state and the society.
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